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The idea for this book came from discussions at kitchen tables in the former 
Soviet  Union. While conducting earlier research, I lived with families who regu-
larly described the struggles they faced as a result of the demise of the Soviet 
welfare state and, in many countries, the smaller economic roles that their new, 
market- oriented governments played. No longer did their governments guaran-
tee them employment, housing, higher education, and other necessities. While 
the families celebrated the po liti cal freedoms that the collapse of the Soviet 
 Union brought, they lamented the loss of economic guarantees. After research-
ing the po liti cal changes brought about by the collapse, I turned to an examina-
tion of how people  were coping with the economic transformation. I am grateful 
to these dear friends and welcoming families for sharing their daily experiences 
with me.
I also extend my thanks to the 266 individuals who shared their experiences 
more formally through interviews and observational studies that I conducted, 
and to the 4,500 Central Asians who participated in mass surveys that a team and 
I completed.
The coleader of that survey team was Pauline Jones Luong. I am grateful that 
she too was concerned about the paucity of data about Central Asia and enthusi-
astic about conducting surveys to help rectify that. We both appreciate the as-
sistance of the Kazakhstani research fi rm BRIF in administering the surveys.
Two additional colleagues  were instrumental in this project. Henry Hale sug-
gested corruption as a frame when he read a conference paper I wrote early on. As 
the title of the book indicates, this was a recommendation that stuck. I am in-
debted to Andrew Barnes for many suggestions about different parts of the proj-
ect over time and for comments on an early version of the complete manuscript.
I also appreciate suggestions from those who read parts of the book or the 
papers that preceded it: Laura Adams, Catherine Boone, Allen Hicken, Kathryn 
Hochstetler, Michael Johnston, Pauline Jones Luong, Marcus Kurtz, Joel Migdal, 
Jessica Pisano, Susan Stokes, Daniel Treisman; and colleagues at Case Western 
Reserve University, Karen Beckwith, Justin Buchler, Brian Gran, Samantha Hill, 
Kathryn Lavelle, Pete Moore, Elliot Posner, and Joseph White. Justin Buchler 
provided helpful statistical advice repeatedly and enthusiastically as well. I ap-
preciate the useful suggestions that two anonymous reviewers and the Cornell 
University Press faculty Board of Editors provided in the fi nal stages.
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a talented set of Case undergraduates: Philip Kehres, Alexandra Klyachkina, 
Bhavani Raveendran, Sarah Tremont, Andrew Wolf, and— two students who 
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versity. NCEEER’s support was particularly essential as it provided signifi cant 
funding to complete the mass surveys. None of these organizations is responsible 
for the views expressed  here. I also thank SAGE Publications for permission to 
reproduce information from my article “Market Reform as a Stimulus to Par-
ticularistic Politics,” Comparative Po liti cal Studies 42, no. 7 (2009): 971– 94.
This book would also not have been possible without the support of Cornell 
University Press Executive Editor Roger Haydon. I am grateful for the interest he 
took in the manuscript and the time he devoted to reading it carefully and mak-
ing numerous helpful suggestions.
The support of my family was also invaluable. My husband’s parents, Theo-
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I dedicate this book to him.
    xiii
Note on Transliteration
I transliterated Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek names and words from their Russi-
fi ed forms using the Library of Congress system of Rus sian transliteration. I also 
relied on the Library of Congress system for transliterating Rus sian names and 
words. For all of the languages I used a more common spelling, if one existed, for 
well- known names and words (for example, oblast instead of oblast’).
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AN ABSENCE OF ALTERNATIVES
A New Framework for Understanding Corruption
“I do not like to give bribes,” Marzhan, a villager in Kazakhstan, said to me. She 
was explaining why she avoids seeking assistance from government offi cials. In-
stead, when she needs money, credit, or employment, she relies on her uncle 
Kanat, a successful private farmer.1 Her experience illustrates a fundamental point 
about corruption: individuals contemplate alternatives before deciding to engage 
in corrupt behaviors. Government offi cials’ demands, in effec tive laws, cultural 
norms, or economic needs do not automatically propel ordinary citizens into illicit 
exchanges with offi cials, as studies of corruption have implied. Rather, citizens 
consider whether relatives, groups in society, the market, or formal government 
programs can provide them with the resources they need.
From this insight about alternatives to corruption, this book makes two argu-
ments about its causes. First, when essential goods and ser vices are not available 
from alternative sources, individuals engage in corrupt behaviors to try to acquire 
what they need from government offi cials. Second, market reform— policies to 
decrease state economic intervention— can limit these alternatives and thus en-
courage corruption. The fi rst argument reveals the absence of alternative goods 
and ser vices as a cause of corruption, and the second argument offers an explana-
tion for why the absence exists. Together, the arguments constitute an “absence- 
of- alternatives framework” for studying corruption.
1. Marzhan and Kanat are pseudonyms used in order to protect the individuals’ privacy. Their 
comments and descriptions of their experiences appear throughout the book. Other ordinary Cen-
tral Asians who appear multiple times in the book also have pseudonyms. I refer to others by their 
positions or other descriptors. Author’s interview (#161), Kazakhstan, July 22, 2001.
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The corruption this book examines is petty corruption— ordinary citizens’ 
use of bribes, personal connections, and promises of po liti cal support to try to 
secure small quantities of goods or ser vices from low- level government offi cials. 
My focus on petty corruption is a departure from existing studies, most of which 
examine grand corruption, or illicit exchanges of large quantities of goods and 
ser vices between high- ranking offi cials and businesspeople. Although the book 
examines petty corruption, its arguments are also relevant to grand corruption. 
Through the absence- of- alternatives framework, this book provides a new way 
to understand, and ultimately reduce, both types of corruption.
The Absence- of- Alternatives Framework
The absence- of- alternatives framework emphasizes that citizens’ decisions about 
whether or not to offer bribes and favors to government offi cials are as impor-
tant as offi cials’ calculations about whether to demand them. Existing theories of 
corruption have focused on government offi cials’ incentives and capacity, over-
looking citizens— the other half of corrupt exchanges. The absence- of- alternatives 
approach also highlights the importance of family, societal, and market resources— 
not simply state resources— in citizens’ decisions. Earlier theories have examined 
the availability of state resources for corruption but ignored the fact that, from a 
citizen’s perspective, the value of goods and ser vices from the state depends, in part, 
on the possibility of obtaining them from other sources.
An additional advantage of the absence- of- alternatives framework is its abil-
ity to solve two puzzles concerning corruption. The book’s fi rst argument pro-
vides an answer to a puzzle neglected by prior studies of corruption: why do 
some individuals in countries where corruption is rampant rarely or never en-
gage in illicit exchanges? It demonstrates that some individuals within a country 
have greater access than others to alternative resources, and this enables them to 
avoid corruption. The fi rst argument also accounts for variation in corruption 
across countries— the puzzle that corruption studies typically tackle. Specifi cally, 
in countries where alternative sources of essential goods and ser vices are more 
limited, corruption is more common.
Under what conditions are alternative resources scarce? While numerous 
factors may contribute to this scarcity, a leading cause in many countries is 
market reform; this is the book’s second argument. Market reform can under-
mine the ability of markets, societal groups, and families to provide essential 
goods and ser vices when two conditions are present: (1) states have previously 
exerted signifi cant economic control, and (2) reforms have failed to create in-
stitutions to strengthen markets, such as credit registries, judicial systems, and 
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antimonopoly policies. When market reforms are introduced under these two 
conditions, market actors and societal groups start from scratch with few re-
sources and limited opportunities to increase them. At the same time, market 
reform reduces many families’ resources: price liberalization results in higher 
prices that drain families’ savings, and economic restructuring closes or down-
sizes ineffi cient enterprises that once employed family members. Under this set 
of circumstances, essential goods and ser vices are not readily available from 
markets, societal actors, and extended family. Simultaneously, market reform, 
regardless of the two conditions, eliminates formal government programs, so 
the state provides fewer needed goods and ser vices. Unable to readily obtain 
essential goods and ser vices from markets, societal actors, extended family, or 
formal government programs, most citizens try to acquire them illicitly from 
government offi cials. Yet some individuals have relatives who have benefi ted 
from market reform, so they can rely on assistance from kin and avoid corrup-
tion. Market reform under the two conditions accounts for both resource scar-
city in a country and some individuals’ greater access to those resources that 
do exist.
These circumstances have existed in many countries of the world. The two 
conditions, a legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention and weak or ab-
sent market- enhancing institutions,  were very common as market reform spread 
around the world in the late twentieth century. The socialist, and to a lesser ex-
tent the state- led capitalist development, programs of the mid- twentieth century 
resulted in states with substantial control of their economies. And the version of 
market reform championed in the 1980s and 1990s emphasized the reduction of 
states’ economic roles rather than the creation of support institutions to ensure 
market competition. Individuals in such settings are often unable to obtain the 
goods and ser vices they need either through the state or from private actors. In 
these circumstances, they turn to corruption— it is their last resort.
By trading bribes or favors for essential resources, individuals can survive 
trying economic circumstances, but these illicit exchanges can also be harmful 
to society. These behaviors can reduce government legitimacy and effectiveness 
and increase economic in e qual ity and ineffi ciency. Although these exchanges 
constitute “petty” corruption because they involve small amounts of goods and 
ser vices, they are not inconsequential.
From the absence- of- alternatives approach it follows that a reduction in 
petty corruption requires attention to citizens, rather than just to government 
offi cials. Anticorruption strategies commonly call for a reduction in the resources 
available to government offi cials, a decrease in their discretion, and an increase 
in their accountability, but these approaches do not address citizens’ incentives 
to engage in corruption. Ordinary citizens must be able to acquire essential 
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resources through means other than illicit exchanges with government offi cials. 
Substitute resources have to be available from the market, groups in society, and 
extended family in order to stem corruption.
Existing Approach: The State 
as the Cause of Corruption
To underscore the novelty of this book’s arguments, consider how corruption 
and its relationship to market reform have been understood to date. A large por-
tion of corruption studies has concentrated on how characteristics of the state 
can enable government offi cials to engage in corruption.2 This body of work is 
valuable because it has illuminated the government side of corrupt exchanges, 
even though it has neglected the citizen side.3 Studies have found that an over-
bearing state, one with myriad responsibilities, provides offi cials with many 
opportunities to dole out government resources for personal gain.4 Works have 
also documented that a state with weak capacity cannot constrain offi cials from 
distributing resources in return for bribes and favors.5
Policymakers and scholars saw market reform fi rst as an antidote to an over-
bearing state and then as a cause of weak state capacity. As the economies of over-
2. Besides the two institutional theories examined  here, there are two others— those that focus 
on demo cratic institutions and those that examine decentralization. Subsequent chapters examine 
them as well as economic and cultural theories of corruption.
3. A new wave of this research provides additional value by distinguishing between politicians 
and their subordinates, either brokers or bureaucrats. See Susan C. Stokes, et al., Brokers, Voters, and 
Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Dan-
iel W. Gingerich, Po liti cal Institutions and Party- directed Corruption in South America: Stealing for the 
Team (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). One of the few scholars to examine both sides 
of the exchange is M. S. Alam, who has studied how ordinary citizens can counter government offi -
cials’ demands and attempts to benefi t personally from their positions. Yet, this approach also does 
not explore citizens’ incentives. M. Shahid Alam, “A Theory of Limits on Corruption and Some Ap-
plications,” Kyklos 48, no. 3 (1995): 419– 35.
4. Classics on the overbearing state include: Frances Hagopian, Traditional Politics and Regime 
Change in Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robert E. Klitgaard, Controlling 
Corruption (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 74– 75; Gordon Tullock, The Rent- 
Seeking Society, ed. Charles K. Rowley, vol. 5, The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2005).
5. A few of the many works that make this point include Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, 74– 
75; Susan  Rose- Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 12; Carolyn M. Warner, The Best System Money Can Buy: 
Corruption in the Eu ro pe an  Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007). Capacity refers to the 
ability of the state to implement offi cial goals despite social group opposition or challenging socio-
economic circumstances. Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Cur-
rent Research,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda 
Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3– 39,  here 9.
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bearing states failed to meet growth expectations, market reform became the 
standard solution. Overbearing states had developed in the twentieth century in 
many regions, including Africa, Asia, the Middle East, the Eastern bloc, and Latin 
America. Some overbearing states had their roots in colonial policies of granting 
governments broad powers and developing expansive civil ser vices. Later in the 
twentieth century many countries adopted socialist and state- led capitalist devel-
opment programs that further increased state responsibilities. In the 1980s, mar-
ket reform began to spread to most regions of the world, largely through training 
of these countries’ economists in Western universities and through programs of 
international lending institutions such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. The market reforms that countries adopted  were not identical, 
but they share enough similarities to make them a useful concept for my pur-
poses. Market reforms  were consistently characterized by withdrawals of states 
from their economies and the implementation of some or all of the following 
policies: privatization of state property, deregulation of industries, liberalization 
of trade, reduction of welfare expenditures, and increases in labor market fl exibil-
ity. The reforms  were meant to generate economic growth, in part, by reducing 
po liti cal corruption.6 The thinking was that a cutback in states’ responsibilities 
and resources would reduce opportunities for government offi cials to exchange 
state goods and ser vices, such as contracts and licenses, for bribes, favors, and po-
liti cal support. States would simply not be involved in these activities, and econo-
mies would instead be driven by market competition.
In practice, however, because implementing market reforms was itself an ad-
ditional responsibility for government offi cials, it could promote corruption. 
Research has shown that market reform initiatives generated new opportunities 
for government offi cials to exchange state goods and ser vices for personal bene-
fi ts.7 Privatization enabled government offi cials to receive bribes in exchange for 
access to property sales and price reductions. Offi cials also provided this access 
to members of their ethnic groups and par tic u lar individuals in society in order 
to maintain their po liti cal support.8 Government efforts to liberalize foreign 
6. Bela A. Balassa et al., Toward Renewed Economic Growth in Latin America (Washington, DC: 
Institute for International Economics, 1986), 30– 31; John Williamson, “What Washington Means by 
Policy Reform,” in Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? ed. John Williamson 
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), chap. 2,  here 8.
7. Pranab Bardhan, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” in Po liti cal Corruption: 
Concepts and Contexts, ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction, 2002), 331– 32; Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, Po liti cal Consequences of Crony Capitalism in-
side Rus sia (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010); Andrew Hall Wedeman, Double 
Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).
8. In other words, this is the maintenance of ethnic and clientelist networks. See, for example, 
Leslie Holmes, Rotten States? Corruption, Post- Communism, and Neoliberalism (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2006), 189– 90, 200;  Rose- Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 35– 38; Yan Sun, 
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trade and to permit private credit- lending enabled offi cials to illicitly sell licenses.9 
Government offi cials also could profi t from business people’s attempts to shape 
the new legislation that market reform required.10
Studies have demonstrated that market reform can also weaken state capacity 
to prevent and combat corruption.11 Market reform focused on downsizing the 
state and overlooked the importance of developing regulatory institutions, such 
as legal frameworks and in de pen dent judiciaries, for emerging markets. Re-
search has shown that government offi cials had new responsibilities to promote 
market reform, but not the regulatory institutions to constrain themselves. By 
scaling back the state, market reform could also weaken state capacity overall,12 
contributing to, among other problems, contradictory laws, in effec tive law en-
forcement, powerless judiciaries, poor tax collection, and inadequate welfare pro-
vision, each of which further encouraged corruption.13 Scholars now argue that 
creating regulatory institutions prior to market reform can prevent the growth 
of corruption.14 In practice, however, these regulatory institutions  were not estab-
lished in advance of reform. Moreover, some people still advocate fi ghting cor-
ruption primarily by downsizing states.15
Scholarship that focuses on state strength has provided a useful yet partial 
explanation for corruption. In describing government offi cials’ incentives and 
Corruption and Market in Contemporary China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 60; 
Morris Szeftel, “Misunderstanding African Politics: Corruption and the Governance Agenda,” Re-
view of African Po liti cal Economy 25, no. 76 (1998): 221– 40,  here 233; Warner, The Best System Money 
Can Buy, chap. 4.
 9. Rasma Karklins, The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post- Communist Societies (Ar-
monk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 22; Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China, 60– 62.
10. This lobbying has been labeled “state capture,” and it has generated numerous studies. For 
an overview, see Joel S. Hellman and Daniel Kaufman, “The In e qual ity of Infl uence,” in Building a 
Trustworthy State in Post- Socialist Transition, ed. János Kornai and Susan  Rose- Ackerman (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 100– 118,  here 100.
11. Quentin Reed, “Corruption in Czech Privatization: The Dangers of ‘Neo- Liberal’ Privatiza-
tion,” in Po liti cal Corruption in Transition: A Skeptic’s Handbook, ed. Stephen Kotkin and Andrâas 
Sajâo (Budapest: Central Eu ro pe an University Press, 2002), 261– 86; Szeftel, “Misunderstanding Af-
rican Politics,” 233.
12. Alena V. Ledeneva, How Rus sia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post- Soviet 
Politics and Business (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Szeftel, “Misunderstanding African 
Politics,” 233– 34.
13. According to this line of thought, the motivation for government offi cials and citizens to 
engage in illicit acts may be not only to take advantage of, but also to compensate for, weak state ca-
pacity. Ledeneva, How Rus sia Really Works, 24– 25.
14.  Rose- Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 42– 44; Susan  Rose- Ackerman, “Democracy 
and ‘Grand’ Corruption,” International Social Science Journal 48, no. 3 (2008): 365.
15. For example, Anders Åslund writes that after privatization, “The next step [to combating 
corruption in the former Eastern bloc] is to deprive the state apparatus of material resources by cut-
ting public expenditures.” Anders Åslund, How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central 
and Eastern Eu rope, Rus sia, and Central Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 252.
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resources, it overlooks citizens’ incentives and resources. Yet, corruption involves 
two parties: a state actor and a private actor. This book examines why individual 
citizens decide to engage in corruption.
Lessons from Central Asia, 
Implications for the World
To illustrate how individuals consider alternatives to corruption and how market 
reform affects those alternatives, I begin with an analysis of Central Asia and 
then extend the investigation to other regions of the world. Central Asia presents 
a critical case for the argument because it includes countries where, according to 
some observers, alternative sources of support might be expected to exist despite 
the implementation of market reform. The proliferation of Islamic organiza-
tions and secular charities in many Central Asian countries since in de pen dence 
has suggested to some region- watchers that citizens could turn to these organi-
zations and charities for assistance instead of to the state. Especially in countries 
where the states’ economic roles have shrunk as a result of market reform, these 
groups could be critical to citizens’ economic survival. However, data I have col-
lected in the region demonstrate that Islamic institutions and secular charities 
do not provide the type and scope of assistance citizens need. Instead, people use 
bribes, personal connections, and promises of po liti cal support to try to obtain 
help from government offi cials, especially when relatives cannot assist them. The 
nearly twenty years of evidence from the region also emphasizes the staying 
power of corruption: citizens continue to engage in illicit practices because alter-
natives remain limited.
Within Central Asia, I focus on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and draw a con-
trast with Uzbekistan. Since emerging as in de pen dent countries from the Soviet 
 Union in 1991, the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have undertaken 
market reform, but the government of Uzbekistan has not. The governments of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have privatized small fi rms, land, and pensions; de-
regulated wages; and “liberalized” or reduced restrictions on the conversion of 
currency, trade, and the movement of interest rates and prices.16 In Uzbekistan, 
by contrast, “the government continues to rule out fundamental market- oriented 
reform.”17 In fact, according to one regional expert, “Uzbekistan’s economic 
16. World Bank and International Finance Corporation, Doing Business in 2004: Understanding 
Regulation (Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2004); Eu ro pe an Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, “Transition Report 2004: Infrastructure” (London, 2004).
17. Eu ro pe an Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Transition Report 2005: Business in 
Transition” (London, 2005).
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reform program has been distinguished by the effort to retain the state as the key 
actor and manager in the Uzbekistan economy.”18 Details about Kazakhstan’s 
and Kyrgyzstan’s market reforms and Uzbekistan’s lack of them appear in 
chapter four.
While the causal factor, market reform, exists only in Kazakhstan and Kyr-
gyzstan, the two conditions— a legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention 
and weak or absent market- enhancing institutions— are present in all three 
countries, as indicated in Table 1.1. As former Soviet republics, each country 
experienced substantial state economic intervention. The Soviet party- state 
owned the means of production, distributed capital, set prices, directed labor, 
and produced goods and ser vices. Since the countries have become in de pen dent, 
none of the three governments has created effective institutions to strengthen 
markets.
As the argument predicts and the later evidence shows, citizens in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan are more likely than their counterparts in Uzbekistan to com-
pete for state goods and ser vices to meet their basic needs, and this competition 
is characterized by bribery, favoritism, and clientelism.19 Individuals in Uzbeki-
stan have typically received basic state provisions without competing. This fi nd-
ing does not mean that corruption does not exist in Uzbekistan,20 but simply 
that corruption to meet everyday needs has been less common in Uzbekistan, 
where market reform has not been implemented. Nor should the reader con-
clude that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan  were free of corruption in the Soviet era. 
Corruption did exist in the Soviet era, but market reform reshaped who engages 
in illicit practices and why. These independence- era economic policies have had 
a more signifi cant effect than Soviet experiences have had on citizens’ decisions 
about whether to engage in corruption to meet basic needs.
18. Gregory Gleason, Markets and Politics in Central Asia: Structural Reform and Po liti cal Change 
(New York: Routledge, 2003), 119.
19. Clientelism is “the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the 
criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?” Susan C. 
Stokes, “Po liti cal Clientelism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed. Carles Boix and 
Susan C. Stokes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 604– 27.
20. For a discussion of illicit practices in Uzbekistan other than corruption to meet everyday 
needs, including fi rms’ experiences paying bribes related to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, 
government contracts, and adjudication as well as personal enrichment by high- ranking offi cials, see 
World Bank, “Trends in Corruption and Regulatory Burden in Eastern Eu rope and Central Asia” 
(Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2011); 
Alisher Ilkhamov, “Neopatrimonialism, Factionalism and Patronage in Post- Soviet Uzbekistan,” in 
Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond, ed. Daniel Bach and Mamoudou Gazibo (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2012), 186– 96; Alisher Ilkhamov, “Neopatrimonialism, Interest Groups, and Patronage Net-
works: The Impasses of the Governance System in Uzbekistan,” Central Asian Survey 26, no. 1 
(2007): 65– 84; Lawrence P. Markowitz, “Unlootable Resources and State Security Resources in Ta-
jikistan and Uzbekistan,” Comparative Po liti cal Studies 44, no. 2 (2011), 156– 183.
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Examining Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan also makes my fi nding 
more generalizable. Although they are both market reformers, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan are in many other ways quite different. As the information in Table 
1.2 indicates, Kazakhstan is considerably wealthier, more urbanized, and richer 
in natural resources than Kyrgyzstan. It is also larger and more populous. Uz-
bekistan, not a market reformer, falls in- between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
on many of these socioeconomic mea sures. The exceptions are urbanization, 
wealth, and population size. The percentage of Uzbekistan’s population living in 
urban areas is nearly identical to that of Kyrgyzstan, as noted in Table 1.2. Pov-
erty fi gures for Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are similar, and both countries are 
considerably poorer than Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan’s population is larger than 
Kazakhstan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s.
To examine the effect of the two conditions, I extend the analysis beyond 
Central Asia. Statistical analysis of economic and po liti cal data from ninety- two 
countries around the world allows me to explore the importance of historical 
state economic intervention and institutions that strengthen markets. Whereas 
the set of Central Asian countries provides variation only in terms of market re-
form, the group of ninety- two countries provides variation on these two condi-
tions as well, thus enabling closer consideration of them. This analysis offers 
support for the argument; it suggests that countries with weaker legacies of state 
economic intervention and more effective institutions to strengthen markets 
have less corruption.
Conceptualization, Mea sure ment, 
and Data
What constitutes corruption has generated considerable scholarly debate. I have 
opted to follow the lead of ordinary Central Asians in describing as corruption 
the use of irregular payments, personal connections, and promises of po liti cal 
TABLE 1.1. Conditions and causal factor
COMPARABLE CASES CONTRASTING
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN UZBEKISTAN
Causal factor: Market reform yes yes no
Condition 1: Legacy of signifi cant 
state economic intervention
yes yes yes
Condition 2: Weakness or 
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support to try to obtain goods and ser vices from government offi cials. Adhering 
to local interpretations underscores that my use of the label “corruption” does 
not represent a normative critique of these societies, but merely a line of inquiry. 
Also, local citizens’ interpretations of what is corrupt is preferable to legal defi ni-
tions, which may not exist in new or developing states, and international norms, 
which may confl ict with local ones. Interestingly, these Central Asians’ concep-
tualizations of what constitutes corruption do, in fact, resemble those in much 
of the scholarly literature and international development community.
Petty corruption,21 the focus of this book, is especially interesting to study 
because of the ubiquity of market reform policies in the late twentieth and early 
twenty- fi rst centuries. A key aspect of market reform is the reduction of citizens’ 
reliance on the state, yet existing studies have not investigated reform’s effect on 
individuals’ relationships with government offi cials, as this book does.22
This book also departs from earlier work by examining a variety of informal 
techniques. Many studies focus exclusively on bribes,23 personal connections,24 
or selling electoral support.25 Studying a variety of techniques is important to 
understanding the citizen side of corrupt exchanges. Government offi cials’ posi-
tions may enable them to engage in only one or two types of corruption. For 
example, only elected offi cials and their subordinates can trade goods and 
21. I opted to use the standard term petty corruption, even though it falsely implies that the cor-
ruption is insignifi cant, because it more readily relates my argument and fi ndings to existing work 
than a new term would.
22. Studies have provided insights into how market reform has reshaped groups’ interactions 
with the state.
23. A bribe is a payment to a government offi cial to circumvent a rule “with the goal of obtain-
ing a benefi t or avoiding a cost.”  Rose- Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 9. Ernesto Dal Bó, 
Pedro Dal Bó, and Rafael Di Tella, “ ‘Plata o Plomo?’ Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Po liti cal 
Infl uence,” American Po liti cal Science Review 100, no. 1 (2006): 41– 53.
24. This is also termed nepotism, “the instrumental use of positions of power to distribute jobs, 
goods and other public decisions . . .  [to family members and close friends] to maintain and 
strengthen positions of po liti cal power.” Simona Piattoni, ed., Clientelism, Interests, and Demo cratic 
Repre sen ta tion: The Eu ro pe an Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6, esp. note 7. Alena V. Ledeneva, Rus sia’s Economy of Favours: 
Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David L. 
Wank, “Business- State Clientelism in China: Decline or Evolution?” in Social Connections in China: 
Institutions, Culture, and the Changing Nature of Guanxi, ed. Thomas Gold, Doug Guthrie, and David 
L. Wank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 97– 116.
25. This is also referred to as clientelism. See, for example: Javier Auyero, Poor People’s Politics: 
Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); Her-
bert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, “Citizen– Politician Linkages: An Introduction,” in Patrons, Cli-
ents, and Policies: Patterns of Demo cratic Accountability and Po liti cal Competition, ed. Herbert 
Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1– 49; Piattoni, Cli-
entelism, Interests, and Demo cratic Repre sen ta tion; Susan C. Stokes, “Perverse Accountability: A For-
mal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina,” American Po liti cal Science Review 99, 
no. 3 (2005): 315– 25.
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ser vices for votes. By contrast, if needed goods and ser vices are available from 
different types of government offi cials, citizens can use a range of techniques. As 
chapter three describes, an individual’s economic position, as well as the charac-
teristics of the government offi cial, infl uences the choice of technique. To under-
stand citizens’ calculations, I thus examine a variety of forms of corruption. I do 
not, however, study citizens’ use of informal techniques where they are not try-
ing to meet everyday needs, such as when they pay bribes to traffi c offi cers who 
have pulled them over. In addition, I exclude corruption that does not involve 
government offi cials, such as bribing to enter a private university.
Regardless of how the phenomenon is defi ned, a key challenge in studying 
po liti cal corruption is that individuals may not want to admit that they have 
engaged in such practices, which they and their peers consider illegal, unethical, 
or socially unacceptable. Individuals may also be wary of revealing such behav-
ior if they perceive that the researcher disapproves of it.
Confronting these problems, most scholars either rely on media, police 
forces, and judiciaries to document incidents of po liti cal corruption or they use 
existing survey data sets.26 Many data sets claim to be mea sur ing people’s experi-
ences with corruption but actually ask respondents to report on the experiences 
of people like them in reality or hypothetically. In other cases, the respondents 
are experts asked to evaluate corruption in a country. Their judgments are also 
perceptions of corruption.
A smaller number of scholars generate new data,27 most of which originates 
from indirect mea sures of po liti cal corruption. For example, an approach to un-
derstanding clientelism is to ask respondents from which po liti cal parties they 
received goods and for whom they voted.28 Another approach, common among 
economists, is to estimate levels of corruption by calculating differences between 
26. For examples of the fi rst approach, see: Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China; 
Warner, The Best System Money Can Buy; Wedeman, Double Paradox. A couple of examples of the 
many scholars using existing survey data sets include: Hellman and Kaufman, “The In e qual ity of 
Infl uence”; Jong- Sung You and Sanjeev Khagram, “A Comparative Study of In e qual ity and Corrup-
tion,” American So cio log i cal Review 70, no. 1 (2005): 136– 57. Others combine these two approaches. 
For example, see: Karklins, The System Made Me Do It; Szeftel, “Misunderstanding African Politics.”
27. Giorgio Blundo and Jean- Pierre Olivier de Sardan, eds., Everyday Corruption and the State: 
Citizens and Public Offi cials in Africa (New York: Zed, 2006); Gingerich, Po liti cal Institutions; Holmes, 
Rotten States?; Ledeneva, How Rus sia Really Works; William Lockley Miller, Åse B. Grødeland, and 
Tatyana Y. Koshechkina, A Culture of Corruption? Coping with Government in Post- Communist Eu-
rope (Budapest: Central Eu ro pe an Universtiy Press, 2001); Sharafutdinova, Po liti cal Consequences of 
Crony Capitalism inside Rus sia; Stokes, et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism; Vineeta Yadav, Po liti cal 
Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011). For descriptions of a few studies that have generated data through direct observation, 
see Benjamin A. Olken and Rohini Pande, “Corruption in Developing Countries,” Annual Review of 
Economics 4 (2012): 479– 505.
28. See, for example, Stokes, “Perverse Accountability.”
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funds designated for and actually spent on public goods and ser vices or between 
bureaucrats’ incomes and consumption.29 Anthropologists do gather direct evi-
dence. Their approach has been to collect a small number of accounts of po liti-
cal corruption from participants by living with them for extended periods.30 
However, these ethnographies of corruption are not common, in part because 
anthropologists have been reluctant to study corruption;31 they began to do so 
only in the mid- 1990s. Moreover, anthropologists have examined discourses and 
repre sen ta tions of everyday corruption, not causes.32
Unlike the many studies that rely exclusively on indirect mea sures of corrup-
tion, this book also includes direct mea sures, and, by combining the two, illumi-
nates both the extent and character of petty corruption. In research spanning 
1994 to 2013, I conducted mass surveys, observational studies, and in- depth inter-
views, and I analyzed existing economic and corruption data sets and news re-
ports. The observational studies and in- depth interviews provide direct evidence 
of corruption, whereas the other research offers indirect evidence.
The surveys  were administered in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in 
November and December 2003. They  were conducted in Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Rus-
sian, or Uzbek as face- to- face interviews lasting approximately an hour. In each 
country the mass survey questionnaire was administered to 1,500 individuals 
ages eigh teen and older.33
Consistent with many earlier studies, my survey questions asked respondents 
indirectly about corruption; respondents  were not asked to reveal their own cor-
rupt practices. Instead they described from whom they sought assistance and 
29. For a review of these studies, see Olken and Pande, “Corruption in Developing Countries.”
30. Jakob Rigi, “Corruption in Post- Soviet Kazakhstan,” in Between Morality and the Law: Cor-
ruption, Anthropology and Comparative Society, ed. Italo Pardo (Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 
2004), 101– 19; Daniel Jordan Smith, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Pop u lar Dis-
content in Nigeria (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton University Press, 2007).
31. Cris Shore and Dieter Haller, “Introduction—Sharp Practice: Anthropology and the Study 
of Corruption,” in Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives, ed. Dieter Haller and Cris Shore (Lon-
don: Pluto, 2005), 1– 26.
32. Giorgio Blundo, “Corruption in Africa and the Social Sciences: A Review of the Literature,” 
in Blundo and de Sardan, Everyday Corruption and the State, 15– 68.
33. The sample for the mass survey in each country was a multistage stratifi ed probability sam-
ple of the country. In each country, macroregions  were defi ned— fourteen for Kazakhstan, eight for 
Kyrgyzstan, and fourteen for Kazakhstan, including the capital cities as macroregions. Strata  were 
distributed among the macroregions based on each macroregion’s proportion of the total popula-
tion. Primary sampling units (PSUs)  were administrative districts. PSUs  were selected randomly 
using probability proportional to size. Within each PSU,  house holds  were randomly selected. One 
respondent was randomly chosen from each  house hold. If a potential respondent declined to par-
ticipate, another was selected randomly from the PSU. The estimated response rate in the three 
countries ranged from 60 percent to 80 percent. Pauline Jones Luong and I shared space on the 
questionnaire, including questions for our different projects. BRIF, a research and marketing fi rm in 
Almaty, Kazakhstan, administered the survey.
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characterized citizen– government interactions, such as citizen competition for 
state resources. These indirect questions provide more valid answers than direct 
questions would. Survey respondents are more likely to answer indirect ques-
tions honestly because they are not reporting on their own behavior nor is there 
a stigma attached to these behaviors. At the same time, the concept of competing 
to possess state resources encompasses the behaviors of interest in this study: 
ordinary citizens’ use of bribes, personal connections, and promises of po liti cal 
support to try to secure goods or ser vices from government offi cials.
Survey respondents spoke openly about seeking assistance and about inter-
actions between citizens and offi cials. At the time of the survey, Uzbekistanis 
 were more reluctant than Kazakhstanis and Kyrgyzstanis to publicly discuss 
one topic— Islamic institutions not approved by the state. This wariness was due 
to the brutal persecution of these organizations by the government of Uzbeki-
stan. To reduce the apprehension of respondents in Uzbekistan, a question asking 
those who indicated that they had sought assistance from religious institutions 
whether these institutions  were approved by the state was dropped from the ques-
tionnaire. It was evident from the survey pretest and interviewers’ assessments 
that Uzbekistanis  were otherwise willing to speak frankly and did not fear de-
scribing competition for state resources.
The survey data reveal differences among countries in terms of the frequency 
with which people seek government assistance and the nature of interactions 
between citizens and government offi cials generally. The data also reveal differ-
ences in the goods and ser vices sought from government offi cials across coun-
tries. Differences across individuals— members of various ethnic groups, rural 
versus urban dwellers, and the employed and unemployed— are also evident. 
These differences provide support for the argument that market reform with a 
legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention and absent or weak market- 
enhancing institutions promotes corruption.
Direct evidence of corruption came from the nine observational studies and 266 
in- depth interviews that I conducted from 1994 to 2009 in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Because these countries are the market reformers in the study and 
the argument examines market reform’s effect, it was important to collect more 
in- depth information in these countries. For the observational studies, I lived 
for extended periods of time with local families, taking note of their interactions 
with relatives, market actors, societal groups, and government offi cials. I inter-
viewed average citizens; village, district, provincial, and national government of-
fi cials; and market and societal actors who may have provided substitutes for 
state ser vices. These market and societal actors included bankers, heads of pri-
vate employment agencies, directors of university placement offi ces, religious 
leaders, representatives of local and foreign charities, heads of professional 
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associations, and wealthy businesspeople. I used Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek for 
introductions and culture- specifi c words, but mostly conversed with people in 
Rus sian. Because of Soviet education policies, peoples of all ethnic backgrounds 
and social statuses are comfortable speaking Rus sian. In fact, elites, such as gov-
ernment offi cials,  were often more comfortable speaking Rus sian.
The observational studies and interviews took place in rural and urban areas 
of northern, central, and southern Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. I worked in 
 house holds and communities where I had ties so that I could discuss the sensitive 
topics of corruption with members of the  house hold and their networks. I did 
this fi rst by making connections with different  house holds and communities 
in the mid- 1990s during the course of research for another project. I then re-
turned to these  house holds and locations and added a few new ones with the as-
sistance of old acquaintances who could vouch for me. It would not have been 
helpful to have randomly selected  house holds, since the purpose of this portion 
of the investigation was to prepare the survey questionnaire and then to elabo-
rate on the survey data, which  were representative of the population. I also did 
not randomly select market actors, societal groups, or government offi cials, but 
instead interviewed those to whom members of  house holds reported turning for 
assistance or to whom they could potentially turn for assistance.
Interviews began with questions about everyday problems that people faced 
and where they turned for assistance. Ordinary citizens provided fi rsthand ac-
counts; market and societal actors and government offi cials described problems 
that people approached them about and whether and how they could solve them. 
Many interviewees brought up the subject of corruption in response to these 
questions. Otherwise, near the end of the interview, I posed specifi c questions 
about corruption, but ones that did not implicate the interviewee. For example, 
of a credit lender I would ask to what extent applicants for loans believed they 
needed to offer a bribe or have a personal connection in order to obtain credit. 
These questions typically initiated extended discussions of corruption. Based on 
this information, I describe different forms of corruption, the government offi -
cials targeted by citizens for corrupt exchanges, and the resources available to 
government offi cials to use in these exchanges. When I found inconsistencies in 
different people’s accounts, I continued to conduct interviews to clear up the 
discrepancies. Consistent evidence on a topic enables me to make generaliza-
tions, which I illustrate with accounts from specifi c interviews.
Of the interviewees, government offi cials  were most likely to provide fi rst-
hand accounts of engaging in corrupt exchanges. Typically, the offi cials viewed 
practices like taking bribes or buying votes as so commonplace that they  were 
not embarrassed to reveal their involvement, or they  were offi cials whom I knew 
well. Average citizens  were more likely to describe how friends and acquaintances 
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had used bribes, personal connections, and promises of po liti cal support to try 
to obtain benefi ts from government offi cials. However, people I knew well pro-
vided fi rsthand accounts of decisions about corruption. Moreover, in the 
 house holds where I lived I directly witnessed some decision making. Journalists 
I interviewed also described specifi c illicit exchanges that they had uncovered. In 
presenting the information from these interviews and observations, I do not in-
clude details that would make it possible to identify individuals. In order to save 
space, I provide background information for each interviewee, but I footnote 
only direct quotations.
Finally, socioeconomic data and news reports, from 1994 to 2013,  were help-
ful to the project. Sources of socioeconomic data include the national statistical 
agencies of the countries and international organizations such as the World Bank. 
From print and online media outlets, I found useful news articles.
Together the mass surveys, observational studies, in- depth interviews, exist-
ing economic, po liti cal, demographic, and corruption data sets, and news and 
historical reports provide support for the argument that market reform pro-
motes petty corruption. This is clear from Table 1.3, where the types of evidence 
used to support each point of the argument are documented.
In addition to the analytical leverage they provide, the data collected  here 
substantially increase our knowledge of the world, especially Central Asia. Un-
like most prior works on corruption, this book draws primarily on original data, 
including in- depth interviews from rural areas— a large segment of developing 
countries— which most studies do not include.34 The breadth of research allows 
the book to answer questions often overlooked by corruption studies: Which 
goods and ser vices do people seek and why? Which government offi cials do they 
target and why? From where do the offi cials obtain the resources to exchange? 
The survey data I collected are unusual for the region in that they are both na-
tionwide and comparable across multiple countries.35
34. See, for example: Judith Chubb, Patronage, Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy: A Tale of 
Two Cities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Van-
nucci, Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Po liti cal Corruption (New York: Al-
dine de Gruyter, 1999).
35. Besides these surveys, other surveys that are nationwide and comparable across countries 
include “Asiabarometer,”  https:// www .asiabarometer .org (accessed December 19, 2013); Beth Kolko 
et al., “The Effect of the Internet on Society: Incorporating Central Asia into the Global Perspective,” 
National Science Foundation,  http:// www .nsf .gov /awardsearch /showAward .do ?AwardNum-
ber=0326101 (accessed December 19, 2013); Scott Radnitz, Jonathan Wheatley, and Christoph 
Zürcher, “The Origins of Social Capital: Evidence from a Survey of Post- Soviet Central Asia,” Com-
parative Po liti cal Studies 42, no. 6 (2009); Michael Swafford et al., “General Social Survey of the Rus-
sian Federation and Central Asia, October– December 1992,” Inter- University Consortium of Po liti-
cal and Social Research, 1992,  http:// www .icpsr .umich .edu /icpsrweb /ICPSR /studies /06499 (accessed 
December 19, 2013).
TABLE 1.3. Summary of evidence and data
CENTRAL EVIDENCE DATA (CHAPTER NUMBER)
Market reform, a legacy of signifi cant state economic 
intervention, and absent or weak market- enhancing 
institutions exist in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
•  Economic data sets (4)
Because of absent or weak market- enhancing institu-
tions, market actors are not an alternative to 
corruption in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
•  Survey data (4)
•  Interview data (4)
•  News reports (4)
Individuals tend not to turn to market actors for 
assistance in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
•  Survey data (4)
•  Interview data (4)
Market reform has limited state goods and ser vices and 
thus legal means to obtain them in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan.
•  Interview data (4)
•  News reports (4)
Governments’ market- reform messages in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan discourage use of state goods and 
ser vices.
•  Interview data (4)
•  News reports (4)
Because market reform under a signifi cant state 
economic legacy and absent or weak market- 
enhancing institutions has limited resources of 
societal actors, they are not an alternative to 
corruption in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
•  Interview data (5)
•  Historical reports (5)
•  News reports (5)
Individuals tend not to turn to societal actors for 
assistance in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
•  Survey data (5)
•  Interview data (5)
Individuals compete to obtain state goods and ser vices 
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
•  Survey data (4)
Individuals use corruption to try to secure state goods 
and ser vices in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
•  Interview data (3)
•  Observational studies (3)
Individuals with family members who can meet their 
needs avoid corruption in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
•  Interview data (6)
•  Observational studies (6)
CORROBORATING EVIDENCE
In rural areas, where market alternatives are more 
limited, people are more likely to seek state 
assistance.
•  Survey data (4)
Individuals’ demands of the state match challenges 
brought about by market reform in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan.
•  Survey data (4)
•  Interview data (4)
•  Economic data sets (4)
Those most affected by market reform are those most 
likely to seek state assistance.
•  Survey data (4)
Competition for basic state resources is not as common 
in the nonmarket reformer Uzbekistan.
•  Survey data (4)
•  Economic reports (4)
Uzbekistanis are no more likely to turn to market and 
societal actors for assistance than Kazakhstanis and 
Kyrgyzstanis.
•  Survey data (4)
Alternative explanations do not explain the differences 
among the three Central Asia countries.
•  Survey data (4)
•  Economic data sets (4)
•  Po liti cal data sets (4)
•  Demographic data sets (4)
The argument applies outside of Central Asia. •  Economic data sets (4)
•  Global corruption data set (4)
Citizens in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are not averse to 
religious organizations and charities.
•  Interview data (5)
•  News reports (5)
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Combined, the different types of data provide an important window into how 
citizens in Central Asia have coped with the economic upheaval caused by the 
collapse of the Soviet economy and implementation of market reform. In par tic-
u lar, they highlight the role (or lack of a role) of family, market actors, societal 
groups, and the state in individuals’ survival strategies. The fi ndings also chal-
lenge preconceived notions, such as the idea that Islamic organizations and for-
eign charities have become citizens’ main sources of support and thus are threats 
to Central Asian states. The nearly twenty- year span of the data allows me to 
comment on change, or lack of change, over time. The book’s arguments indi-
cate that an increase in alternative sources of essential goods and ser vices, as a 
result of new or strengthened market- enhancing institutions, should reduce cor-
ruption. Unfortunately, the latest evidence shows that market- enhancing insti-
tutions continue to be weak in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and corruption re-
mains rampant.
Structure of the Book
Why is corruption more common in some countries, and yet why do some indi-
viduals in these countries rarely or never engage in illicit exchanges? The absence- 
of- alternatives framework provides answers in chapter two. The reader will also 
fi nd defi nitions of the arguments’ core concepts— basic needs, market reform, 
legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention, and market- enhancing institu-
tions. In addition, this chapter elaborates on how the absence- of- alternatives ap-
proach is distinct from existing theories of corruption and offers advantages 
over them.
Chapter three describes the specifi c corruption this book seeks to explain— 
petty corruption in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The interview, observational, 
and survey data reveal that citizens use bribes, personal connections, and prom-
ises of po liti cal support to try to obtain money, credit, and employment, mostly 
from village and other low- level offi cials.
What are the causes of this corruption? Chapters four and fi ve show how 
market reform coupled with a legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention 
and weak or absent market- enhancing institutions have promoted corruption 
by limiting alternative resources. Chapter four demonstrates how these three fac-
tors have restricted income, credit, and employment from market actors and for-
mal government programs. This is not the case, however, in Uzbekistan, where 
market reform has not been undertaken. The absence- of- alternatives framework 
can account for the difference between Uzbekistan and the market reformers, Ka-
zakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, whereas other theories of corruption cannot. The 
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ninety- two- country statistical analysis provides additional support for the argu-
ment. Shifting to societal actors, chapter fi ve shows how market reform under 
the two conditions has also limited the ability of religious institutions and secu-
lar charities to meet basic needs in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The goods and 
ser vices of other societal actors, including foreign charitable organizations, for-
eign companies, local companies, labor  unions, aksakals (respected male elders), 
and educational establishments have also not become substitutes for state re-
sources.
Despite the widespread corruption in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, how have 
some people managed to rarely or never engage in it? Chapter six demonstrates 
that they have family members who can help meet their needs. Yet, not all families 
can provide the credit, employment, and money that their kin require. Market re-
form has made only some family networks resource- rich. This chapter describes 
factors that account for these families’ fi nancial success in the new economies.
Finally, chapter seven uses these insights about corruption to offer policy pre-
scriptions more in tune with the socioeconomic reality of developing countries 
than previous advice has been. In par tic u lar, anticorruption strategies should 
include the expansion of nonstate sources of assistance for average citizens. This 
book highlights that corruption, despite its negative societal implications, is a 
sound survival strategy for individuals. Loosening government policies that limit 
the activities of societal groups, such as religious organizations, as well as actively 
developing institutions to increase market competition, such as credit registries, 
would provide individuals with survival alternatives that have fewer social costs. 
In addition to reforming government, providing citizens with alternatives to 
corruption is likely to be an effective anticorruption strategy. Unfortunately, lit-
tle evidence indicates that Central Asia is on this path.
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ALTERNATIVES TO CORRUPTION AND 
THE EFFECT OF MARKET REFORM
The Arguments and Their 
Theoretical Implications
“Workers who gave money to the sovkhoz received goods,” Marzhan, the woman 
in the village in Kazakhstan, recounted to me.1 In the late 1990s when the sovkhoz 
(state farm) in the village collapsed, workers who gave bribes to the local au-
thorities received goods from it, Marzhan and other village residents explained. 
Former sovkhoz workers needed these essential agricultural inputs for the new 
farms they  were establishing; their limited income and access to credit made it 
diffi cult for them to obtain the goods elsewhere. Yet some villagers, like Marzhan 
and her family, opted not to pay bribes and thus not to receive the inputs.
This story underscores that not all individuals engage in corruption. Earlier 
studies of corruption have examined the puzzle of why it is more common in 
certain countries, but they have neglected the question of why some individuals 
in countries where corruption is rampant rarely or never engage in it.
The absence- of- alternatives explanation presented in this book solves both 
puzzles. First, it shows that corruption is more common in countries where alter-
native sources of essential goods and ser vices are more limited. Second, even 
within a single country some individuals have greater access to alternative re-
sources than others, and this enables them to avoid corruption. Market reform 
can account for individuals’ differing access to resources as well as the paucity of 
resources in a country. By enriching some families and impoverishing others, 
market reform leads individuals whose relatives have not prospered to engage in 
corruption to meet their everyday needs. When market reform limits the resources 
1. Author’s interview (#161), Kazakhstan, July 22, 2001.
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that formal government programs, market actors, and societal groups can provide 
to individuals, it increases the prevalence of corruption in a country. To elaborate 
on these arguments and demonstrate the benefi ts of the absence- of- alternatives 
framework, I begin with some fundamental observations about seeking assistance.
Seeking Assistance
Central to the absence- of- alternatives framework are the ideas that individuals 
have basic needs to meet and that they prefer not to use illicit means to meet 
them. These basic needs include employment, credit, money, food, clothing, and 
shelter. Employment and credit both provide money— employment does so 
through income, and credit does so by enabling people to initiate profi table en-
trepreneurial ventures. Individuals may also receive money as a direct handout. 
Regardless of the source, money enables individuals to purchase food, clothing, 
and shelter. People may also receive these goods directly as charitable donations. 
This defi nition of basic needs is supported by the accounts given by Central 
Asians. As the data in chapter three reveal, Central Asians seek employment, 
credit, and money in order to ensure that they have food, clothing, and shelter.
The claim that individuals prefer to avoid illicit exchanges with government 
offi cials to meet these needs refl ects reality: studies of countries in Africa, East-
ern Eu rope, and Latin America, as well as my own research in Central Asia, have 
found that people consider it repugnant to offer bribes, use personal connec-
tions, and promise po liti cal support for necessities, even when they perceive the 
practices to be pervasive in their societies.2 Thus, the idea that people’s fi rst 
preference is to avoid corruption is a sound assumption.
This book’s arguments, however, do not require a par tic u lar judgment as to 
whether corruption to meet basic needs is good or bad. As noted in the fi rst 
chapter, petty corruption can have both benefi ts and drawbacks. It can enable 
people to survive diffi cult economic circumstances, but it also undermines re-
gime legitimacy, fuels economic and po liti cal in e qual ity, and increases economic 
ineffi ciencies.3 The arguments hold whether or not one fi nds corruption useful, 
harmful, or a mix of the two.
2. Javier Auyero, Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita (Dur-
ham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); William Lockley Miller, Åse B. Grødeland, and Tatyana Y. 
Koshechkina, A Culture of Corruption? Coping with Government in Post- Communist Eu rope (Buda-
pest: CEU Press, 2001); Daniel Jordan Smith, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Pop u-
lar Discontent in Nigeria (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton University Press, 2007).
3. Miller, Grødeland, and Koshechkina, A Culture of Corruption? 11– 13; Luis Roniger, “Po liti-
cal Clientelism, Democracy, and Market Economy,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 3 (2004): 353– 75, 
 here 354; Susan  Rose- Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform 
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In what ways can people meet their basic needs besides by engaging in illicit 
exchanges with government offi cials? Possible alternative sources of goods and 
ser vices include formal government programs, markets, groups in society, and 
family members. Formal state assistance programs provide help to individuals 
based not on their particularistic characteristics, such as bureaucrat’s relatives, 
but based on their fi t within a category, such as veterans. The programs may pro-
vide employment, credit, money, food, clothing, or shelter. Specifi c examples 
include public employment, subsidies to enterprises to help increase hiring, and 
welfare benefi ts to individuals. Market actors, including private banks and own-
ers of private companies, are most likely to provide credit or employment, 
although some perform charitable acts that help meet the other needs. Societal 
groups and family members may assist people with employment, credit, money, 
food, clothing, or shelter. Societal groups include places of worship, religious 
organizations, and secular charities, and family members include kin both inside 
and outside of a  house hold.
Differences among Countries: Market 
Reform, Legacies, and Institutions
Under certain conditions, market reform can limit these alternatives and thus 
account for why corruption is more common in some countries. Market reform 
refers to efforts in the late twentieth and early twenty- fi rst centuries to decrease 
state economic intervention through policies, such as privatization of state prop-
erty, deregulation of industries, liberalization of trade, reduction of welfare ex-
penditures, and increases in labor market fl exibility. Market reform’s promotion 
of corruption is ironic because the set of policies is designed to reduce the re-
sources government offi cials have and expand opportunities for individuals to 
obtain assistance from private actors. For example, farmers should be able to 
secure credit from private banks instead of government programs. Moreover, 
individuals should obtain those limited goods and ser vices that remain available 
from the state based on their membership in certain categories, such as “farmers 
eligible for credit,” not based on their particularistic traits, such as their ability to 
exploit personal connections. In practice, however, people do take part in illicit 
exchanges in order to obtain assistance from government offi cials. And the 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2, 3, 12, 14, 16, 26; Eric M. Uslaner, Corruption, 
In e qual ity, and the Rule of Law: The Bulging Pocket Makes the Easy Life (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2008), 17.
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greater the number of people who lack substitute resources in a country, the 
more common corruption is.
Of the different market reform policies, the reduction of welfare expenditures 
has the greatest infl uence on citizens’ abilities to meet their basic needs. A reduc-
tion in welfare expenditures can include a cutback in public employment and 
diminution of some benefi t payments and an end to others. As a result, individu-
als have fewer formal government programs that they can turn to for assistance. 
Those government programs that do exist formally restrict the distribution of 
resources to individuals who meet narrow requirements in order to manage their 
scarcity. As a result, competition for these resources increases. At the same time, 
price liberalization can reduce the relative size of citizens’ incomes, and privati-
zation and reforms to increase labor market fl exibility can result in layoffs and 
thus loss of income. Consequently, people’s needs grow as government assistance 
shrinks.
Market reform can further undercut citizens’ welfare by limiting resources 
from markets, societal groups, and extended family. This occurs when two con-
ditions hold: (1) state involvement in the economy has been historically signifi -
cant, and (2) market- enhancing institutions are weak or absent.
The fi rst condition, a legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention, histori-
cally created a scarcity of resources provided by nonstate individuals and organi-
zations. The resources included employment, credit, and welfare assistance, for 
example. The scarcity existed because the government granted monopoly or 
near- monopoly rights to businesses, allowing only one or a few to provide each 
good or ser vice. This limited the production of goods and ser vices because few 
entrepreneurs had the rights and other entrepreneurs expended time and capital 
on lobbying for the rights instead of on production.4 Some governments also 
outright prohibited anyone other than the state from providing par tic u lar goods 
and ser vices. Even in the absence of a formal ban, entrepreneurs had little incen-
tive to produce goods and ser vices that the government was already providing.
States’ attempts to control their countries’ economies also limited the re-
sources that societal groups could provide to individuals. State economic inter-
vention resulted in a crowding out or banning of societal groups. In par tic u lar, 
governments that provided extensive welfare benefi ts reduced the need for secu-
lar and religious groups to provide charitable assistance. When states actually 
prohibited the creation of societal groups or severely limited their activities, 
these groups  were even less likely to offer substitute resources.
4. James M. Buchanan, “Rent- Seeking and Profi t- Seeking,” in Toward a Theory of the Rent- 
Seeking Society, ed. James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock (College Station: 
Texas A&M University, 1980), 3– 15.
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The breadth, length, and immediacy of state economic intervention vary 
across countries. The more goods and ser vices that the state controls for a longer 
time closer to the onset of market reform, the more the legacy of the intervention 
will limit nonstate resources once market policies are adopted.
By reducing state economic intervention, market reform spurs the emergence 
of private businesses and societal groups; however, these new entities have diffi -
culty immediately meeting people’s basic needs. Market reform ends prohibi-
tions on private market and charitable activities, and economic and social entre-
preneurs have incentives to create private businesses and charitable organizations 
now that the state no longer provides extensive goods and ser vices. These new 
businesses and charities, however, face obstacles in meeting people’s needs for 
employment, credit, money, and other goods and ser vices. The businesses and 
charities are beginning from scratch with few resources to distribute and little 
knowledge of how to distribute them. The broader, longer, and more recent the 
state economic intervention of the past, the fewer resources and less experience 
businesses and charities have when market reform is introduced.
Market- enhancing institutions are critical to helping these new businesses 
and charities to thrive, yet they have rarely been part of market reforms. Market- 
enhancing institutions are “[r]ules, enforcement mechanisms, and organiza-
tions . . .  [that] help transmit information, enforce property rights and contracts, 
and manage competition in markets.”5 Credit registries, accounting fi rms, consti-
tutions, judicial systems, and antimonopoly policies are some of the many rules, 
organizations, and enforcement mechanisms that count as market- enhancing 
institutions. By providing information about potential partners and by defi ning 
and enforcing property rights, market- enhancing institutions encourage market 
transactions and investment. By stimulating competition, they give new busi-
nesses the opportunity to prove their mettle and they help to ensure reasonable 
prices for inputs.
States must create, or at least encourage, the development of market- enhancing 
institutions. These institutions are public goods and, in some cases, represent 
constraints on market actors. Market competitors have little or no incentive to 
overcome the collective action problem in order to establish these public goods or 
to constrain their own profi t- seeking behavior.
Consider in greater detail two market- enhancing institutions, credit registries 
and antimonopoly policies, that can be especially important to citizens’ welfare. 
Credit registries, as well as credit bureaus, are databases that have information 
about the creditworthiness of individuals. Without this information, banks must 
5. World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 4.
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demand signifi cant collateral to reduce the likelihood that clients will default 
and to reduce the losses to the banks if the clients do fail to repay their loans. In 
rural areas throughout much of the world, it is diffi cult for banks to collect this 
information on their own. Population density is low, so it is not profi table for 
banks to establish branches, which could collect the necessary information.6 
Banks could share credit information with one another, but they have little in-
centive to do this because they are competitors. Governments or entrepreneurs 
responding to government incentives typically create public credit registries or 
private credit bureaus, respectively. Credit registries or credit bureaus that cover 
much of the population enable banks to acquire credit information about poten-
tial borrowers without the cost of building branches in less populated areas. 
With this information, private banks can better determine which potential bor-
rowers pose a suffi ciently low risk that it would be profi table to lend to them. 
Improved coverage does not mean that all people become eligible to obtain 
credit— some individuals may be too risky— but it typically expands the pool of 
eligible borrowers.7
Governments also play an important role in encouraging market competition 
by developing and enforcing antimonopoly policies. When businesspeople are 
forced to buy from a monopoly provider, it is diffi cult for them to expand their 
businesses. Money paid for infl ated electricity or agricultural pro cessing prices 
cannot be reinvested to hire additional employees, for example.
Despite the importance of market- enhancing institutions, they  were gener-
ally not part of market reforms for twenty years. Only in the early twenty- fi rst 
century did market reform advocates, such as the World Bank, acknowledge that 
state withdrawal from the economy did not guarantee strong markets. Instead, 
along with liberalization, privatization, and deregulation, governments must 
actively develop market- enhancing institutions.
As a result of this oversight, market and societal actors, particularly in countries 
with a legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention, cannot meet individu-
als’ needs for employment, income, and credit. Fewer private businesses exist 
and those that do are less likely to expand and employ more people. As a result 
fewer people can earn income in private business. Similarly, fewer private banks 
6. Daniel Verdier, Moving Money: Banking and Finance in the Industrialized World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002).
7. As formal models of credit rationing indicate, banks may consider certain groups of indi-
viduals too risky to lend to even when the individuals are willing to pay higher rates and provide 
more valuable collateral. Most likely, these individuals would have no or poor credit histories. Joseph 
E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,” American 
Economic Review 71, no. 3 (1981), 393– 410.
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exist and their credit- lending is more limited. When private fi rms are less profi t-
able they engage in less charitable giving as well.
The lack of market- enhancing institutions as well as the legacy of signifi cant 
state economic intervention limit the resources of groups in society too. The 
 effect is both indirect and direct. Charitable organizations rely on membership 
dues and donations. To the extent that market actors are not prospering, indi-
viduals give less to places of worship, religious organizations, secular charities, 
and other societal groups. Furthermore, societal groups may also have the legal 
right to obtain credit or engage in business ventures in order to earn revenue to 
use toward their missions. So, societal groups can also be directly harmed by weak 
credit markets.
In sum, market reform in countries that have a legacy of signifi cant state eco-
nomic intervention and no or weak market- enhancing institutions not only re-
duces assistance from formal government programs but also limits help from 
markets, charities, and kin. The more extensive, lengthy, and recent the state 
economic intervention and the weaker the market- enhancing institutions, the 
more limited the assistance.
Individuals’ Decisions: Market Reform’s 
Differential Effect on Families
When resources citizens need are no longer available through formal state pro-
grams and are also not obtainable from outside the government, individuals en-
gage in corruption.8 However, because market reform has a differential effect 
on families, some individuals have kin who can help them and some do not.9 
This differential effect accounts for why some individuals, even in countries 
8. The order in which citizens approach formal government programs, market actors, societal 
groups, and kin depends on ease of access and cultural characteristics, such as strength of family ties. 
Yet, eventually, they will either secure assistance from one of these individuals or groups and thus not 
need to engage in corruption or they will not secure assistance and thus need to engage in corrup-
tion.
9. Market reform has increased income in e qual ity in wages. Julien Gourdon, Nicolas Maystre, 
and Jaime de Melo, “Openness, In e qual ity, and Poverty: Endowments Matter,” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3981 (2006): 1– 51,  here 24,  http:// elibrary .worldbank .org /doi /book /10 .1596 
/1813 -9450 -3981 (accessed December 19, 2013); Xubei Luo and Nong Zhu, “Rising Income In-
equal ity in China: A Race to the Top,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4700 (2008): 1– 23, 
 here 20,  http:// go .worldbank .org /ZFIMAX6400 (accessed December 19, 2013); Lance Taylor and 
Rob Vos, “Balance of Payments Liberalization in Latin America: Effects on Growth, Distribution and 
Poverty,” in Economic Liberalization, Distribution, and Poverty: Latin America in the 1990s, ed. Rob 
Vos, Lance Taylor, and Ricardo Paes de Barros (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002), 1– 53.
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where corruption is pervasive, avoid engaging in corruption to meet their every-
day needs.
Scholars have largely ignored these differences among individuals.10 Institu-
tional theories, such as explanations based on the overbearing state and weak 
state capacity, focus on national government institutions, and cultural explana-
tions assume that everyone shares the same norms and habits. The only factor 
identifi ed that can even address this variation is citizens’ wealth.11 However, stud-
ies have found that both the poor and nonpoor engage in corruption, so wealth 
cannot be the explanation.12 Also, wealth cannot account for why some poor 
people nevertheless manage to avoid corruption.
This book’s arguments explain that those individuals whose relatives have not 
prospered in the new market economy use bribes, personal connections, and 
promises of po liti cal support to try to obtain state resources. Those individuals 
whose relatives have prospered can avoid corruption. Initially, under market re-
form the economic situation of many families worsens; family members may 
lose state jobs and welfare benefi ts; however, some families also manage to en-
rich themselves.13 In countries with a legacy of signifi cant state economic inter-
vention and lack of market- enhancing institutions, the long- term prospects for 
10. Scholars have examined variation in corruption across regions within a country, but not 
across individuals. See, for example: J. David Brown, John S. Earle, and Scott Gehlbach, “Helping 
Hand or Grabbing Hand? State Bureaucracy and Privatization Effectiveness,” American Po liti cal Sci-
ence Review 103, no. 2 (2009), 264– 83; Phyllis Dininio and Robert Orttung, “Explaining Patterns of 
Corruption in the Rus sian Regions,” World Politics 57, no. 4 (2005), 500– 529; Yan Sun, Corruption 
and Market in Contemporary China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 121– 57.
11. Herbert Kitschelt, “Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Demo cratic Politics,” Com-
parative Po liti cal Studies 33, no. 6 (2000): 845– 79,  here 857; Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, 
“Citizen- Politician Linkages: An Introduction,” in Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Demo-
cratic Accountability and Po liti cal Competition, ed. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 1– 49,  here 25; Claus Offe, “Po liti cal Corruption: Conceptual and Practical 
Issues,” in Building a Trustworthy State in Post- Socialist Transition, ed. János Kornai and Susan 
 Rose- Ackerman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 77– 99,  here 86; Simona Piattoni, “Clien-
telism in Historical and Comparative Perspective,” in Clientelism, Interests, and Demo cratic Repre sen-
ta tion: The Eu ro pe an Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective, ed. Piattoni (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1– 30,  here 17; James C. Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, 
and Po liti cal Change,” American Po liti cal Science Review 63, no. 4 (1969): 1142– 58; Alice Sindzingre, 
“A Comparative Analysis of African and East Asian Corruption,” in Po liti cal Corruption: Concepts 
and Contexts, ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 2002), 441– 60,  here 452; Susan C. Stokes, “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of 
Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina,” American Po liti cal Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005): 
312– 25,  here 321– 22.
12. See, for example, Judith Chubb, Patronage, Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy: A Tale of 
Two Cities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 6– 7.
13. The differential effect of market reform has been well documented in terms of increased in-
e qual ity. Gourdon, Maystre, and de Melo, “Openness, In e qual ity, and Poverty,” 24; Luo and Zhu, 
“Rising Income In e qual ity in China,” 20; Taylor and Vos, “Balance of Payments Liberalization in 
Latin America.”
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initially impoverished families are gloomy because market and societal actors 
cannot provide money, employment, and credit for families to escape the dire 
economic circumstances. To meet their basic needs, members of these families 
turn to government offi cials.
Turning to a downsized state for material assistance is not the paradox that it 
might seem to be at fi rst glance. How do government offi cials have resources to 
give in illicit exchanges if the state has been downsized by market reform? First 
of all, the state is still resource- rich relative to other institutions and groups. This 
is especially true in cases where the state historically had signifi cant control of 
the economy, and reform did not establish effective market- enhancing institu-
tions. Second, the resources individuals are seeking to meet basic needs are com-
paratively insignifi cant for the state to provide. Even in a downsized state, gov-
ernment offi cials can fi nd some money, jobs, or credit for illicit exchanges.
In sum, citizens use bribes, personal connections, and promises of po liti cal 
support to try to obtain state resources when formal state assistance programs, 
market actors, societal groups, and family members do not have the means to 
meet their basic needs. The more extensive state economic intervention has been 
historically and the weaker the market enhancing- institutions in a country, the 
more individuals market reform causes to engage in petty corruption and the 
more corruption in the country.
A Parsimonious, Causal, 
Generalizable Explanation
This explanation for corruption is parsimonious, causal, and generalizable. Ear-
lier corruption studies have provided valuable insights, but their explanations 
tend to take the form of a long list of possible causal factors, correlative state-
ments, or conclusions limited to a par tic u lar location. Studies of a small number 
of countries have often resulted in long lists of causes of corruption. For exam-
ple, Leslie Holmes identifi es eigh teen factors that have contributed to corruption 
in just one region of the world— the former Eastern bloc.14 Statistical studies of 
many countries, or large- n analyses, have provided useful clues, but no causal 
explanations with compelling empirical support.15 Field experiments avoid these 
14. Leslie Holmes, Rotten States? Corruption, Post- Communism, and Neoliberalism (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2006).
15. A key problem is that these studies often rely on data that mea sure the perception of corrup-
tion, instead of corruption itself. See, for example: Uslaner, Corruption, In e qual ity, and the Rule of 
Law; Jong- Sung You and Sanjeev Khagram, “A Comparative Study of In e qual ity and Corruption,” 
American So cio log i cal Review 70, no. 1 (2005), 136– 57. For a review of large- n analyses, see Daniel 
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problems, but their fi ndings are less generalizable than those from this book, 
which combines comparative case study and large- n designs.16
The absence- of- alternatives approach provides a general, causal framework 
for understanding and combating corruption. An absence of alternatives to il-
licit exchanges with government offi cials is a necessary and suffi cient condition 
for petty corruption. When can an absence of alternatives occur? Together the 
two conditions— a legacy of signifi cant state economic involvement and poor or 
absent market- enhancing institutions— are suffi cient for the causal factor, mar-
ket reform, to result in an absence of alternatives and, subsequently, citizens’ use 
of illicit means. Market reform is not the only factor that promotes petty corrup-
tion, and research has shown that market reform can decrease grand corruption 
by reducing government offi cials’ responsibilities. However, considering its spread 
in the 1980s and 1990s, and the frequency of the conditions under which it en-
courages petty corruption, market reform is worthy of focus.
The direction of the causal relationship between market reform under the 
two conditions and corruption is clear. Logic and evidence indicate that corrup-
tion to meet everyday needs is unlikely to have caused market reform, weak or 
absent market- enhancing institutions, or a legacy of signifi cant state economic 
intervention. Studies have suggested that grand corruption can result in market 
reform with weak or absent market- enhancing institutions, as government offi -
cials avoid creating market- enhancing institutions that would limit their ability 
to reap personal benefi ts from policies such as privatization. How ordinary citi-
zens’ illicit efforts to obtain basic goods and ser vices would lead to market re-
form under the two conditions is neither evident nor supported by prior studies. 
Ordinary citizens are not likely to have such infl uence, nor would it be in their 
interest to support policies that ultimately limit their means of obtaining essen-
tial goods and ser vices.17
Evidence from Central Asia supports the idea that market reform under the 
two conditions has resulted in petty corruption, not the reverse. Corruption to 
obtain basic goods and ser vices developed after market reform began and after 
the period of signifi cant state economic intervention, as described in chapter 
four. Corruption did exist in the Soviet era, prior to market reform; however, 
evidence in chapter four shows that the individuals who engage in illicit practices, 
the targets of their requests, and the goods and ser vices sought have changed since 
Treisman, “What Have We Learned about the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross- 
National Empirical Research,” Annual Review of Po liti cal Science 19 (2007), 211– 44.
16. For a review of fi eld experiments, see Benjamin A. Olken and Rohini Pande, “Corruption in 
Developing Countries,” Annual Review of Economics 4 (2012), 479– 509.
17. Why market- enhancing institutions are weak and how corruption may play a role are im-
portant issues, but not the puzzles this book aims to solve.
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the Soviet era. So today’s petty corruption did not cause market reform, the weak-
ness or absence of market- enhancing institutions, or the signifi cant state eco-
nomic intervention historically. Evidence in chapter four also demonstrates that 
the needs citizens seek to meet through corrupt practices developed in large part 
directly from market reform under the two conditions. This further supports the 
proposed causal relationship.
These same pieces of evidence about timing and needs and the analysis of the 
ninety- two countries suggest that the causal factor, conditions, and corruption 
are not all caused by something  else. We know that market reform, not eco-
nomic reform in general, is infl uential because the evidence shows that market 
reform under the two conditions created the needs that prompted the illicit be-
havior. The statistical analysis demonstrates that leading alternative explana-
tions cannot account for market reform, the two conditions, and corruption. 
The fact that corruption to meet everyday needs has been less common in Uz-
bekistan further casts doubt on another factor causing all components of the 
argument. Uzbekistan shares many characteristics with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz-
stan, including economic upheaval, which, in theory, could cause market re-
form, the conditions, and the corruption. Yet, even though it, too, experienced 
the economic chaos of the collapse of the Soviet  Union, Uzbekistan has neither 
undertaken market reform nor exhibited the corruption for basic goods and ser-
vices that Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do.
The contrast with Uzbekistan also challenges the alternative explanation that 
a legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention causes market reform and 
corruption. Uzbekistan experienced signifi cant state economic intervention but 
neither market reform nor signifi cant corruption to meet essential needs. Chap-
ter four presents evidence from Central Asia that challenges all of these alterna-
tive explanations as well as a host of others and supports the causal argument 
proposed by this book.
The causal argument is parsimonious in the sense that this single idea that 
people engage in corruption when alternatives are not available is a framework 
that can explain multiple types of corruption in different settings. It is useful to 
identify varied proximate causes of different forms of corruption, but it is also 
helpful to have a framework with which to understand corruption generally. 
Earlier frameworks have considered only government offi cials’ roles in corrup-
tion, and neglected citizens’ roles. The absence- of- alternatives framework recti-
fi es this problem.
Moreover, the absence- of- alternatives approach expands the study of corrup-
tion by examining nonstate and nonmarket resources. Most studies of corrup-
tion, especially those in the overbearing state school of thought, are based on the 
idea of a state monopoly of resources. A few others consider the infl uence of 
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scarce market resources as well, contending that the state’s monopoly on re-
sources creates scarcity in the market, which encourages corruption.18 However, 
their focus overlooks the possibility that nonmarket actors, such as kin, may 
be able to offer substitute resources. This insight has two important implica-
tions. Most broadly, resource scarcity in a territory affects individuals differently. 
Equally important, those individuals with resource- rich kin can avoid engaging 
in corruption by obtaining needed goods from family members. By examining 
the availability of resources from not only government offi cials and markets but 
also family members, this study acknowledges that resource scarcity has varied 
effects on individuals and that some individuals can avoid engaging in corrup-
tion even in countries where it is pervasive.
While expanding the focus to citizens and family and societal resources, the 
absence- of- alternatives approach remains parsimonious. With the basic idea 
that individuals consider alternatives before engaging in corruption, this frame-
work can likely illuminate not only petty but also grand corruption. Petty and 
grand corruption are distinct phenomena, but the underlying dynamics may be 
similar enough for the framework to apply. In grand corruption, instead of aver-
age citizens meeting basic needs, the focus is on own ers of large businesses seek-
ing additional profi t. If no alternatives other than illicit exchanges with govern-
ment offi cials exist for earning additional profi t, we would expect the business 
own ers to offer bribes, use connections, and promise po liti cal support. While 
average citizens consider the availability of resources from market actors, soci-
etal groups, and family, large- scale business own ers would be most affected by 
the resources of market actors. For example, if private banks did not provide 
credit, corrupt practices could be more appealing as a means to expand one’s 
business. The applicability of this framework to grand corruption relies on the 
assumption that large- scale business own ers, like average citizens, prefer not to 
engage in corruption. This is an empirical question that requires investigation.
The framework also allows for other possible causes of limited alternatives. 
Most boldly, a reversal of market reform, or the introduction of socialism, could 
limit alternatives and encourage corruption to meet everyday needs. Hypotheti-
cally, a state could circumscribe market activities, for example, through nation-
18. Chubb, Patronage, Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy;  Rose- Ackerman, Corruption and 
Government; Andrew Hall Wedeman, Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012). In his work on po liti cal parties in Rus sia, Henry Hale 
reveals a situation somewhat contradictory to this thinking. He discovers that state control of re-
sources, although not monopolies, and strong market actors coexist in the form of gubernatorial 
po liti cal machines and fi nancial- industrial groups. He demonstrates that this combination serves as 
a substitute for programmatic po liti cal parties and encourages clientelism in their place. Henry E. 
Hale, “Correlates of Clientelism: Po liti cal Economy, Politicized Ethnicity, and Postcommunist Tran-
sition,” in Kitschelt and Wilkinson, Patrons, Clients, and Policies, 227– 50.
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alization and price controls, while also abandoning government assistance pro-
grams and banning or severely restricting the activities of societal groups. In 
practice, these two mea sures have not typically accompanied the introduction of 
socialism— rather socialist policies tend to include an expansion of government 
assistance, and contemporary socialist governments, even if not all of their his-
torical counterparts, have allowed societal groups to continue to assist citizens. 
Research on other eras, including the future, is likely to reveal other factors that 
limit alternatives and thus promote corruption. Although it is a simple frame-
work, the absence- of- alternatives approach has the potential to explain a lot.
An Absence of Alternatives versus 
Economic Development and Poverty
At fi rst glance, the absence- of- alternatives approach may resemble economic de-
velopment or poverty theories, but it is, in fact, distinct from them in crucial 
ways and offers advantages over them. An absence of alternatives to illicit means 
to obtain essential goods and ser vices does not necessarily result from economic 
underdevelopment or poverty. This is evident in the Central Asian cases; seeking 
assistance illicitly from the state to meet basic needs has not been common in 
Uzbekistan even though it exhibits levels of economic development and poverty 
similar to those in Kyrgyzstan. Instead, market reform under the two conditions 
is the cause. Unlike economic development studies, the absence- of- alternatives 
theory offers a causal account and an explanation for individual variation; un-
like poverty theories, this approach takes into account not only individuals but 
also societal actors who may help them, and thus more accurately depicts indi-
viduals’ decisions about engaging in corruption.
Economic development explanations are based on large- n analyses. Many of 
these studies have found correlations between economic development and per-
ceived or “experienced” corruption.19 They have found that higher levels of eco-
nomic development coincide with lower levels of perceived or experienced 
corruption. The studies typically use per capita gross domestic product at pur-
chasing power parity as a mea sure of economic development and one or more 
existing corruption data sets, such as Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index and Global Corruption Barometer or the World Bank’s World 
Business Environment Survey and World Governance indicators. These data 
sets collect information about petty corruption and, in some cases, also grand 
19. Surveys claiming to mea sure corruption that people have experienced are often instead only 
measuring corruption that people perceive.
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corruption.20 The relationship between economic development and corruption 
is robust; the relationship cannot be explained by infl uences such as in e qual ity, 
trade, infl ation, religion, ethnic heterogeneity, and region, as mea sured by a va-
riety of control variables in these studies.21
The fi rst weakness of these studies, however, is that, although they propose a 
causal explanation, they demonstrate only a correlation between economic de-
velopment and corruption.22 In fact, one review of these studies found that two 
common components of economic development— urbanization and greater av-
erage educational attainment— did not affect corruption levels,23 suggesting that 
the relationship is at least poorly understood, if not spurious. Furthermore, these 
studies cannot explain variation among people in a country. They use country- 
level mea sures of corruption and economic development, overlooking the fact 
that within a country some individuals engage in corruption more than oth-
ers do.
Explanations of corruption that focus on poverty avoid these two weaknesses; 
however, the absence- of- alternatives approach offers advantages. Poverty studies 
do provide helpful causal explanations, which clearly link poverty to corrupt ac-
tions: as James Scott wrote in 1969, “Poverty shortens a man’s time horizons and 
maximizes the effectiveness of short- run material inducements. Quite rationally 
he is willing to accept a job, cash, or simply the promise of assistance when he 
needs it, in return for his vote and that of his family.”24 Compared to my ap-
proach, these theories are rather limited in scope because they focus on one type 
20. The Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance indicators 
use surveys of average citizens and domestic and international businesspeople and also business ex-
perts’ ratings. The Global Corruption Barometer asks average citizens whether the respondent or 
anyone in the respondent’s  house hold has paid a bribe. The World Business Environment Survey 
surveys fi rms. For more information, see Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index,” 
 http:// www .transparency .org / (accessed December 19, 2013); Transparency International, “Global 
Corruption Barometer,”  http:// www .transparency .org / (accessed December 19, 2013); Daniel 
Kaufman and Andrew H. W. Stone, “World Business Environment Survey,” World Bank, 1999– 2000, 
 http:// go .worldbank .org /RV060VBJU0 (accessed December 19, 2013); Daniel Kaufmann, Aart 
Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analyti-
cal Issues” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010).
21. Treisman fi nds that the inclusion of variables for demo cratic institutions and free media 
does affect the relationship, suggesting that it may, in fact, be these aspects of highly eco nom ical ly 
developed countries that explain their lower levels of perceived and experienced corruption. How-
ever, this is only a preliminary fi nding. Treisman, “What Have We Learned About the Causes of 
Corruption,” 225.
22. See the Alternative Explanations section of chapter four for a description of these theories 
and tests of them with the Central Asian cases.
23. Treisman, “What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption,” 225.
24. Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Po liti cal Change,” 1150. Others have reiterated 
this idea, for example, Kitschelt and Wilkinson, “Citizen- Politician Linkages,” 25; Offe, “Po liti cal 
Corruption”; Sindzingre, “A Comparative Analysis of African and East Asian Corruption,” 452– 53.
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of corruption—vote- selling or exchanging one’s vote for a material good. More 
critically, they assume that only authorities, in this case party machines, are 
resource- rich. They overlook the possibility that there may be societal actors or 
kin who can help poor individuals meet their basic needs.
The absence- of- alternatives approach offers advantages over other corrup-
tion explanations. It accounts for differences in corruption among countries and 
among individuals, and it offers a parsimonious, generalizable, causal explana-
tion for why people engage in corruption. These theoretical contributions trans-
late into concrete policy recommendations, which are the focus of the conclud-
ing chapter of the book. The next chapter begins the pro cess of illustrating the 
applicability of the theory to Central Asia and other regions of the world by de-





Evidence from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
“I would need to have an acquaintance or pay a bribe,” Marzhan, the villager 
from Kazakhstan, said, explaining the standard approach for obtaining credit 
from the local government in her district.1 Marzhan had decided to apply for 
credit through the raion akimat (district administrative offi ce) and establish a 
business because her family has been in dire straits. Both she and her husband, 
Temir, have been unemployed for several years, except for a few weeks in the 
summer when Temir fi nds work driving a combine. They have four children to 
support, and they bring in only 23 USD per month when it costs about 50 USD 
to run a six- person  house hold. Despite these diffi cult economic circumstances, 
Marzhan abandoned her efforts to obtain credit when neighbors informed her 
that it was standard to offer a bribe or use a personal connection in the district 
offi ce. As noted in the fi rst chapter, she does not like to give bribes, and she did 
not have a personal connection in the raion akimat.
Marzhan’s story about the route to obtaining credit highlights that in Kazakh-
stan citizens engage in corrupt practices in order to secure state resources that 
will help them to cope with economic challenges. This is true in Kyrgyzstan as 
well, and these practices are what this book seeks to explain. In this chapter the 
details of the corruption unfold. The interviews I conducted offer direct evi-
dence that citizens use bribes, personal connections, and promises of po liti cal 
support to try to obtain money, credit, and employment from government offi -
cials. Whereas the interview data reveal the illicit nature of citizens’ efforts to 
1. Author’s interview (#161), Kazakhstan, July 22, 2001.
36     CHAPTER 3
secure resources from government offi cials, the survey data demonstrate how 
citizens are competing among themselves for state resources, and thus a bribe, 
connection, or promise of po liti cal support can provide an individual with an 
edge. The survey data also show how relatively common the practice of seeking 
help from government offi cials is. Citizens’ most pressing needs are money, 
credit, and employment, and they try to obtain these resources from village lead-
ers and raion and oblast (provincial) bureaucrats and to a lesser extent oblast 
and national deputies. The money, credit, and employment that offi cials can 
distribute for bribes and favors come from different sources. Village leaders 
can direct government welfare benefi ts and resources from state banks and 
societal organizations to supplicants; raion and oblast bureaucrats can distribute 
credit from state programs; oblast and national deputies can provide resources 
from other state positions they hold or, if they are personally wealthy, their own 
largesse.
Bribes, Personal Connections, and 
Promises of Po liti cal Support
Citizens use an array of informal techniques, including bribes, personal connec-
tions, and promises of po liti cal support. Individuals’ decisions about which 
technique to try are infl uenced by a near universal preference for using connec-
tions, their own economic positions, and the identities, locations, and positions 
of the targeted offi cials. Using a connection is typically preferred to paying a 
bribe, which requires giving up one’s money or, in some cases, a portion of the 
resource obtained. The most impoverished citizens are the least able to use bribes 
because they do not have the necessary funds, although they can share some of 
the goods and ser vices they obtain with the offi cials. Those who are more affl u-
ent, yet still need employment, credit, or money, will sometimes choose to pay a 
bribe instead of owing a favor to a connection. For all citizens, the offi cial’s iden-
tity also matters. Is the offi cial a personal connection or not? Even the poorest 
citizens tend to have useful connections because the offi cials targeted are low- 
ranking. One might not know a government minister, but one is likely to know 
a town bureaucrat. The large size of families, particularly in rural areas, and the 
legacy of mass education and promotion of rural cadres mean that even the 
poorest have kinship and school ties. Individuals also consider the location of 
the offi cial and whether meeting face- to- face with the person would be prohibi-
tively costly. Whether the offi cial is elected is important too. A promise of elec-
toral support is feasible only if the targeted offi cial is elected. Those who can 
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promise not only their own votes but also the votes of others can most effectively 
use this technique. For example, the promise of a respected elder to ensure nu-
merous votes carries more weight than the promise of an ordinary citizen to pro-
vide his or her vote. The use of these three techniques to try to secure credit, em-
ployment, and money is evident from the 203 in- depth interviews I conducted 
with average citizens, government offi cials, and background in for mants.2
Bribery is prevalent in the government credit pro cess, as Marzhan described 
and as government offi cials and local representatives of international fi nancial 
institutions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan corroborated. An employee of a city 
government offi ce for the support of small- and medium- size businesses in 
southern Kazakhstan volunteered that taking bribes from individuals seeking as-
sistance was common in her line of work. In Kyrgyzstan a local employee of an 
international or ga ni za tion recounted, “I have heard that at the branches [of a 
government bank] they hold out their hat” to credit applicants, meaning that 
bribes are regularly given to bank offi cials.3 Reacting to the prevalence of brib-
ery in the credit pro cess, a Eu ro pe an Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
offi ce in central Kazakhstan provides its clients with a letter to reduce the likeli-
hood that they will need to pay a bribe in order to register their collateral with 
state offi cials.
Individuals who have personal connections with offi cials in government 
credit institutions will use those contacts instead of offering bribes. For example, 
despite high fuel prices, farmers in a southern district of Kazakhstan travel an 
hour and a half to another district to seek credit because they have personal ties 
with offi cials there, according to the head of a raion agency to support small- and 
medium- size business. The benefi t of saving money makes personal connections 
common in credit transactions. “ ‘I know your director,’ ” is a frequent refrain 
from potential clients, according to an employee of a bank with a state credit- 
lending program in southern Kazakhstan.4 Farmers in northern Kyrgyzstan of-
fered similar accounts. A farmer who grows fruits, vegetables, and animal feed 
and has twice obtained credit explained, “Connections have played a role. With-
out connections people would not receive credit.”5 Likewise, a farmer who 
grows wheat, clover, and corn; raises sheep; and has borrowed three times said, 
2. The background in for mants included unsuccessful electoral candidates and representatives 
of electoral commissions, local media, and international fi nancial institutions. I conducted an addi-
tional sixty- three interviews with societal actors, such as religious leaders and representatives of 
charities. Material from these interviews appears in chapter fi ve.
3. Author’s interview (#124), Kyrgyzstan, May 25, 2009.
4. Author’s interview (#142), Kazakhstan, July 3, 2001.
5. Author’s interview (#128), Kyrgyzstan, May 30, 2009.
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“To receive credit you need connections.”6 Also in Kyrgyzstan a man now 
working as a driver explained that his auto mechanic business failed because he 
did not have the connections needed to obtain the credit to make his venture 
profi table.
Personal connections that citizens use include their acquaintances from post-
secondary school and military ser vice as well as people in their families, clans, 
ethnic groups, and regions. The employee of a bank with a state credit- lending 
program in southern Kazakhstan described how many potential clients would 
say, “ ‘My uncle works  here,’ to try to infl uence the decisions.”7 Citizens use these 
personal connections not only to obtain credit but also to secure a job. In one 
oblast of Kyrgyzstan, the oblast prosecutor, head of the oblast offi ce of a federal 
agency, and a raion akim (district leader) all have the same mother- in- law. A local 
journalist with in de pen dent media outlets indicated that the offi cials obtained 
their prominent positions through this family connection. I witnessed the use of 
personal connections to attempt to obtain employment fi rsthand in a Kyrgyz 
 house hold in northern Kyrgyzstan. A distant acquaintance contacted the middle- 
aged parents in the  house hold about meeting with them to discuss the possible 
marriage of his son to their daughter. At the meeting, the potential groom’s fa-
ther offered his son and then asked that the potential bride’s parents have their 
son, the deputy head of a national government agency, provide the potential 
groom with a job. The potential bride’s mother also received a request from her 
sister- in- law that the same son alter her niece’s civil ser vice exam results so that 
she could obtain a government job.
Personal connections can also be useful in maintaining one’s job. A journalist 
in central Kyrgyzstan described how he required protection from government 
harassment because he worked for in de pen dent media outlets and therefore crit-
icized authorities. His protection comes in the form of the district prosecutor, 
who is a friend from school, and the head of the district court, who is a former 
classmate of his wife, he explained.
Besides school and family connections, regional and clan affi liations are also 
commonly activated in exchanges between citizens and government offi cials. An 
editor at an oblast newspaper in southern Kyrgyzstan recounted how as part of 
the selection pro cess for the position, staff members asked, “ ‘Where are you 
from? What are your origins? Who was your mother?’ ”8 Using the term clan in 
a professional setting is rare in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but asking questions 
such as these can be considered appropriate.
6. Author’s interview (#131), Kyrgyzstan, May 30, 2009.
7. Author’s interview (#142), Kazakhstan, July 3, 2001.
8. Author’s interview (#56), Kyrgyzstan, April 29, 1998.
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Clan ties play a role in the credit pro cess too. Government “bureaucrats try to 
get credit for their ‘brothers,’ ” meaning those with whom they share clan or fam-
ily ties, according to the manager of an agricultural consulting ser vice in northern 
Kyrgyzstan.9 An editor with a provincial government newspaper in central Kyr-
gyzstan gave a more specifi c example, explaining that state agricultural credit 
had been distributed in his region recently based on clan ties.
Ethnic ties have also been infl uential in obtaining and maintaining employ-
ment in government institutions. Posts in the customs, tax, and passport control 
agencies reportedly have tended to go to members of the titular ethnic groups 
because opportunities for extracting bribes when working in these positions make 
them some of the more lucrative government jobs. A staff member of an ethnic 
Rus sian or ga ni za tion that monitors the status of the Rus sian minority in Kyrgyz-
stan explained that offi cials often discriminate in favor of members of their own 
ethnic groups when distributing jobs with these agencies. Similarly, a young 
woman recounted to me how her father, an ethnic Rus sian, felt forced to retire 
from his position as an offi cer in the Kyrgyzstani military as hiring and promotion 
have increasingly favored ethnic Kyrgyz since the country became in de pen dent.
The use of ethnic ties in competition for state resources is also refl ected in the 
mass surveys I conducted in the countries. Whereas 20 percent of Kazakh re-
spondents have sought assistance from government offi cials in Kazakhstan in the 
past year, only 12 percent of non- Kazakh respondents have sought assistance. In 
Kyrgyzstan, 30 percent of Kyrgyz respondents have sought assistance from gov-
ernment offi cials, but only 13 percent of non- Kyrgyz have done so.10
Besides bribes and connections, promises of po liti cal support are exchanged 
in return for elected offi cials’ help. For meeting everyday needs this form of cor-
ruption is least common because citizens are most likely to turn to more acces-
sible lower- level offi cials, such as village leaders, but since in de pen dence they 
have been less likely to be elected than oblast and national deputies.11 While citi-
zens can promise po liti cal support other than votes, votes are most tangible. The 
evidence of clientelism thus comes mostly from higher levels of government and 
 9. Author’s interview (#125), Kyrgyzstan, May 26, 2009.
10. These percentages come from the second question in a series of two. First, respondents an-
swered the question “What are the three most serious problems you face in your daily life? Please call 
the fi rst the most serious problem, then the second and third.” Second, they responded to the ques-
tion, “Which people and organizations have you relied on for help with these problems? Choose as 
many as apply.” Respondents received a card with twenty- one actors and institutions listed, includ-
ing “no one” and the option to list others. Interviewers read the card aloud.
11. Only since 2001 in Kyrgyzstan and 2006 in Kazakhstan has it been possible to elect village 
leaders, whereas deputies to representative bodies, maslikhats in Kazakhstan and keneshes in Kyrgyz-
stan, and to the national parliamentary bodies, Majlis in Kazakhstan and the Zhogorku Kenesh in 
Kyrgyzstan, have been elected since in de pen dence.
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during electoral campaigns. For example, national deputies from different re-
gions of Kyrgyzstan described how they received requests for material assistance 
from individual constituents and often distributed student stipends to grateful 
voters in response. One deputy explained that he also gives out gifts of 1,000 som, 
or 55 USD at the time, a suffi cient amount to start some small businesses.
During electoral campaigns material assistance is too modest to help people 
solve the problem of insuffi cient money. Citizens demand small gifts, such as med-
icine, fl our, sugar, tea, vodka, and little sums of money. Citizens also expect that 
national parliamentary candidates will host parties where they can get a free meal. 
This modest material assistance is not even available in all races. Few oblast candi-
dates provide material assistance because, as a journalist in southern Kyrgyzstan 
explained, “There was no reason because what do they [oblast deputies] decide?”12 
In other words, oblast deputies have few responsibilities and little infl uence, 
so candidates typically do not put much effort into these races. Instead, material 
assistance is typically only available from candidates in higher- level races.
Another election- time clientelist exchange, though, does have an effect on 
long- term material stability: individuals exchanging po liti cal loyalty for job se-
curity. Although job loss for po liti cal activity is possible at any time, it is more 
likely during elections when people are more po liti cally engaged.13 A common 
occurrence is that government employees support an incumbent’s electoral bid 
in order not to lose their jobs. For example, in the presidential election in Kyr-
gyzstan in the summer of 2008, state university staff collected signatures on 
petitions nominating incumbent Kurmanbek Bakiyev so as to keep their jobs. 
Whereas these individuals exchanged po liti cal assistance for continued employ-
ment, others use bribes, personal connections, and other forms of po liti cal sup-
port to try to obtain employment, credit, or money.
The State as an Arena for Competition
Individuals in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan use these informal techniques be-
cause they believe that such methods will provide them with an advantage in the 
competition for state resources. People in these countries describe their states 
primarily as arenas where they compete for goods and ser vices for themselves 
and their families. In the surveys, respondents  were asked to agree or disagree 
12. Author’s interview (#54), Kyrgyzstan, April 28, 1998.
13. Kelly M. McMann, Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Rus sia and Kyr-
gyzstan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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with a series of statements representing different relationships between individ-
uals and their states. In Kazakhstan 70 percent of respondents and in Kyrgyzstan 
61 percent strongly agreed or agreed with the statement “Citizens compete to 
possess state resources, such as jobs.”
By contrast, other descriptions of individual– state relations— the state as a 
guarantor of resources and the Western social contract— did not resonate with 
most survey respondents. Only about 30 percent of respondents in each country 
affi rmed the statement “Citizens use state resources, such as medical ser vices 
and education.” The idea that people “use” state resources was a particularly 
common way to describe the Soviet welfare state. The Soviet state provided ex-
tensive social ser vices to the population. Many consumer products and some 
ser vices  were of poor quality and there  were shortages of some goods by the 
1980s. Nonetheless, for de cades Soviet citizens had received basic cradle- to- 
grave support.14 With the birth of a child, a family received supplemental in-
come. Free or highly subsidized day care, education, and recreation for the child 
followed. Upon graduation the child, now an adult, received a job assignment 
from the state. Through the workplace, the individual acquired subsidized hous-
ing and utilities, received health care and vacations, and had access to credit for 
consumer purchases. In addition, the individual earned income to use toward 
the purchase of highly subsidized basic goods.  Union dues and money to sup-
port a poverty fund  were taken directly from citizens’ pay; however, these deduc-
tions  were not comparable to the payment of taxes. The distribution of these 
resources was not linked to a citizen’s obligation to pay taxes; the state was the 
guarantor of goods and ser vices regardless. According to Kazakhstanis and Kyr-
gyzstanis their states are no longer guarantors of goods and ser vices.
The governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have promoted the idea of 
the Western social contract through both their economic reforms and their rhet-
oric; however, most citizens do not fi nd that this accurately describes individual– 
state relations either. Only about 30 percent of respondents in each country af-
fi rmed the statement “Citizens expect that the state will provide ser vices if they 
pay their taxes,” as Table 3.1 shows. An even smaller number of people found 
relevant paradigms of individual– state relations drawn from studies of other re-
gions of the world. Less than 20 percent of respondents described citizens as in-
corporated in the state, the state as highly involved in citizens’ lives, or the state 
as embedded in, yet autonomous from society.15
14. Linda J. Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed: Welfare Policy and Workers’ Poli-
tics from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 25– 53.
15. The other models are incorporation, the overdeveloped state, and embedded autonomy. For 
defi nitions of these, see: Victor Azarya, “Reordering State- Society Relations: Incorporation and Dis-
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Most citizens in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan consider the state primarily an 
arena for competition; however, only a portion of citizens compete for state 
resources themselves. In Kazakhstan 19 percent of survey respondents and in 
Kyrgyzstan 24 percent turned to a state institution or offi cial for assistance 
in the previous year. Nonetheless, more people sought help from the state than 
from any other societal or market actor. At most, 4 percent of respondents in 
Kazakhstan and 4 percent in Kyrgyzstan sought help from a par tic u lar societal 
engagement,” in The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa, ed. Donald S. Rothchild and 
Naomi Chazan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 3– 21,  here 6; Peter B. Evans, “The State as 
Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change,” in The Politics of 
Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Confl icts, and the State, ed. Stephan 
Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (Prince ton: Prince ton University Press, 1992), 139– 81,  here 165– 
66; Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1990); Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, State Power and Social 
Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 25.
TABLE 3.1. Citizens’ relationships with states in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: 
Arena of competition, guarantor, social contract (percentage of respondents, 
rounded)
CITIZENS COMPETE 
TO POSSESS STATE 
RESOURCES, SUCH 
AS JOBS
CITIZENS USE STATE 
RESOURCES, SUCH AS 
MEDICAL SER VICES 
AND EDUCATION
CITIZENS EXPECT THAT 
THE STATE WILL PROVIDE 
SER VICES IF THEY PAY 
THEIR TAXES
KAZAKHSTAN




Disagree or strongly 
disagree
11 35 35
Diffi cult to answer 6 2 8
Decline to answer 1 1 1
TOTAL (rounded) 100 100 100
KYRGYZSTAN




Disagree or strongly 
disagree
12 29 32
Diffi cult to answer 7 3 8
Decline to answer <1 <1 <1
TOTAL (rounded) 100 100 100
Note: n = 1,500 for each country. Percentages for each country do not necessarily total to 100 because they 
are rounded.
For each country the difference in percentages between the most pop u lar statement and each of the less 
pop u lar statements is statistically signifi cant at the .001 level, meaning that such a difference would be 
observed due to random chance approximately .1 percent of the time.
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or market actor, as indicated in Table 3.2. Individuals seeking state assistance 
typically turn to government offi cials once, twice, or four times a year, as Table 
3.3 shows. More pop u lar than any of the state, societal, or market sources of 
assistance, however, is family; reliance on family is the focus of chapter six. 
Although not ubiquitous, the pursuit of state resources instead of societal or 
market ones is a signifi cant practice because it violates the intent of market re-
form to reduce state reliance. Because this contact with the state often involves 
TABLE 3.2. Individuals and institutions from whom citizens have sought 




Any state actor a 19 24
Government offi cial 16 23
MARKET AND SOCIETAL ACTORSb
Any market or societal actor 16 14
Bank c 3 1
Current employer c 4 3
Former employer c 4 2
Local company where you don’t work c 3 <1
Foreign company where you don’t work <1 0
Religious institution/leader 1 2
Foreign charitable or ga ni za tion <1 1
Local, private charitable or ga ni za tion 1 2
Labor  unionc 1 1
Respected male elder 1 4
Educational institutionc <1 2
PERSONAL CONTACT
Any family or friendd 39 47
Familye 35 42
Note: n = 1,200 for Kazakhstan and 1,199 for Kyrgyzstan. A portion of the 1,500 respondents in each country 
claimed that they had no problems or that describing their problems was too diffi cult and thus some 
respondents  were not asked this question about seeking assistance.
a The broader state category includes the replies of a small number of respondents who specifi ed law 
enforcement, social security, and government employment offi ces as separate from “government offi cials.”
b Another societal institution is the mahalla, a subdivision of urban neighborhoods, particularly Uzbek ones, and 
a favorite topic among Central Asian observers. I did not include it in the survey because the concept is 
relevant primarily to urban, ethnic Uzbek communities. However, there is overlap with the category of neighbors 
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and the survey question did allow respondents to list other institutions. No one 
in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan listed the mahalla as a place to turn for help.
c Some employers, local companies, banks, labor  unions, and educational institutions remain state institutions 
in these countries as a result of the communist period; however, market reforms have ensured that most are 
now nonstate entities. Including all these actors and institutions in the “market and societal actors” category 
increases the diffi culty of arguing that the reliance on the state is greater than reliance on nonstate actors.
d Included in this category  were members of  house holds, relatives living in one’s own country, relatives living in 
another country, neighbors, friends who are not neighbors, acquaintances, and coworkers.
e Included in this category  were members of  house holds, relatives living in one’s own country, and relatives 
living in another country.
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bribery, personal connections, and promises of po liti cal support, these interac-
tions also introduce the negative implications of petty corruption.
Those who seek assistance from state offi cials come from many different de-
mographic backgrounds. Men and women and people of all ages have sought 
help from the state, as indicated in Table 3.4. Females are slightly more repre-
sented among those who have sought assistance in Kazakhstan and less repre-
sented in Kyrgyzstan. These small differences in percentages of men and women 
seeking state aid challenge the ste reo type, often propagated by casual observers 
of Central Asia, of women in the region as passive. The absence of signifi cant age 
differences is interesting because we might expect individuals who  were adults in 
the Soviet era to be more likely to seek state assistance because of the extensive 
state benefi ts and the absence of nonstate alternatives in that period. Instead, the 
minimal differences in age suggest that as a group older people have adapted to 
new welfare circumstances, adopting coping strategies similar to their younger 
counterparts.
What does distinguish those who seek and do not seek help are ethnicity, 
place of residence, and economic circumstances. These differences are evidence 
in support of the argument that market reform promotes corrupt practices, as 
described later in this chapter and chapter four. Later sections of this chapter 
describe how differences in ethnicity and place of residence relate to forms and 
targets of corruption, respectively; chapter four marshals the evidence about all 
three types of differences in support of the argument.
TABLE 3.3. Frequency of seeking assistance from state actors in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (percentage of respondents, rounded)
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN
Once in the past year 31 26
Twice in the past year 25 27
Four times in the past year 20 24
Each month in the past year 12 11
Twice monthly in the past year 4 4
Weekly in the past year 1 2
Every day in the past year 0 1
Not the past year, but the previous 
year
7 4
TOTAL (rounded) 100 100
Note: n = 229 for Kazakhstan and 293 for Kyrgyzstan for the number of respondents who 
sought assistance from state actors. State actors includes the category “government 
offi cials” as well as the replies of a small number of respondents who specifi ed law 
enforcement, social security, and government employment offi ces as separate from 
“government offi cials.” When a respondent offered more than one of these categories, the 
response of greatest frequency was used. Percentages for each country do not necessarily 
total to 100 because they are rounded.
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Resources Sought from 
Government Officials
People in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan seek money, credit, and employment from 
state offi cials because a common problem in both countries is lack of funds. 
Eighty- three percent and 52 percent of respondents who had sought help from 
state offi cials in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively, identifi ed lack of 
money as one of their top three problems in daily life, as indicated in Table 3.5. 
Unemployment was the source of money problems for 40 percent and 23 per-
cent of respondents who sought state help, respectively. Other root causes  were 
inability to obtain credit, low salaries, and high prices, as well as unpaid wages, 
pensions, and children’s benefi ts. Respondents reported that lack of money 
made it diffi cult to afford housing, utilities, medical ser vices and medications, 
public transportation, education, livestock, fodder, and fuel.
Government offi cials in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also described how people 
lack funds and subsequently request money, credit, and employment.16 For ex-
ample, a deputy in an oblast maslikhat (regional representative body) in central 
Kazakhstan explained that his constituents request money to pay for utilities, and 
16. This paragraph presents representative evidence from interviews with seventy- two govern-
ment offi cials in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
TABLE 3.4. Demographic similarities of those who seek and do not seek help 
from state offi cials in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (percentage of respondents, 
rounded)
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN
SEEK HELP DO NOT SEEK HELP SEEK HELP DO NOT SEEK HELP
GENDER
Male 43 46 51 43
Female 57 54 49 57
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
AGE
75 or older 8 4 3 4
65–74 11 10 6 8
55–64 16 11 10 10
45–54 15 18 14 14
35–44 24 24 25 22
25–34 18 18 26 24
18–24 7 15 17 20
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
Note: n = 229 for those who seek help and 1,271 for those who do not seek help in Kazakhstan and 293 for 
those who seek help and 1,207 for those who do not seek help in Kyrgyzstan. Percentages for each column do 
not necessarily total 100 because they are rounded.
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assistance in fi nding jobs. A deputy in an oblast kenesh (regional representative 
body) in southern Kyrgyzstan recounted that people request money for utility 
payments as well as medical ser vices, home repairs, and, when pension payments 
are delayed, daily expenses. He also regularly receives requests for credit and for 
assistance in fi nding a job. A deputy governor in central Kyrgyzstan said that resi-
dents of his region approach him about fi nding jobs for members of their 
 house holds, especially when every adult member is without work. At public meet-
ings with the governor, individual constituents frequently demand funds to re-
solve personal problems, according to a local journalist who covers these events. A 
deputy to the national parliament, the Zhogorku Kenesh, from southern Kyrgyz-
stan described how credit and employment requests are also made of him. Be-
sides lack of money, the poor quality of public infrastructure is a common chal-
lenge.17 Less common problems include personal crises, bureaucratic challenges, 
societal crises, and other economic diffi culties, as the data in Table 3.5 show.
17. Because of the relative poverty of Kyrgyzstan compared to Kazakhstan, poor public infra-
structure poses a greater challenge to residents of Kyrgyzstan. Sixty- seven percent of the population 
in Kyrgyzstan was living on less than 2 USD per day in 2002 versus 22 percent in Kazakhstan. In 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, respectively, 47 percent and 16 percent of respondents who sought state 
help identifi ed the diffi culty of obtaining water for drinking and irrigation as a main problem. Some 
locations have never had access to reliable, safe sources of water, whereas others have witnessed the 
deterioration of canals that used to provide water. Respondents in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan also 
identifi ed the absence and poor quality of other utilities, including electricity, cooking gas, and sew-
TABLE 3.5. Types of problems for which respondents sought assistance from 
state offi cials in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (percentage of respondents, 
rounded)
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN
Lack of money 83 52
Poor public infrastructure 31 61
Personal crisesa 14 8
Bureaucratic challengesb 12 5
Societal crisesc 10 2
Economic diffi cultiesd 6 17
Note: n = 229 for Kazakhstan and 293 for Kyrgyzstan for the number of people who turned to state offi cials for 
assistance in the past year. The percentages for each country exceed 100 because respondents could list up 
to three problems.
a Personal crises include poor health, death or imprisonment of a loved one, caring for old or ill parents, raising 
one’s children, completing one’s education, and dealing with an unreasonable boss.
b Examples of bureaucratic challenges include “red tape,” offi cials’ abuse of power, and unfair tax and 
nationalities policies.
c Societal crises include crime, environmental degradation, HIV/AIDS, alcoholism, drug addiction, homelessness 
of children, dishonest people, and distrust among people.
d Economic diffi culties include insuffi cient arable land, decline of agriculture, limited economic opportunities for 
nontitular language speakers, poor quality goods, and foot and mouth disease among livestock.
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Targets of Citizens’ Demands
While citizens do request help from oblast and national offi cials, their most 
common targets in their search for assistance are village and raion offi cials. Text-
box 3.1 depicts the different levels of government. Of the survey respondents 
who had sought assistance from government offi cials in the previous year, 80 
percent in Kazakhstan and 54 percent in Kyrgyzstan requested help from village 
or city offi cials, as indicated in Table 3.6. However, village offi cials are really the 
main players: twenty- two percent of rural residents in Kazakhstan and 31 per-
cent in Kyrgyzstan have sought government assistance compared to only 9 percent 
and 6 percent of urban dwellers, respectively. The next most pop u lar offi cials to 
turn to are raion ones. In Kazakhstan 29 percent and in Kyrgyzstan 39 percent of 
respondents had turned to raion offi cials for assistance. The fi gures  were only 
6 percent and 13 percent for oblast offi cials and 3 percent and 5 percent for na-
tional offi cials in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively.18 A higher percentage 
of survey respondents turn to local offi cials in Kazakhstan relative to Kyrgyzstan, 
likely refl ecting the larger size of Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan the average oblast 
size is 167,000 square kilometers, whereas in Kyrgyzstan it is only 28,000 square 
kilometers.19




Local (village and city)
Individuals in both countries are most likely to seek assistance from local of-
fi cials because they are most accessible. Particularly for rural residents, it is dif-
age systems, as problems. The lack of paved roads and public transportation as well as the poor qual-
ity of those that do exist pose challenges. Respondents also complained about the availability and 
quality of medical facilities and educational institutions.
18. Respondents could select more than one type of offi cial.
19. These fi gures are calculated from data available from “Regions of Kazakhstan, 2005– 2009” 
(Astana: Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2010), 4; National Statistics Committee 
of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Itogi pervoi natsional’noi perepisi naseleniia Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki 1999 
goda” [First Results of the National Population Census of the Kyrgyz Republic in 1999] (National 
Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic),  http:// www .stat .kg /stat .fi les /census .pdf. (accessed De-
cember 19, 2013).
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fi cult to reach oblast and national offi cials. Much of the countries’ transporta-
tion infrastructures are of low quality, thus infl ating travel times, and the cost of 
gasoline can make travel prohibitive. Furthermore, the public transportation 
systems have eroded. National parliamentarians and sometimes oblast kenesh 
offi cials have constituent offi ces in towns, but even those can be diffi cult and 
expensive for rural residents to reach. Moreover, mail ser vice is slow and unreli-
able, and phone calls can be prohibitively expensive.
To better understand the practice of citizens turning to local offi cials, particu-
larly village offi cials, consider the village in southern Kazakhstan where Marzhan 
resides and where I lived, observed, and conducted interviews for nearly two 
months. In this village more than 20 people visit the deputy akim each day 
throughout the year with requests for work, social assistance, and credit.20 The 
village comprises 650 homes with a total of approximately 3,300 people. The vil-
lage formed in 1935 around the sovkhoz, where Marzhan and her husband used 
to work. Employment at the sovkhoz dropped from 780 to 11 individuals, none 
of whom receive a salary now. Half the able people in the village are unemployed. 
After the village leader, raion offi cials are the most common targets of those re-
questing help; seeking assistance from oblast offi cials is rare because of distance 
and transportation. By car the village is twenty minutes from the raion center 
and one and a half hours from the oblast capital. A bus travels three times a day 
from the village to the raion center, but not to the oblast capital. Some villagers 
with access to cars ferry neighbors back and forth to the raion center for a fee. 
Travel in a car to the oblast capital was prohibitively expensive for all. As in all 
rural areas, the village leader was most accessible. Reliance on raion, but not 
oblast, offi cials is common in villages because the raion center is typically closer.
20. The deputy akim is the de facto, day- to- day leader of this village because the akim is based in 
the district capital and oversees multiple villages.
TABLE 3.6. State offi cials from whom people sought 
assistance in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (percentage of 
respondents, rounded)
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN




Note: n = 229 for Kazakhstan and 293 for Kyrgyzstan for the number of people who 
turned to state offi cials for assistance in the previous year.
BRIBERY, FAVORITISM, AND CLIENTELISM     49
Government Officials’ Sources 
of Money, Credit, and Employment
What resources do offi cials at different levels have to respond to citizens’ re-
quests for assistance and potentially to distribute in return for bribes and other 
favors? Village offi cials— the most likely individuals to receive requests— direct 
national benefi t payments and international charitable donations to residents of 
their villages and seek additional resources from better- off residents and busi-
nesses. Raion and oblast bureaucrats channel credit from formal programs 
under their auspices. Members of oblast representative bodies and national par-
liamentary deputies typically hold a second state job that gives them access to 
resources, and both sets of offi cials can share their personal wealth.
Village Leaders’ Resources
Village governments have little money to spend, but they can acquire funds infor-
mally. The national governments in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have undertaken 
decentralization campaigns that have devolved responsibilities, but not adequate 
funding, to local governments. As a result, local leaders, particularly in villages 
where economies tend to be poor, are short of funds. Only by acting as gatekeep-
ers to benefi ts, credit, and charity from outside their villages and by seeking dona-
tions from wealthy residents do village leaders have access to some resources.
Village governments are short on funds because tax revenue goes to higher 
authorities, who tend to redistribute it in an arbitrary fashion. As the deputy 
akim of the village in southern Kazakhstan, explained, “The tax proceeds all go 
to the raion. There is nothing left. There is not enough left to buy a pen.”21 Dur-
ing much of the in de pen dence period, all local tax revenue in Kazakhstan and 80 
percent in Kyrgyzstan has gone to higher levels of government, and with the ex-
ception of land taxes in Kazakhstan, local offi cials cannot create new taxes.22 The 
higher levels of government then redistribute the local tax revenue in a rather 
21. Author’s interview (#172), Kazakhstan, July 26, 2001.
22. Meruert Makhmutova, “Local Government in Kazakhstan,” in Developing New Rules in the 
Old Environment: Local Governments in Eastern Eu rope, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, vol. 3, ed. 
Igor Munteanu and Victor Popa (Budapest: Central Eu ro pe an University Press, 2003), 403– 68,  here 
439; Nuruipa Mukanova, “Assessing ‘New Public Management’ Reforms in Kyrgyzstan,” in Mixes, 
Matches, and Mistakes: New Public Management in Rus sia and the Former Soviet Republics, ed. B. Guy 
Peters (Budapest: Open Society Institute/Local Government and Public Sector Reform Initiative, 
2008), 197– 296,  here 209.
A change in Kazakhstan allowed village governments to keep more tax revenue; however, the 
rates  were simultaneously reduced so that village governments will not have signifi cantly more 
funds. World Bank, “Republic of Kazakhstan: Tax Strategy Paper, Volume 1: A Strategic Plan for In-
creasing the Neutrality of the Tax System in Non- Extractive Sectors,” 36494- KZ (2008),  here 19.
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arbitrary manner, meaning that some villages receive more resources than oth-
ers but none can be sure of how much they will receive at any given time.23
Restricted taxation abilities and arbitrary redistribution are especially prob-
lematic because village governments have been given greater welfare responsi-
bilities as a part of the decentralization campaigns that the national governments 
have mounted. The funds that village governments have are simply too scant to 
cover the welfare responsibilities they have been delegated.24 By one estimate, 70 
percent of local government functions in Kyrgyzstan have been delegated from 
above without funding. Consequently, local governments are able to perform at 
most four of the eleven functions that are their responsibility. Unperformed 
functions include road repair and maintenance of schools, medical facilities, and 
communal transport, among other responsibilities.25
Although village leaders do not have money to spare, they can direct resources to 
individuals because they serve as gatekeepers. Village leaders are formal gatekeepers 
in the sense that the national governments have made them responsible for identi-
fying who should receive benefi ts in their villages. Identifi cation of who is fi nan-
cially needy has become particularly important with the reform of the welfare sys-
tems. Each country has moved from the Soviet system of privileges for all members 
of par tic u lar groups to monetary assistance based on need.26 For example, children 
under age sixteen, students up to age twenty- one, people unable to work, and pen-
sioners qualify for a monthly payment in Kyrgyzstan if their average per capita fam-
ily income falls below the guaranteed minimum consumer level of 200 som (about 
5 USD) per person per month. In Kazakhstan, people who receive similar assistance 
include children whose family income is less than 1,550 tenge (about 11 USD) per 
month per person and people who pay more than 30 percent of their income to 
utilities and have less than eigh teen square meters of living space per person.
23. A. N. Deryugin, “The Challenges of Decentralization in the Kyrgyz Republic: The Kyrgyz 
Republic: Government Structure and Reform of the Bud getary System” (Budapest: Open Society 
Institute/Local Government and Public Sector Reform Initiative: Fiscal Decentralization Initiative 
for Central and Eastern Eu rope, 2007),  here 7; S. Slukhai and O. Honcharenko, “The Challenges of 
Decentralization in the Kyrgyz Republic: Financial Equalization at the Sub- National Level in the 
Ukraine, the Republic of Belarus, and the Kyrgyz Republic” (Budapest: Open Society Institute/Local 
Government and Public Sector Reform Initiative: Fiscal Decentralization Initiative for Central and 
Eastern Eu rope, 2007),  here 8.
24. Makhmutova, “Local Government in Kazakhstan,” 432.
25. Mukanova, “Assessing ‘New Public Management’ Reforms in Kyrgyzstan,” 216– 17.
26. A small portion of people receive assistance regardless of need. In Kyrgyzstan these individu-
als include children who have lost a breadwinner or both parents, mothers of many children, and 
people with certain disabilities. In Kazakhstan unemployed individuals who  were two years shy of 
pension age, have many or invalid children, or who are ethnic Kazakhs who returned to the country, 
among others, are eligible for unemployment benefi ts regardless of need.
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Villager leaders evaluate who is eligible for assistance and thus have signifi -
cant control over the resources. In Kazakhstan each village akim, working with a 
team he forms, develops a list of those in his village who meet the fi nancial re-
quirements to receive monetary assistance. The akim is also responsible for issu-
ing certifi cates to establish that an individual has characteristics, such as being a 
mother of a disabled child, that make him or her eligible for a government ben-
efi t. Those who receive benefi ts must then regularly demonstrate to the akim that 
they are still eligible for them. For example, a mother of a disabled child must 
prove to the akim that her child remains disabled. In Kyrgyzstan the heads of the 
aiyl okmota (village council) play a similar role in determining who should re-
ceive benefi ts. Each country’s ministry of social protection relies on the certifi -
cates and lists generated by village leaders to determine who receives help.
These responsibilities give the village leaders considerable infl uence in the 
distribution of state benefi ts. For example, in Kazakhstan Marzhan recounted 
how the leader of her village rejected her request to be eligible for state monetary 
assistance, “He said, ‘You are rich. You have a tractor and a cow.’ ” I asked if she 
then traveled to the raion capital to ask those offi cials for help. “Where would I go 
in [the raion capital]? If the village akim would not help, why would they? They 
would ask, ‘From where did you appear?’ ” she replied.27 The head of a raion offi ce 
of the department of labor, employment, and social protection corroborated that 
the question of whether a person has a right to receive a benefi t rarely reaches 
him. One of his superiors at the oblast level confi rmed that to receive benefi ts an 
individual must have his or her village akim’s support and only then can the indi-
vidual continue with the pro cess.
Village leaders are gatekeepers not only to state benefi ts, but also to state and 
nonstate credit and charitable assistance. State banks, state credit programs, 
professional associations, and charitable organizations rely on akims’ authority 
to issue documents and knowledge of villagers’ needs. For example, the head of 
the credit department for a state bank in Kyrgyzstan described how the bank 
works closely with village leaders to lend microcredit to the needy. In Kazakh-
stan an oblast credit program requires applicants fi rst to submit their materials 
to their local akims for review. In Kyrgyzstan village leaders also use their infl u-
ence in the credit pro cess to encourage repayment of loans. A manager at a state 
bank explained, “Aksakals and the aiyl okmota leaders go [to the clients] and say, 
‘Kids, you need to pay.’ ”28 Aksakals have some infl uence because of the respect 
for elders in these countries.
27. Author’s interview (#161), Kazakhstan, July 22, 2001.
28. Author’s interview (#126), Kyrgyzstan, May 27, 2009.
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Village leaders also play a role in directing the resources of charitable associa-
tions. The head of a raion branch of the Red Cross/Red Crescent in southern 
Kazakhstan explained that she distributes donations, such as children’s clothing, 
using the lists of the needy that the village leaders create. “The village authorities 
do research into who needs assistance because people do not tell the truth or 
they are ashamed,” she explained.29
Village leaders are also informal gatekeepers in the sense that they are a vital 
source of information about resources beyond the village. They receive informa-
tion about employment and credit opportunities because they are contact people 
for entities operating outside the village. For example, the head of a nongovern-
mental agricultural association in Kazakhstan explained that he shared informa-
tion about acquiring credit with the village akims in the raion where he works and 
they disseminated it to residents of their villages. Village offi cials also know to 
refer their residents to raion or oblast government employment centers, which 
then provide the akims with a small number of people funded by the government 
to do public works, such as cleaning canals and streets, removing snow, and fi ght-
ing steppe fi res, for two to three months.
In addition to serving as formal and informal gatekeepers to credit and as-
sistance from outside the village, village leaders obtain funds from comparatively 
wealthy residents in their village. As the deputy akim of the village in southern 
Kazakhstan put it, “The only money comes from the population.” Using dona-
tions from local families, he employs villagers for public works projects. He ex-
plained, “I asked the uncles and kids to go down their streets and ask each family 
for 30 tenge to use to clean the water canals.”30 The wealthier families contrib-
uted and the money went toward the wages of those the deputy akim employed. 
The deputy akim also created a program where thirty better- off families in the 
village provide assistance, usually food, to another poor family a few times a 
year. The phenomenon of contributions from better- off community members is 
not limited to this village. In fact, the deputy akim borrowed the idea from an-
other village. Wealthier villagers play the same role in Kyrgyzstan. The generos-
ity of these individuals is limited, of course, by their own resources and by their 
own evaluation of what makes a worthy cause. Marzhan’s uncle, Kanat, the well- 
off private farmer, described how the deputy akim had asked him to donate 
money so that the village could host a concert. Kanat declined to contribute and 
responded, “I would rather sing myself.”31
29. Author’s interview (#160), Kazakhstan, July 20, 2001.
30. Author’s interview (#172), Kazakhstan, July 26, 2001.
31. Author’s interview (#153), Kazakhstan, multiple dates in July and August 2001.
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City leaders do not play the roles of formal and informal gatekeepers as vil-
lage leaders do for a number of reasons. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have de-
partments of social protection staffed with bureaucrats and based in cities. These 
departments establish whether urban residents are eligible for benefi ts, so city 
akims in Kazakhstan and shaar bashchylar (mayors) in Kyrgyzstan do not carry 
out these tasks. Population densities are high enough in urban areas to locate these 
departments there, but this is not the case in rural areas. Because urban residents 
readily have access to these specialized bureaucrats, they do not rely on city akims 
and shaar bashchylar for information about resources outside the city. In addi-
tion, urban dwellers have access to more media and nonstate organizations, such 
as banks and charities, than rural residents, and thus can obtain information 
without the help of local offi cials. Organizations also rely less on city akims and 
shaar bashchylar than village leaders for information about their residents be-
cause the specialized bureaucracies exist and because city leaders do not know 
their residents as well. City leaders are not directly involved in the collection of 
information about residents’ needs and there are simply too many people in ur-
ban areas for city leaders to personally know or regularly interact with. Instead, 
urban residents seek assistance from raion and oblast bureaucrats, as some rural 
residents do as well.
Raion and Oblast Bureaucrats’ Resources
Raion and oblast bureaucrats manage credit programs from which they can 
redirect funds to those who seek assistance.32 Urban residents and villagers liv-
ing near raion and oblast capitals have easy access to raion and oblast bureau-
crats who administer these programs. Residents of villages far from capitals 
travel to seek assistance from raion and oblast bureaucrats only if they can secure 
free or inexpensive transportation with a family member, friend, or stranger who 
has a car.
Government business- credit programs, administered by oblast or raion bu-
reaucrats and funded by oblast and national governments,  were created because 
credit from private banks and microcredit companies has been in limited sup-
ply for much of the in de pen dence period, as described in chapter four. The ob-
jectives of most government programs are to shift the economy from subsis-
tence farming and small trade to commercial agriculture, manufacturing, and 
32. The raion and oblast levels also have government- run employment centers; however, I found 
no evidence of citizens’ use of informal practices to obtain jobs through these centers, most likely 
because only the least appealing jobs are advertised through centers. Lucrative jobs have already been 
snatched up through bribes and connections, and never reach the employment center.
54     CHAPTER 3
ser vices.33 To meet their objectives, the government programs lend to start- ups, 
agricultural ventures, and borrowers with minimal collateral and no other source 
of income, and demand repayment in relatively fewer intervals over a longer pe-
riod of time. This is in contrast to most private banks and reputable microcredit 
programs. As a result, this credit is a valuable resource for government offi cials to 
dispense.
Many of the government credit programs lend to agricultural ventures, help-
ing to address the problem of lack of credit in rural areas. Some programs pro-
vide start- up funds, enabling those who have lost their jobs or no longer receive 
their salaries, but have not yet developed businesses, to potentially earn income. 
For example, throughout Kazakhstan the national government funds a micro-
credit program run by oblast akimats. The program provides 400 USD interest- 
free to unemployed individuals to begin a business. The director of one of the 
oblast programs stressed the minimal requirements: “If a person has hands and 
skills, they get microcredit.”34 Projects include purchasing seeds to grow and sell 
potatoes and buying materials to start a shoe repair business.
Government programs have also mitigated the problem of steep collateral re-
quirements. In Kyrgyzstan a program run through a government bank to pro-
vide assistance in rural areas accepts rural homes, farm equipment and build-
ings, and livestock as collateral. This program also offers the option of community 
collateral, where other residents provide collateral on a borrower’s behalf. An 
oblast akimat in southern Kazakhstan has established a communal collateral fund, 
where the borrower contributes 30 percent of the collateral and the akimat con-
tributes 70 percent using oblast buildings, such as hospitals, offi ces, theaters, and 
hotels. Businesspeople have borrowed through this program to develop busi-
nesses in the livestock and wheat industries and to build a water park.
Longer loan and repayment periods are also available through government 
credit programs. An oblast government in southern Kazakhstan offers longer 
periods through its own credit program and one through a bank, which the na-
tional government partially owns. In both cases, the programs aim to address 
farmers’ diffi culties in repaying loans during growing seasons. The akimat pro-
gram offers loans for two- year periods, and farmers have borrowed in order to 
secure seeds, animals, fertilizer, land, and equipment. The program through the 
bank lends for eigh teen months with a grace period for repayment if necessary. 
Farmers have purchased seed and fuel through this program. The agricultural 
33. These government credit programs are not market- enhancing institutions themselves but 
instead are examples of government provision of a ser vice that a market actor cannot provide be-
cause of the absence of market- enhancing institutions. Market- enhancing institutions enable market 
actors to engage in their activities; they are not government substitutes for those activities.
34. Author’s interview (#204), Kazakhstan, June 11, 2001.
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credit program that operates through the government bank in Kyrgyzstan has 
extended the payment periods beyond one month to reduce risk for farmers 
there.
Government programs also offer loans at zero percent or a low percent. A 
national fund provided credit interest- free to poor families in agricultural regions. 
In a rural raion in southern Kazakhstan some farmers benefi ted from raion and 
oblast programs that lent at zero percent. The two- year program and eighteen- 
month program described above lend money for 7 percent and 8 percent, respec-
tively, instead of the typical 22– 33 percent for one year. However, few farmers, 
traders, and other businesspeople in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan indicated to 
me that loan rates  were a problem: most of the entrepreneurs I interviewed had 
not even been able to obtain credit or had such diffi culty securing it because 
of these restrictions that the rate was of less concern. Only those who borrow 
from the newest microcredit companies have encountered problems with high 
rates. The next chapter describes how these companies have proliferated in recent 
years and typically charge exorbitant rates.
The less stringent requirements of government credit programs make them a 
valuable resource that raion and oblast offi cials can distribute. Because these 
programs are relatively small, as chapter four describes, competition to obtain 
these resources is intense.
Oblast and National Deputies’ Resources
In their oblasts citizens seek assistance not only from bureaucrats who manage 
credit programs but also from deputies to the oblast maslikhat or kenesh. Na-
tional deputies who represent their oblasts in the country’s parliament are also 
possible targets, although they are the least accessible of all the offi cials to whom 
citizens turn for help. The resources that oblast and national deputies can pro-
vide to citizens depend less on their authority as representatives than on their 
second jobs or personal wealth. Many oblast and national deputies hold another 
state job from which they can take resources to use in clientelist exchanges.35 For 
example, oblast deputies who are doctors at state hospitals in Kyrgyzstan report 
that they provide free medicine and secure hospital admissions for constituents. 
An oblast deputy who works in the state coal industry in Kazakhstan is able to 
provide heat to people in his district. An oblast deputy in southern Kyrgyzstan 
used capital from his private advertising and information agency to open an 
35. For example, in the mid- 1990s more than two- thirds of the deputies in the Assembly of 
People’s Representatives in the Zhogorku Kenesh also had another position in the state administra-
tion. Eric McGlinchey, Chaos, Violence, Dynasty: Politics and Islam in Central Asia (Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011), 91.
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auto ser vice shop, a photography laboratory, and a press to provide jobs to con-
stituents.36 Through their second jobs or from their personal largesse oblast and 
national deputies secure resources that they can provide to constituents.
In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan individuals compete for state resources from vil-
lage leaders, raion and oblast bureaucrats, and, to a lesser extent, oblast and na-
tional deputies in order to meet their everyday needs; extensive welfare goods 
and ser vices from the state are no longer guaranteed to each person as they  were 
in the Soviet era. In the competition for resources from these offi cials, citizens 
use bribes, personal connections, and promises of po liti cal support. The next 
chapter shows how market reform, in the context of a legacy of signifi cant state 
economic intervention and absent or weak market- enhancing institutions, ac-
counts for these practices. Specifi cally, it explains why citizens turn to govern-
ment offi cials instead of market actors and why citizens use corruption in their 
interactions with leaders.
36. For additional accounts of clientelism in Kyrgyzstan, see Scott Radnitz, Weapons of the 
Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite- Led Protests in Central Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2010), 85– 86.
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MARKET ACTORS AS 
AN UNREALIZED ALTERNATIVE
The Effect of Market Reforms
“Everybody lives on their own,” Marzhan said to explain how people cope now 
without the Soviet welfare state.1 The idea of “living on one’s own,” in other 
words, being accountable for one’s own survival, is a frequent refrain among 
people in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It is also the governments’ stance 
and thus a partial explanation for why individuals use corrupt practices when 
trying to obtain state resources. Through the media and their conversations with 
citizens, government offi cials tell individuals that they are responsible for their 
own economic success or failure because Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are now 
market reformers. Faced with this message, individuals without alternative sources 
of assistance offer government offi cials personal incentives, such as bribes, to make 
an exception to the mantra and provide them with state resources.
While government rhetoric about market reform encourages the use of cor-
rupt practices, the economic effect of market reform drives individuals to seek 
state assistance in the fi rst place. By limiting alternative resources from market 
and societal actors, market reform has promoted corruption. In theory, this re-
form policy creates market goods and ser vices to replace state ones. However, 
under the two conditions, a legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention and 
weak or absent market- enhancing institutions, this has not occurred. Instead, 
market actors, such as private banks and entrepreneurs, have not been able to 
provide suffi cient credit and employment for people to earn adequate income 
1. Author’s interview (#161), Kazakhstan, July 22, 2001.
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and avoid engaging in corruption. Market reform under these circumstances has 
also hindered societal actors’ ability to provide substitutes for state welfare, as 
described in the next chapter. In an environment where market and societal 
actors cannot assist with economic survival, individuals turn to government 
offi cials for assistance. Yet market reform has also limited the resources of govern-
ment offi cials, increasing the competition among citizens for state goods and ser-
vices and thus encouraging them to engage in corrupt practices to gain an edge.
How do we know market reform has limited market actors’ ability to provide 
goods and ser vices and thus has encouraged citizens to seek them illicitly from 
government offi cials— the claim of this chapter? Numerous pieces of evidence 
build the case. Reports of international fi nancial institutions and economic his-
tories show that market reform, a legacy of signifi cant state economic interven-
tion, and absent or weak market- enhancing institutions— the causal factor and 
two conditions— exist in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Market actors and govern-
ment offi cials from the countries describe how markets are not an alternative to 
corruption because of the absent or weak institutions. Consistent with this, my 
survey data show that individuals tend not to turn to market actors to try to 
solve their everyday problems. Moreover, the demands individuals make of the 
state match challenges brought about by market reform under these conditions. 
Interviews with ordinary citizens and offi cials reveal that market reform has re-
duced the availability of government resources and discouraged reliance on the 
state, thus providing incentives for individuals to use corruption in the compe-
tition to secure state goods and ser vices. The survey data indicate that, in con-
trast, competition for basic state resources is not as common in Uzbekistan, a 
country that has not undertaken market reform but otherwise resembles Kazakh-
stan and Kyrgyzstan on many factors thought to cause corruption. Finally, anal-
ysis of global data suggests that this effect of market reform extends beyond 
Central Asia.
From Economic Intervention 
to Market Reform without 
Market- Enhancing Institutions
In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the signifi cant state economic intervention of the 
Soviet era has been replaced with market economies, albeit ones lacking market- 
enhancing institutions. In the Soviet era, state economic intervention was sub-
stantial. The state owned the means of production in all spheres, and state em-
ployees produced the goods and ser vices. The state allocated resources, including 
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capital and labor, according to a national economic plan. It also set prices.2 
Market activity was offi cially banned and as a result was nearly non ex is tent. A 
second economy compensated for the weaknesses of Soviet socialism. The Soviet 
party- state put little emphasis on consumer ser vices and goods, so their quality 
tended to be poor, and, periodically they, as well as productive goods,  were in 
short supply. As a result, individuals traded these outside of the offi cial economy. 
For example, haircuts, appliance repair, better cuts of meat, contraband Western 
literature, high- quality shoes, and scarce industrial and agricultural inputs  were 
available in the second economy.3 Even with the second economy, however, the 
Soviet  Union was characterized by signifi cant state economic intervention.
Since becoming in de pen dent countries in 1991, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
have undertaken numerous market reforms, in the areas of liberalization, priva-
tization, and deregulation. The reforms have included the establishment of cur-
rent account convertibility; liberalization of interest rates, trade, and prices; de-
regulation of wages; and privatization of small fi rms, land, and pensions, as 
indicated in Table 4.1.
Although Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have undertaken market reforms, these 
reforms have not included the development of market- enhancing institutions. 
Credit bureaus and registries and effective competition policies would be par-
2. V. Bunce, “Elementy neopredelennosti v perekhodnyi period” [Elements of uncertainty in 
the transition period], Polis 1 (1993), 44– 51.
3. Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, Soviet Economic Structure and Per for mance, 4th ed. 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1990), 274– 76.
TABLE 4.1. Market reforms in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN
LIBERALIZATION
Current account convertibility full full
Interest rate liberalization full full
Trade liberalization almost full full
Price liberalization almost full almost full
PRIVATIZATION
Small fi rms full full
Land fulla fullb
Private pensions yes yes
DEREGULATION
Wages deregulated yes yes
Source: Eu ro pe an Bank for Reconstruction and Development “Transition indicators by country,” at “Forecasts, 
Macro Data, Transition Indicators,”  http:// www .ebrd .com /pages /research /economics /data /macro .shtml #t. 
The data are from 2003, the year of my survey research.
a Land is fully tradable except by foreigners.
b Land is fully tradable; however, there have been diffi culties implementing this policy.
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ticularly helpful in these economies. Yet, the countries have not had private 
credit bureaus, public credit registries, or effective competition policies through-
out most of their in de pen dence periods. The World Bank and International Fi-
nance Corporation reported that neither country had a private or public credit 
bureau at the time of my surveys. Beginning in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan and 2006 in 
Kazakhstan, private credit bureaus slowly began to develop, and by 2013, they 
covered approximately 46 percent of the adult population in Kazakhstan and 32 
percent in Kyrgyzstan— far from the 100 percent found in most developed econ-
omies.4 This trend is visible in Table 4.2. The governments of Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan still have not created public credit registries nor have they established 
effective competition policies. The Eu ro pe an Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (EBRD) describes the countries as having only limited competition 
policies from the time of the surveys to 2013.5
Inadequate Market Goods and Ser vices
In this economic context, market actors have not been able to offer goods and 
ser vices to meet everyone’s basic needs, so citizens use illicit means to obtain 
4. International Finance Corporation and World Bank, “Doing Business: Mea sur ing Business 
Regulations,”  http:// www .doingbusiness .org /custom -query (accessed December 19, 2013).
5. See EBRD, “Transition Indicators by Country,” at “Forecasts, Macro Data, Transition Indi-
cators,”  http:// www .ebrd .com /pages /research /economics /data /macro .shtml #t (accessed December 
19, 2013). EBRD, “Transition Report 2009: Transition in Crisis” (London, 2009); EBRD, “Transition 
Report 2013: Stuck in Transition?” (London, 2013).
TABLE 4.2. Private credit bureau coverage 













Source: International Finance Corporation and World Bank, 
“Doing Business: Mea sur ing Business Regulations,” 
 http:// www .doingbusiness .org /custom -query .
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them. The private businesses that exist today in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan be-
gan from scratch immediately prior to the collapse of the Soviet  Union and in 
the in de pen dence era. With the end of the ban on private enterprise in the late 
Soviet era, private banks, microcredit companies, and other private ventures 
began to emerge. The absence of some market- enhancing institutions and the 
weakness of others have limited the market goods and ser vices provided by these 
businesses. The absence of credit registries and bureaus has prevented private 
banks and most microcredit companies from lending in rural areas, in par tic u lar. 
The lack of government regulation of the microfi nance industry has hindered 
the emergence of sound credit, encouraging predatory lending instead. The dearth 
of effective government antimonopoly policies has stifl ed business expansion 
by enabling suppliers to charge infl ated prices. As a result, credit, employment, 
and charitable donations from private ventures have not been adequate to meet 
people’s needs.
Private banks and responsible microcredit companies have adopted stringent 
lending requirements in response to the absence of credit registries and bureaus. 
The requirements reduce the risks of lending and minimize the losses from bor-
rowers who default on their loans. These restrictions, in turn, have prevented 
much of the populations, particularly rural residents, from obtaining credit ex-
cept from predatory lenders. Private banks’ business credit programs typically 
require that borrowers have an existing business, seek funds for nonagricultural 
ventures, possess valuable collateral, and repay the funds in frequent intervals 
within a short period.6 Responsible microcredit companies demand some other 
source of income and repayment in frequent intervals.
People who need assistance do not have the existing business that private 
lenders require or the other source of income that responsible microcredit com-
panies prefer. Typically these individuals have lost their jobs and do not already 
have a business on the side or some other source of income. Approximately half 
of the people who inquire about small- business credit request start- up funds and 
are turned away, according to a specialist who directs a credit program that op-
erates through many private banks in a city of central Kazakhstan. The general 
manager of a microcredit company in Kyrgyzstan explained that all the compa-
ny’s fi rst- time borrowers have another source of income.
Many private banks will not lend money to farmers. This practice excludes 
much of the population in each country from obtaining credit because 46 per-
cent and 65 percent of the population is rural in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
6. The 2007– 9 global economic crisis increased banks’ aversion to risk, albeit temporarily. 
International Monetary Fund, “Republic of Kazakhstan 2012 Article IV Consultation” (Washington, 
DC, 2012).
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respectively. Banks’ refusals to lend to farmers stem, in part, from the lack of 
valuable collateral in rural areas. Private banks generally accept only homes and 
cars as collateral. In rural areas, homes are worth little, which makes them ineli-
gible to serve as collateral. Car own ership was not common in the Soviet era, and 
today, particularly in rural areas, personal cars are not ubiquitous. Farm equip-
ment, future harvests, livestock, and land would be diffi cult for banks to realize 
when clients default, so this property is typically not accepted for collateral. Farm 
equipment is mostly Soviet- made and has little value, and banks have not devel-
oped the networks to sell farm products and livestock. Furthermore, the value of 
harvests and livestock can unexpectedly drop. Drought and disease can destroy 
crops, and theft and illness can reduce herds. Land has been diffi cult for banks 
to convert into cash for numerous reasons: some areas have an excess of land; 
farmers tend to have long- term leases instead of own ership of land; most farm-
ers do not have the capital to rent or purchase additional land; and foreigners 
cannot buy it. Private banks typically do not accept smaller  house hold objects, 
such as tele vi sions, because they can be diffi cult to locate. Lack of collateral is 
not a problem exclusively in rural areas. In towns and even in some cities, apart-
ments are of so little value that collateral can be diffi cult to obtain. An auto parts 
distributor, Sulushash, explained how she looked for two years for credit to be-
gin her business but repeatedly found that her city apartment was not worth 
enough to serve as collateral.
Private banks tend to offer only short- loan periods, and both private banks 
and responsible microcredit companies typically require the repayment of loans 
in installments. These requirements are prohibitive for farmers; as the head of a 
raion association of in de pen dent farmers in southern Kazakhstan explained, “If 
we had long- term credit we could all get on our feet.”7 During the crop- growing 
season, which lasts from approximately April to October, farmers do not have 
funds to make loan payments. They do not have available funds until they har-
vest their crops in the fall. For this reason, those few private programs that lend 
to farmers typically require them to have a nonagricultural business in addition 
to their farming venture; however, few farmers are in such a position. Farmers 
explained to me that they need longer loan periods, three years for example, to 
be able to repay loans for the purchase of seed or fertilizer, even if they suffered a 
bad harvest. Private banks’ credit programs are even less conducive to livestock 
ventures, as most animals need to mature approximately fi ve years for farmers 
to recoup their investments. These programs also do not meet the needs of farm-
ers or urban entrepreneurs who want to invest in equipment. Many farmers 
need to replace Soviet- era farm equipment. Some farmers are also interested in 
7. Author’s interview (#169), Kazakhstan, July 25, 2001.
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selling pro cessed goods in order to obtain a greater profi t. In order to pro cess 
their crops and livestock into fl our, macaroni, or juice, for example, they have to 
purchase equipment. Similarly, urban entrepreneurs, most of whom buy goods 
in one location and sell them in another, have to invest in equipment, for manu-
facturing or higher- end ser vice industries, in order to further develop their busi-
nesses. For these types of purchases farmers and urban entrepreneurs need a 
fi ve- to ten- year loan period.
Credit is more readily available from microcredit companies engaged in pred-
atory lending, but the risk of default and greater impoverishment is high. These 
companies offer larger loans at exorbitant rates of 50– 70 percent per annum and 
typically obfuscate the terms and risks from the borrowers. The growth of preda-
tory lending has been enabled by the absence of another market- enhancing 
institution— government regulations. For example, in Kyrgyzstan an individual 
with only 2,175 USD and no microfi nance or banking expertise can establish a 
microfi nance institution. Today 100 are in operation and another 350 have been 
created in Kyrgyzstan.8 In Kazakhstan about half of the 1,800 microcredit orga-
nizations created are in operation.9
Islamic banks and fi nancial institutions represent another new, but not very 
promising market alternative to state assistance. In Kazakhstan the government 
passed a law allowing Islamic banks and fi nancing organizations to operate in 
the country, and Kyrgyzstan has embarked on a pi lot Islamic banking project.10 
These institutions invest directly in business ventures, instead of granting interest- 
bearing loans. Advocates claim that this approach is more transparent and creates 
a relationship between the institutions and their clients, suggesting that preda-
tory behaviors are less likely. Unfortunately, investment from Islamic banks and 
fi nancing institutions has not signifi cantly expanded opportunities for business 
capital in its fi rst few years. One report points to the reluctance of secular elites to 
embrace Islamic institutions,11 although enthusiasm has grown for learning about 
Islam. Nonetheless, Islamic banks and fi nancing institutions do not currently 
provide a signifi cant alternative to state assistance.
 8. Myles G. Smith, “Kyrgyzstan: Could Microfi nance Bubble Burst?” EurasiaNet, June 11, 2012, 
 http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /65527 (accessed December 19, 2013).
 9. “Regulation of Microcredit Organisation Becomes Tougher,” CaspioNet, June 28, 2012, 
 http:// caspionet .kz /eng /general /Regulation _of _microcredit _organisation _becomes _tougher 
_1340857351 .html (accessed November 28, 2012).
10. “Central Asia: Governments, Banks Gradually Open up to Islamic Banking,” EurasiaNet, 
July 12, 2007,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /departments /insight /articles /pp071307f .shtml (accessed 
December 19, 2013); Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Regulation of Activities of the Re-
gional Financial Centre of Almaty City, “Islamic Financing,”  http:// www .rfca .gov .kz /6196 (accessed 
November 28, 2012).
11. Justin Vela, “Kyrgyzstan: Islamic Banking Offers Alternative to the ‘Eu ro pe an System,’ ” 
EurasiaNet, June 14, 2011,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /63675 (accessed December 19, 2013).
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Accounts of those in the banking and government sectors confi rm that the 
absence, and more recently, the limited coverage, of credit registries and bureaus 
restricts the ability of private secular banks and responsible microfi nance fi rms 
to provide credit. The manager of a microcredit company set the scene, explain-
ing, “There is still high demand for credit. The market is not saturated.”12 An 
offi cial with the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the Regulation of Nat-
ural Monopolies, Protection of Competitiveness, and Support of Small Business 
attributed the lack of legitimate small business capital available in the country to 
the lack of information about current and potential entrepreneurs’ creditworthi-
ness. The general manager of the head offi ce of a private bank in Kyrgyzstan 
elaborated on how government offi cials verbally encouraged the expansion of 
private credit into rural areas but did not provide the institutions essential to 
making it possible. “The government has requested that we issue agricultural 
credit,”13 he began. And, then he proceeded to explain that his bank would need 
a network of branches in rural areas in order to collect information about poten-
tial clients. He added that fi fteen banks have formed the nascent credit bureau, 
but none has data on rural residents, so the collective has not made lending in 
rural areas possible. Moreover, a representative of the World Bank in Kyrgyzstan 
explained to me that the banks hold back much of their information from the 
collective effort because they are competing with one another.
Private banks’ limited collective efforts to pool creditworthiness databases 
could be successful with incentives from the governments of Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Ironically, however, in Kyrgyzstan the government has the most in-
formation about the creditworthiness of rural residents but it has refused to pro-
vide it to private banks. The head of the credit department of a government bank 
with an agricultural lending program explained that the bank has data on cred-
itworthiness of some rural residents because they have specialists based in raions. 
Of all the banks, this one has the largest number of credit histories, the depart-
ment head revealed, but it opted not to join the collective effort. “It would not 
have been an even exchange of information” because the private banks had so 
little information, he explained.14
Microcredit companies view this absence of credit histories and the weak reg-
ulatory environment as a profi t- making opportunity. The head of one of the larg-
est microcredit fi rms in Kyrgyzstan, Babur Tolbaev of Mol Bulak Finance, stated: 
“Every month we have new customers without credit histories. I believe there is 
room for growth, maybe not like the last two years, but there is.”15 While these 
12. Author’s interview (#134), Kyrgyzstan, June 4, 2009.
13. Author’s interview (#122), Kyrgyzstan, May 25, 2009.
14. Author’s interview (#127), Kyrgyzstan, May 28, 2009.
15. Smith, “Kyrgyzstan: Could Microfi nance Bubble Burst?”
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fi rms’ pursuit of profi t has expanded credit, the expectation by industry watchers 
is that a microfi nance bubble has formed and will soon pop, with the consequence 
that borrowers will default and have even greater diffi culties meeting their basic 
needs. In response, Kyrgyzstan’s national bank closed ninety- four microcredit 
lenders in 2012, and the parliament of Kazakhstan has considered legislation to 
regulate the industry. Microcredit institutions themselves have not been able to 
agree to self- regulate to address the problem. Guidelines proposed by the Foun-
dation for International Community Assistance (FINCA), an American micro-
credit nonprofi t,  were rejected by other microcredit institutions.16
The weakness of another market- enhancing institution, government antimo-
nopoly policies, has made it diffi cult for individuals to obtain income and employ-
ment in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Although both countries have government 
antimonopoly committees, neither has been effective in reducing monopolies, 
particularly in rural areas. Because rural residents face monopolies in energy, 
pro cessing, and purchasing, they cannot readily obtain these goods and ser vices 
as they once did from the state.
Energy monopolies have infl ated prices, so it is diffi cult for farmers to pur-
chase inputs and to make a profi t. In Kyrgyzstan the government broke the state 
energy concern, Kyrgyzenergo, into eight companies but continues to protect 
them from competition.17 The head of the credit department in the government 
bank in Kyrgyzstan lamented, “The antimonopoly committee does not help. For 
example, oil prices fell but the committee kept prices high locally. Not until the 
president made a request did the committee help.”18 The deputy director of the 
Agency for the Regulation of Natural Monopolies in Kazakhstan acknowledged 
to me that the government has not addressed the problem of middlemen who 
are infl ating the cost of electricity to rural areas. Farmers in the village in south-
ern Kazakhstan where I lived confi rmed the high costs of electricity resulting 
from middlemen. In Kyrgyzstan, a monopoly on diesel fuel has forced farmers 
to pay 38 som per liter; they earn only 12 som for a kilo of wheat. At these prices, 
a farmer growing wheat on forty- two hectares, one of the larger plots available 
through privatization, pays 3.32 USD per gallon of gas and earns 5,800 USD, 
before expenses, from a good harvest. With the 5,800 USD he could purchase 
thirty- six gallons of gas each week for a year for planting, harvesting, and mar-
keting but have nothing left over.
16. “Regulation of Microcredit Organisation Becomes Tougher”; Smith, “Kyrgyzstan: Could 
Microfi nance Bubble Burst?”
17. Cholpon Orozobekova, “Kyrgyzstan: Bishkek Food Prices Soaring, Discontent Brews,” 
EurasiaNet, March 3, 2011,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /62999 (accessed December 19, 2013).
18. Author’s interview (#127), Kyrgyzstan, May 28, 2009.
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In addition to energy monopolies, national and local pro cessing monopolies 
are obstacles to profi table farming. A pro cessing facility can monopolize busi-
ness in a locale because farmers cannot afford to transport their products great 
distances to another pro cessing facility. Kyrgyzstan has had only two sugar- 
processing plants and two cotton- washing facilities, one of which is now closed, 
so these facilities can demand a high percentage of farmers’ output. In the south-
ern part of Kyrgyzstan, farmers have struggled to have their cotton ginned at a 
reasonable price. The south has multiple cotton gins, but they have colluded on 
price. The manager of a nonprofi t rural consulting association for Talas and 
Issik- Kul’ Oblasts explained that he had encountered regional pro cessing mo-
nopolies in these two oblasts as well as in Osh Oblast. Marzhan’s uncle in south-
ern Kazakhstan described a similar situation in his region. “It is a monopoly,” 
Kanat complained, when he recounted how the miller, the only one in the vicin-
ity, requires 40 percent of his grain as payment.19
As for purchasing monopolies, the manager of the agricultural consulting 
ser vice in Kyrgyzstan explained, “The government has control over the buyers 
and offi cials profi t personally.”20 A single foreign fi rm buys all the tobacco from 
southern Kyrgyzstan and therefore can unilaterally set the price. On a smaller 
scale, another foreign fi rm buys all the beans from Talas Oblast. The Kyrgyz Bak-
ers’  Union has lodged a complaint with the government antimonopoly agency 
over the agency’s inattention to the problem of purchasing monopolies for baked 
goods. To the extent that the antimonopoly committees in Kazakhstan and Kyr-
gyzstan have been active, they have focused on prices consumers pay instead of 
energy, pro cessing, and purchasing monopolies that affect farmers and other 
small business own ers.21 The lack of government antimonopoly policies to sup-
port business and data on citizens’ creditworthiness has stifl ed business in Ka-
zakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Consequently, the weakness or absence of market- enhancing institutions has 
made it diffi cult for market actors to meet people’s demands. Most directly, pri-
vate banks and responsible microcredit companies cannot lend to many who 
need credit.22 “There are many good hands and heads, but people do not have 
19. Author’s interview (#153), Kazakhstan, multiple dates in July and August 2001.
20. Author’s interview (#125), Kyrgyzstan, May 26, 2009.
21. Antimonopoly committees are not the sole remedy for pro cessing and purchasing monop-
olies. Governments could also invest in public transportation, ensuring that roads are of decent qual-
ity and passable year- round, for example. This would enable farmers to more easily buy, pro cess, and 
sell outside of their locales.
22. As formal models of credit rationing indicate, some individuals will be too risky to lend to. 
Most likely, their credit histories would indicate this, or they would have no credit histories. Joseph 
E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.” American 
Economic Review 71, no. 3 (1981), 393– 410.
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capital today,” the head of a raion committee for the support of small and me-
dium business in southern Kazakhstan explained.23 Lack of credit has been the 
main problem in agriculture and has stymied its growth. “If this question had 
been resolved, agriculture would have improved long ago,”24 a director of an 
oblast committee for the support of small and medium- size business in southern 
Kazakhstan clarifi ed. With limited credit and with the infl ated prices resulting 
from monopolies, entrepreneurs cannot boost their own incomes. As market 
actors themselves, entrepreneurs also cannot expand their businesses to employ 
more people and thus provide others with the employment and income they need. 
Consider, for example, Marzhan’s uncle Kanat, the successful private farmer. He 
would like to earn more income and employ more people by purchasing equip-
ment, at a cost of 12,000 USD, to mill the wheat he grows himself instead of rely-
ing on the single miller in the area. He would also like to build a factory to produce 
macaroni from his fl our. He cannot do either, however, because of the diffi culty 
of obtaining credit and the milling monopoly. Credit would enable him to pur-
chase the necessary equipment and build a facility. More competitive milling 
prices would allow him to save money to fund the expansion of his business. 
Similarly, Nikolai, a successful store own er in a small town in central Kazakhstan 
explained, “I would prefer to be engaged in industry instead of trade . . .  but I do 
not have the capital to do it.”25 He cannot obtain the credit needed to purchase or 
establish a plant.  Were these businesspeople able to execute their plans they would 
be able to offer jobs to more people and potentially have enough income to make 
generous charitable donations, thus helping others meet their needs for employ-
ment and money.
The inability of businesspeople to make generous charitable donations al-
ludes to another effect of weak or absent market- enhancing institutions. The 
weaknesses or absence of these institutions has had direct and indirect effects 
on societal actors. They have had diffi culty obtaining credit. Limited market 
opportunities also have meant that most individuals, particularly in rural ar-
eas, have not had suffi cient income to make generous donations to societal 
groups, such as mosques and charities. The case of Marzhan’s uncle is one ex-
ample of this.
The evidence given in this section about the effect of weak or absent market- 
enhancing institutions also explains the greater corruption in rural areas and it 
challenges an alternative explanation. The more signifi cant effect of weak or ab-
sent market- enhancing institutions in rural areas helps to explain why informal 
23. Author’s interview (#170), Kazakhstan July 25, 2001.
24. Author’s interview (#148), Kazakhstan, July 9, 2001.
25. Author’s interview (#191), Kazakhstan, June 5, 2001.
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competition for state goods and ser vices is greater there. This evidence about 
why effective market- enhancing institutions are weak or absent and how this 
limits markets actors’ ability to meet everyday needs also casts doubt on the idea 
that some other factor accounts for both the institutions’ weakness or absence 
and corruption.
Minimal Reliance on Market Actors
Market actors’ diffi culty in providing necessary goods and ser vices is also evi-
dent from how little citizens rely on them. At most, 4 percent of survey respon-
dents had sought assistance from a par tic u lar market actor in the preceding year 
(see Table 4.3). Only 3 percent of survey respondents in Kazakhstan and 1 per-
cent in Kyrgyzstan had turned to a private bank for help. The fi gures for one’s 
current employer and former employers  were, respectively, 4 percent and 4 per-
cent in Kazakhstan and 3 percent and 2 percent in Kyrgyzstan. The numbers for 
local companies where one does not work and foreign companies where one 
does not work  were even lower. For Kazakhstan the proportions  were 3 percent 
and less than 1 percent, and for Kyrgyzstan they  were less than 1 percent and 
zero, respectively. Respondents also did not use the ser vices of private employ-
ment agencies even though unemployment was one of the most common prob-
lems.26 These employment agencies typically offer job hunters leads for a range 
of positions: manual labor jobs, such as construction worker; ser vice jobs, in-
cluding bartender, security guard, and waiter; and positions requiring educa-
tion, such as a se nior accountant or computer programmer. The job hunter 
pays for the ser vice; one employment agency in central Kazakhstan charges in-
dividuals 300 tenge, approximately 2 USD, for each lead and an additional 1000 
tenge or 7 USD once a position is accepted. The reason these agencies are used 
rarely is that the unemployed do not have funds to pay for the ser vices because 
price liberalization wiped out people’s savings. As a result, most of these private 
employment agencies last only six months before going under. Those that have 
operated longer typically have another business that subsidizes the employment 
agency.27
26. “Private employment agency” was not an option on the survey, but respondents  were able 
to list additional places to which they turned for assistance. No one listed private employment agen-
cies and my interviews indicate why few people turn to them.
27. Local and foreign companies are also examined in the next chapter because they have the 
potential to provide charitable assistance, as societal groups do.
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Challenges and Demands
Without assistance available from market actors or societal groups, individuals 
turn to government offi cials for help. The fact that the demands made of govern-
ment offi cials by individuals in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan match the challenges 
brought about by market reforms and absent or weak market- enhancing institu-
tions further increases our confi dence that these are a causal factor and an im-
portant condition, respectively. Market reforms without market- enhancing insti-
tutions resulted in unemployment, insuffi cient income, and limited credit— the 
very problems for which citizens seek government offi cials’ help. Specifi cally, 
privatization led to job loss, price liberalization and in effec tive antimonopoly ef-
forts made incomes insuffi cient, and the absence of credit registries and bureaus 
hampered borrowing. The demise of the Soviet economy also contributed to 
these problems; however, it was market reform under these conditions that made 
them dire.
The collapse of the Soviet  Union disrupted the economies of the former re-
publics so that the governments and state enterprises of the newly in de pen dent 
countries, including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, faced signifi cant crises. The 
economies of the Soviet republics had been highly specialized, so, as a result, 
many individual goods  were available from only one location. With the disinte-
gration of the  Union it became diffi cult for state enterprises— including facto-
ries, farms, and natural resource concerns— to obtain inputs from other former 
republics. Moscow no longer guided the fl ow of inputs, and new borders and 
currencies further hampered the movement of inputs.
To respond to the structural problems of the Soviet economy and obtain for-
eign fi nancial assistance for the immediate crisis, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
TABLE 4.3. Market actors from whom citizens have sought assistance in the 
past year in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (percentage of respondents, rounded)
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN
Bank a 3 1
Current employer a 4 3
Former employer a 4 2
Local company where you don’t work a 3 <1
Foreign company where you don’t work <1 0
Note: n = 1,200 for Kazakhstan and 1,199 for Kyrgyzstan. A portion of the 1,500 respondents in each country 
claimed that they had no problems or that describing their problems was too diffi cult and thus some 
respondents  were not asked this question about seeking assistance.
a Some banks, employers, and local companies remain state institutions in these countries as a result of the 
communist period; however, market reforms have ensured that most are now nonstate entities. Counting all 
of them as market actors increases the diffi culty of arguing that the reliance on the state is greater than 
reliance on market actors.
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began to implement the market reforms advocated by the World Bank and In-
ternational Monetary Fund. Both state enterprises and the governments took a 
fi nancial hit as a result of these reforms. The reforms meant that state enterprises 
lost their guarantees of government purchases. Price liberalization further bur-
dened state enterprises as energy costs skyrocketed. State enterprises as well 
as the government institutions of the former republics also lost subsidies from 
Moscow because of the collapse of the Soviet  Union. Having adopted a market 
reform approach and lacking substantial revenue from enterprises and subsidies 
from Moscow, the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan could not prop 
up every state concern. Many  were privatized; others, in industries such as con-
struction, mining, energy production, and public transportation,  were main-
tained by the governments.
These economic shocks to state industrial and agricultural enterprises further 
reduced funds in government coffers. As a result, nearly all Kazakhstanis and 
Kyrgyzstanis suffered as everyone was an employee of either a state enterprise or, 
in the case of teachers, medical personnel, and bureaucrats, the government. 
Employees of state enterprises, whether privatized or not, lost income. Privatiza-
tion offered little in the way of job security. Some enterprise managers wrested 
shares from employees and then stripped the enterprises of assets, putting em-
ployees out of work. Some investors, entrepreneurial managers, and employee 
collectives downsized enterprises in order to make them more internationally 
competitive. As a result a portion of the employees lost their jobs. For example, 
Marzhan was laid off from her job in the accounting offi ce of the sovkhoz (state 
farm) in the village in 1998 as it struggled fi nancially. Of the survey respondents, 
19 percent in Kazakhstan and 26 percent in Kyrgyzstan  were unemployed,28 and 
this was in 2003, after the worst of the economic crisis had passed.
In other cases, workers did not lose their jobs but did not receive their salaries 
because the enterprises faced the challenges of obtaining inputs and fi nding buy-
ers. As an employee remaining at the bankrupt sovkhoz in southern Kazakhstan 
put it, “We receive no pay. We work for free. For a ‘thank you.’ ”29 Marzhan’s 
husband Temir, an electrician at the sovkhoz, left his job in 1999 because the 
28. These respondents selected “I am temporarily without a job, am looking for work” to de-
scribe why they  were unemployed. Others without a job, but not included in this statistic,  were stu-
dents, pensioners, the physically disabled, those caring for a child, or individuals who chose not to 
work. These fi gures are preferable to offi cial statistics, which are typically based on those who have 
registered as unemployed. Unemployment benefi ts are not widely available in Kazakhstan and Kyr-
gyzstan, so people have little incentive to register and thus offi cial statistics underreport unemploy-
ment. For example, the World Bank reports unemployment fi gures of 10 percent and 9 percent in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively, for the same time period. Data are from World Bank, 
“World Databank,”  http:// databank .worldbank .org /ddp /home .do (accessed December 19, 2013).
29. Author’s interview (#159), Kazakhstan, July 19, 2001.
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sovkhoz was unable to pay him. In some workplaces in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz-
stan, employees  were paid with the goods they produced. While employees could 
use some of the goods they received, in many cases they needed to sell most of 
them. This was diffi cult, particularly when an enterprise dominated the labor force 
in a locale and thus many individuals received the same good. Even employees of 
the government and state enterprises that  were not privatized faced hardship; as 
government coffers shrunk, the state also delayed payment of salaries or paid 
workers in goods.
Compared to those working at state enterprises at the time of the collapse, 
pensioners  were no better off. Some people retired early thinking that earning a 
pension during the economic crisis would be preferable. But the value of pen-
sions fell dramatically because of price liberalization and the resulting infl a-
tion in Kyrgyzstan, where pensions  were not simultaneously increased. Further-
more, delayed and unpaid pensions have been common in both countries. New 
and newly privatized companies concerned with their bottom lines failed to 
contribute to the pension system, and local offi cials used pension funds to pay 
other social benefi ts. Pension reform in the mid- 1990s in Kazakhstan and in the 
late 1990s in Kyrgyzstan mitigated delayed pay and nonpayment problems in 
the new century, but the size of pensions for many retired people remains too 
small.30
Any money people do earn does not go far, as infl ation, fueled by price liber-
alization, has been steep and many goods and ser vices are no longer free or sub-
sidized. While infl ation has tapered off, it saw highs of 1,880 percent in Kazakh-
stan and 885 percent in Kyrgyzstan in the early 1990s, as noted in Table 4.4. In 
reaction to the economic crisis and new market reform approach, workplaces— 
the provider of most benefi ts in the Soviet era— and local governments curbed 
goods and ser vices. Or in the case of dissolved enterprises, the enterprises no 
longer existed to provide benefi ts. Medical care, medications, utilities, home re-
pairs, day care, and vacations— once highly subsidized— are now expensive. 
Most people in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan now have to pay for textbooks, heat, 
30. Kazakhstan’s system underwent a transition from pay- as- you- go, where current workers 
pay from their salaries the pensions of current retirees, to individual retirement accounts into which 
workers pay from their salaries for their future pensions. Pension reform in Kyrgyzstan involved in-
creasing the retirement age and ending additional pension payments to some categories of people. 
William Baldridge, “Pension Reform in Kazakhstan,” in Central Asia 2010: Prospects for Human De-
velopment, ed. United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Eu rope and the CIS 
(1999), 176– 81,  here 177; Edward Palmer, “Pension Reform and the Development of Pension Sys-
tems: An Evaluation of Work Bank Assistance, Kazakhstan Country Study” (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 2007); Edward Palmer, “Pension Reform and the Development of Pension Systems: An 
Evaluation of Work Bank Assistance, Kyrgyzstan Country Study” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 
2007).
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and repairs for their children’s schools and higher education, whereas these  were 
free in the Soviet era.31
With the introduction of market reforms, most people lost their source of 
income or experienced a precipitous drop in income while also having to pay for 
more goods and ser vices, of which there is a much broader selection. A resident 
of a city in central Kazakhstan summarized the change from the Soviet era: “Ev-
erything is in stores. Now the problem is money.”32 These challenges match the 
demands of those who try to obtain government help. Of those who sought as-
31. In rural areas the problem is compounded by shortages of goods and ser vices. Many day- 
care centers, village clubs, stores, schools, and medical clinics have closed in rural areas. Some vil-
lages no longer have access to certain utilities because some villagers are unable to pay and the pri-
vate fi rms have cut off ser vices to villages rather than provide utilities to a smaller number of people 
unprofi tably.
32. Author’s interview (#186), Kazakhstan, June 3, 2001.
























Source: Years 1991– 95 are from International Monetary Fund, “The World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) Database April 1999,”  http:// www .imf .org /external /pubs /ft /weo /1999 
/01 /data /index .htm. Years 1996– 2012 are from World Bank, “World Databank,” 
 http:// databank .worldbank .org /ddp /home .do .
Note: Neither data set covers the entire time period. Each data set gives the annual 
percent change in the cost to the average consumer of purchasing a selection of goods 
and ser vices. The World Economic Outlook information notes that for some transition 
countries for earlier years a retail price index, instead of a consumer price index, is used; 
however, further details are not given. The latest data are presented.
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sistance from state offi cials in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 83 percent and 52 
percent, respectively, identifi ed lack of money as one of their top problems. It is 
also clear from government offi cials’ accounts in the previous chapter that as-
sistance sought matches outcomes from market reform. These offi cials described 
how people request money, credit, and employment because they lack funds.
The characteristics of those who seek help from government offi cials also 
support the argument that market reform promotes these interactions. Those 
who have been most adversely affected by market reform in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan are the individuals most likely to approach government offi cials. 
Specifi cally, those who are unemployed in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are more 
likely to seek help from offi cials. Among individuals who have sought assistance 
from government offi cials, 29 percent in Kazakhstan and 40 percent in Kyrgyz-
stan are unemployed, compared to the adult population unemployment aver-
ages of 19 percent and 26 percent, respectively. As a result of market reform 
without market- enhancing institutions, citizens have economic needs that they 
hope government offi cials can meet.
Scarcity of Government Goods 
and Ser vices
Market reform has also made government resources scarce, so citizens seeking 
government assistance try to gain an advantage in the competition for state re-
sources by using corrupt practices. The reforms have ended or shrunk formal 
government programs so fewer resources are available to raion and oblast bu-
reaucrats, village leaders, and deputies. Those programs that do exist formally 
restrict the distribution of resources to individuals who meet narrow require-
ments in order to manage their scarcity.
Raion and oblast credit programs, as described in the previous chapter, are 
the governments’ response to the new challenges posed by the market economy 
and the loss of extensive welfare assistance under the Soviet economy. However, 
there is not enough credit to meet demand, so individuals use illicit means to try 
to obtain it. The comments from the head of a large government agricultural credit 
program in Kyrgyzstan illustrate the relationship among these factors well: “We 
do not have enough money and we have more demand. . . .  Some people are 
offended if they are denied credit and they say ‘give me credit because I have this 
acquaintance.’ ”33
33. Author’s interview (#127), Kyrgyzstan, 2009.
74     CHAPTER 4
The number of loans made also indicates that demand has not been met. 
In Kazakhstan, a country of about fi fteen million, and Kyrgyzstan, a country of 
about fi ve million people, approximately three million people in each  were poor 
at the time I conducted the surveys. The numbers of rural residents in the coun-
tries  were approximately six million and three million, respectively.34 The most 
productive credit program has been the government bank program targeted at 
rural areas in Kyrgyzstan, yet it has not helped the three million rural residents 
in the area. This bank has made approximately ninety thousand loans in fi ve 
years, and many of the loans are to repeat customers. Other programs in Kyrgyz-
stan fall far short of these numbers. In Kazakhstan the Agriculture Financial 
Support Fund established to help low- income residents and small businesses in 
rural areas met only 2 percent of demand for microcredit.35 The national micro-
credit program in Kazakhstan has assisted 890 people in a southern oblast where 
I worked and 150 people each year for a few years in a central, more urbanized 
oblast where I worked. Yet these oblasts each have approximately one million 
residents.36 Other programs, described in the preceding chapter, have lent to 
considerably fewer people. In the southern oblast in Kazakhstan only six people 
in three years have borrowed through the communal collateral fund. In the same 
oblast, approximately two hundred people applied for the eighteen- month 
loans, but only twenty people received them. Steep competition is typical; one 
hundred applications for fourteen loans is not uncommon, according to an of-
fi cial with an oblast committee for the support of small and medium- size busi-
ness also in the south.
Besides having the resources to offer only small numbers of loans, govern-
ment credit programs tend to have liberal requirements in some respects and 
restrictive requirements in others, thus effectively excluding much of the popu-
lations from borrowing. For example, the program through the national bank in 
Kyrgyzstan offers more options for collateral and thus is less restrictive in this 
respect, but it prefers that its borrowers have another business as a further pro-
tection. Similarly, the oblast agricultural credit program in southern Kazakhstan 
that lends for eigh teen months has a longer period but requires another busi-
ness, such as a store, on the side. The microcredit provided through the oblasts 
nationwide and the national fund in Kazakhstan have the benefi t of being inter-
34. I calculated these fi gures using the World Bank’s population numbers, rural residence data, 
and statistics on the percentage of the population living on less than 2 USD per day. The rural resi-
dence fi gures are for 2003 and the poverty statistics are for 2002 because none was available for 2003. 
World Bank, “World Databank.”
35. Shoplan Gaisina, “Credit Policies for Kazakhstani Agriculture,” Central Asian Survey 30, 
no. 2 (2011): 257– 74,  here 265.
36. “Regions of Kazakhstan, 2005– 2009” (Astana: Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Ka-
zakhstan, 2010), 1– 24,  here 5.
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est free, but the money must be returned in one year. Numerous government 
credit programs in Kazakhstan are targeted only at large- scale agricultural con-
cerns, instead of medium and small ones.37 Restrictions are a way for the govern-
ments to manage scarce credit, but these restrictions as well as the scarcity 
encourage people to engage in corruption to try to obtain credit.
Government offi cials at other levels also do not have abundant resources. Vil-
lage leaders have little national money and tax revenue at their disposal, but they 
can direct state benefi ts, state and nonstate credit, and charitable assistance and 
they can obtain donations. For these reasons, villagers have incentives to pro-
pose a corrupt exchange to village leaders.
Money, credit, and employment from deputies to representative bodies are 
also scarce. Deputies can secure state resources if they have another government 
job and they can distribute their personal wealth if they have a successful busi-
ness. Yet many deputies do not have access to such resources, and those that do 
have insuffi cient resources to support all of their constituents. This scarcity en-
courages citizens to promise their po liti cal support to deputies in exchange for 
goods from either the state or deputies’ own property.
Government Message
Besides scarcity, the governments’ message about market reform also gives indi-
viduals an incentive to engage in corruption. Through the media the govern-
ments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan emphasize that they are market reformers. 
In their direct interactions with individuals, government offi cials in both coun-
tries convey the message that because of these market reforms individuals can no 
longer turn to them for assistance. Individuals, thus, have an incentive to offer 
bribes, use personal connections, and promise po liti cal support to try to cir-
cumvent this new philosophy.
A content analysis of state newspapers highlights the governments’ market 
reform message. Approximately one- third of the thirty issues of Kazakhstanskaia 
pravda and Slovo Kyrgyzstana published immediately prior to the surveys included 
at least one article about market reform.38 Deregulation was a pop u lar topic, 
with articles on the importance of the market determining wages, the decreased 
role of the government, and the state’s responsibility only to ensure safety in the 
production pro cess. Articles also emphasized that work in the private sector and 
37. Gaisina, “Credit Policies for Kazakhstani Agriculture.”
38. This calculation does not include laws published in the newspapers.
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assistance from local and foreign nongovernmental organizations  were solu-
tions to poverty.39
Government offi cials’ and citizens’ accounts of their interactions with each 
other make it clear that individuals are, in fact, responsible for their own economic 
well- being. Consider, for example, the remark of a minister of labor and social 
protection in Kazakhstan, Alikhan Baimenov: “People should become less ac-
customed to state paternalism.”40 He elaborated that the government has given 
more responsibility to the private sector and people should be more in de pen-
dent. This message comes not only from offi cials in the capital but also from 
those at lower levels. The head of a raion- level social assistance offi ce in Kazakh-
stan explained that “In the USSR everyone relied on the state. Recently people 
have begun to understand that without action you cannot do anything, and they 
have begun to work. You cannot count on anyone. You cannot count on some 
uncle to help you. . . .  You can work a piece of land, take care of a herd, trade, 
but you cannot sit around. You are on your own.”41 The message that the govern-
ments are now market reformers reaches down to the village akims and is central 
in their discussions with villagers. The leader of the village in southern Kazakh-
stan remarked, “We tell them each person needs to earn money on his own. . . . 
Earlier the state fed and clothed them, but now they are on their own.”42 Even 
the head of a government unemployment center in a central city of Kazakhstan 
conveyed the new philosophy: “During the transition to a market economy, we 
need to wake up people who are accustomed to receiving benefi ts.”43 The mes-
sage is the same in Kyrgyzstan.
In both countries average citizens have, in many cases grudgingly, accepted 
this message. A farmer in Kyrgyzstan said, “The government cannot help us. We 
rely on ourselves. We feed the government. . . .  You can only survive on your 
own with your own family.”44 However, a Rus sian woman in the village in Ka-
zakhstan, Irina, noted that the government’s strategy of devolving responsibility 
39. Gul’banu Aimanbetova, “Bol’she ekonomicheskoi svobody” [Greater Economic Freedom], 
Kazakhstanskaia pravda, October 21, 2003; “Kakoi byt’ oplate truda?” [What Is to Become of 
Wages?], Kazakhstanskaia pravda, October 25, 2003; T. Karateeva, “Vyvesti biznes iz- pod pressa” [To 
Take Business out from under the Press], Slovo Kyrgyzstana, October 14, 2003; L. Pavlovich, “Shag k 
svobode. Ekonomicheskoi” [Step toward Freedom. Economic], Slovo Kyrgyzstana, October 31, 2003; 
Natal’ia Todorova, “Glavnoe sredstvo bor’by s nishchetoi” [The Main Way of Fighting Poverty], Ka-
zakhstanskaia pravda, October 4, 2003; “Za strokoi poslaniia Prezidenta Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki. Ryn-
ochnoi ekonomike- sotsial’noe litso” [Beyond the Lines of the Kyrgyz Republic President’s Message. 
To Market Reform: A Social Face], Slovo Kyrgyzstana, October 28, 2003.
40. Author’s interview (#261), Kazakhstan, May 21, 2001.
41. Author’s interview (#164), Kazakhstan, July 24, 2001.
42. Author’s interview (#172), Kazakhstan, July 26, 2001.
43. Author’s interview (#185), Kazakhstan, June 1, 2001.
44. Author’s interview (#128), Kyrgyzstan, May 30, 2009.
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for welfare sometimes fails: “The state has distanced itself . . .  we live on our own 
strengths, no one  else’s. . . .  The government cannot be counted on for assistance 
but now not everyone can help a neighbor.”45 Because the governments are market 
reformers they are not receptive to requests for help. “We need the state to pro-
vide subsidies, but offi cials do not want to do this because they say this would be 
biased against the market,” a deputy director of an oblast agricultural department 
in Kazakhstan said, explaining the farming community’s need for state assis-
tance.46 Through the media and their conversations with government offi cials, 
citizens in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan learn that market reform has brought an 
end to extensive state welfare guarantees and conclude that they have to compete 
for the remaining state resources.
The Nonmarket Reformer Uzbekistan
A comparison between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan bolsters the 
claim that the presence or absence of market reform accounts for different levels 
of corruption. In Uzbekistan individuals have been less likely than their counter-
parts in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to engage in corruption for basic state goods 
and ser vices. Individuals’ relationship with the state in Uzbekistan has been 
characterized chiefl y by a guarantee of state goods and ser vices, whereas in Ka-
zakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the relationship has been a competition for resources 
often involving corrupt practices. At fi rst glance the lower level of corruption in 
Uzbekistan is surprising, considering the many ways in which Uzbekistan re-
sembles Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, Uzbekistan has not undertaken 
market reform.
From the survey data it is evident that individuals in Uzbekistan typically re-
ceive basic state provisions without competing. People in Uzbekistan do seek 
assistance from government offi cials. In fact, the proportions across the three 
countries— 16 percent, 23 percent, and 19 percent— for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Uzbekistan, respectively, are similar.47 However, survey respondents in Uzbeki-
stan described their state as a guarantor of goods and ser vices more than as an 
45. Author’s interview (#158), Kazakhstan, July 19, 2001.
46. Author’s interview (#145), Kazakhstan, July 4, 2001.
47. These fi ndings are consistent with those of Scott Radnitz. He found that for a loan people in 
Uzbekistan  were hypothetically more likely to turn to a state, rather than a nonstate, entity than  were 
people in Kyrgyzstan. Because Uzbekistan has not undertaken market reform but Kyrgyzstan has, 
Uzbekistan has many more state institutions. The statistic I present  here includes only government 
offi cials, not other state institutions, such as state banks and state agricultural and industrial enter-
prises. Scott Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite- Led Protests in Central 
Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
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arena for competition. By contrast, respondents in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
described the state as foremost an arena of competition. The survey fi nding that 
competition for state resources is less common in Uzbekistan than in Kazakh-
stan and Kyrgyzstan suggests that corruption for basic goods and ser vices is also 
less common in Uzbekistan. In other words, not competing for state resources 
precludes the possibility that one is using illicit techniques to gain limited goods 
and ser vices from government offi cials. This logic is further substantiated by the 
in- depth interviews and observational studies in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. These 
direct mea sures of corruption demonstrate that bribes, personal connections, 
and promises of po liti cal support are the techniques used in this competition in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
In Uzbekistan the main characterization of the state is as a guarantor of goods 
and ser vices, not as an arena for competition as is the case in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Whereas 51 percent of survey respondents in Uzbekistan character-
ized citizens as using state resources, the fi gures  were only 28 percent and 34 
percent for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively (see Table 4.5). Only 46 per-
cent of respondents in Uzbekistan strongly agreed or agreed with the description 
of their state as an arena for competition. By contrast, 70 percent of respondents 
in Kazakhstan and 61 percent in Kyrgyzstan did. The social contract character-
ization, where citizens pay taxes in return for state ser vices, also resonated more 
in Uzbekistan. Forty- three percent of respondents in Uzbekistan but only 28 
percent in Kazakhstan and, more similarly, 36 percent in Kyrgyzstan, selected 
this option.
The greater resonance of the state- as- a-guarantor description in Uzbekistan 
refl ects the more extensive array of state goods and ser vices that Uzbekistanis 
have received from their government in the in de pen dence period. Throughout 
much of the in de pen dence period, the government of Uzbekistan has main-
tained state enterprises, provided guaranteed inputs and orders, and subsidized 
consumer goods, such as energy.48 These goods and ser vices have been guaran-
teed; citizens did not have to compete for them. Moreover, individuals who seek 
assistance from state offi cials more commonly approach them about access to 
medical specialists in local hospitals and family turmoil, as in the Soviet era, 
rather than about a lack of money.49 Only 36 percent of respondents who sought 
48. It is important to note that since the survey was conducted in Uzbekistan in 2003, the state 
has increasingly failed to provide guaranteed goods and ser vices. Uzbekistanis have experienced 
growing wage arrears, delayed pensions, and energy shortages in recent years. On the government’s 
earlier provision of necessities, see EBRD, “Transition Report 2003: Integration and Regional Coop-
eration” (London, 2003); Gregory Gleason, Markets and Politics in Central Asia: Structural Reform 
and Po liti cal Change (New York: Routledge, 2003).
49. At the time of the survey respondents  were also concerned about an outbreak of foot- and- 
mouth disease in livestock.
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assistance from state offi cials in Uzbekistan identifi ed lack of money as one of 
their main problems, whereas the proportions  were 83 percent for Kazakhstan 
and 52 percent for Kyrgyzstan. Similarly, in Uzbekistan 20 percent of those who 
sought assistance from government offi cials are unemployed, and this fi gure is 
close to the unemployed proportion of the population (17 percent). As noted 
previously the proportions of those who sought assistance who are unemployed 
 were 10 percent and 14 percent higher than the overall unemployment fi gures in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. Uzbekistan’s continued provision of 
state goods and ser vices and its citizens’ less severe problems with money and 
unemployment underscore that market reform, more than the Soviet economic 
collapse, reduced government assistance and exacerbated economic challenges 
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. After all, Uzbekistan, like Kazakhstan and Kyr-
gyzstan, also suffered from the collapse of the Soviet economy but did not un-
dertake market reform.
TABLE 4.5. Citizens’ relationships with states: Guarantor, arena of 
competition, social contract (percentage of respondents, rounded)
CITIZENS USE STATE 
RESOURCES, SUCH AS 







THAT THE STATE WILL 
PROVIDE SER VICES IF 
THEY PAY THEIR TAXES
UZBEKISTAN
Strongly agree or agree 51 46 43
Somewhat agree/disagree 28 21 23
Disagree or strongly disagree 16 14 20
Diffi cult to answer 4 19 14
Decline to answer 1 1 1
TOTAL (rounded) 100 100 100
KAZAKHSTAN
Strongly agree or agree 28 70 28
Somewhat agree/disagree 36 13 29
Disagree or strongly disagree 35 11 35
Diffi cult to answer 2 6 8
Decline to answer 1 1 1
TOTAL (rounded) 100 100 100
KYRGYZSTAN
Strongly agree or agree 34 61 36
Somewhat agree/disagree 35 20 24
Disagree or strongly disagree 29 12 32
Diffi cult to answer 3 7 8
Decline to answer <1 <1 <1
TOTAL (rounded) 100 100 100
Note: n = 1,500 for each country. Percentages for each country do not necessarily total to 100 because they 
are rounded. For each country the difference in percentages between the most pop u lar statement and each of 
the less pop u lar statements is statistically signifi cant at the .001 level, meaning that such a difference would 
be observed due to random chance approximately .1 percent of the time.
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According to standard mea sures of market reform, the government of Uz-
bekistan has done nothing or only very little. As Table 4.6 shows, current ac-
count convertibility is limited. The government has done little to liberalize inter-
est rates, trade, and prices. Privatization of small fi rms and land has occurred on 
only a limited scale. Private pensions do not exist and wages remain regulated. 
In the past few years the government slightly expanded small- scale privatization 
and liberalized foreign exchange and trade, but not enough to merit a different 
characterization.50
Uzbekistan has not undertaken market reform, but the two conditions of the 
argument— a legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention and an absence 
or weakness of market- enhancing institutions— are present. As a former repub-
lic of the Soviet  Union, Uzbekistan was also subject to the Soviet party- state’s 
control of the economy. In this respect, it was not different from Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Also like its neighbors, Uzbekistan has not actively developed 
market- enhancing institutions. The World Bank and International Finance Cor-
poration reported that Uzbekistan has not had a private credit registry or public 
credit bureau for most of its in de pen dence period. From 2008 to 2011 less than 
10 percent of the population was covered by either type of institution with the 
number jumping to approximately 17 percent in 2013.51 The EBRD describes 
50. The latest data available for interest rate liberalization are from 2010. See “Transition indica-
tors by country,” in EBRD, “Transition Report 2009: Transition in Crisis.”
51. International Finance Corporation and Bank, “Doing Business: Mea sur ing Business Regula-
tions,”  http:// www .doingbusiness .org /custom -query (accessed December 19, 2013).




Current account convertibility limited full full
Interest rate liberalization limited full full
Trade liberalization limited almost full almost full
Price liberalization limited almost full almost full
PRIVATIZATION
Small fi rms limited full full
Land limited fulla fullb
Private pensions no yes yes
DEREGULATION
Wages deregulated no yes yes
Source: Eu ro pe an Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Transition indicators by country,” at “Forecasts, 
Macro Data, Transition Indicators,”  http:// www .ebrd .com /pages /research /economics /data /macro .shtml #t. 
The data are from 2003, the year of my survey research.
a Land is fully tradable except by foreigners.
b Land is fully tradable; however, there have been diffi culties implementing this policy.
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Uzbekistan as having almost no competition policy from the time of the surveys 
to 2013.52
The absence of market reform and the presence of the two conditions in Uz-
bekistan, as well as the lower level of competition for basic state goods and ser-
vices in the country, support the argument that market reform in the context of 
the two conditions promotes corruption. Evidence of Uzbekistanis’ weak reli-
ance on market and societal actors further corroborates this account. The lower 
level of competition for state resources in Uzbekistan is, in fact, because the gov-
ernment continued to guarantee goods and ser vices, rather than because market 
and societal actors in Uzbekistan offer an alternative to the state. The percent-
ages of Uzbekistanis who have sought assistance from market and societal actors 
are comparable to the percentages of Kazakhstanis and Kyrgyzstanis who have 
done so (see Table 4.7). The legacy of state economic intervention and the ab-
sence of market- enhancing institutions has hindered the development of market 
and societal alternatives in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In Uzbekistan, where 
market reform has not taken place, the continuing state economic intervention 
likely reduces the resources available to market and social actors as the legacy of 
intervention in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has.
The only exception in terms of reliance on market and societal actors is that 
more Uzbekistanis turn to respected male elders than people in Kazakhstan and 
52. See “Transition Indicators by Country,” in EBRD, “Transition Report 2009”; EBRD, “Tran-
sition Report 2013: Stuck in Transition?”
TABLE 4.7. Market and societal actors and institutions from whom citizens 
have sought assistance in the past year
UZBEKISTAN KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN
MARKET ACTORS
Bank 1 3 1
Current employer 5 4 3
Former employer 2 4 2
Local company where you don’t work <1 3 <1
Foreign company where you don’t work <1 <1 0
SOCIETAL ACTORS
Religious institution or leader <1 1 2
Local, private charitable or ga ni za tion 1 1 2
Foreign charity <1 <1 1
Labor  union 1 1 1
Respected male elder 13 1 4
Educational establishment <1 <1 2
Note: n = 1,200 for Kazakhstan, 1,199 for Kyrgyzstan, and 1,170 for Uzbekistan. A portion of the 1,500 
respondents in each country claimed that they had no problems or that describing their problems was too 
diffi cult and thus some respondents  were not asked this question about seeking assistance.
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Kyrgyzstan do. This is explained by a few villages and small cities in Uzbekistan 
where many people have turned to respected male elders. Excluding these loca-
tions brings the results in line with Kyrgyzstan’s. People in these locations in 
Uzbekistan also turned to government offi cials at rates consistent with or 
higher than the country average, indicating that elders  were not an alternative 
to the state. Unlike these few pockets of likely resource- rich male elders, the 
state guarantee of goods and ser vices can explain lower levels of corruption for 
everyday needs throughout Uzbekistan. In sum, the contrast between Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan demonstrates that the outcome of interest—
corruption to meet everyday needs— is weak where the causal factor— market 
reform— is absent.
Alternative Explanations
Other theories of corruption offer valuable insights into illicit behavior, but they 
cannot account for why corruption to meet everyday needs is more common in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan than Uzbekistan. The other explanations examined 
below are drawn from the limited number of studies of petty corruption as well 
as investigations of grand corruption. They include institutional, economic, and 
cultural theories.
Institutional Explanations
Returning to the discussion of the overbearing state and weak state capacity 
theories,53 we fi nd that these explanations do not shed light on the difference in 
Central Asia. As republics in the former Soviet  Union, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Uzbekistan  were all part of an “overbearing state.” Today standard mea sures 
of state regulation, the amount of time and the number of procedures needed 
to establish a business, cannot account for the difference.54 The time required to 
complete the procedures to operate a business is lower in Uzbekistan than in 
Kazakhstan, but is similar to Kyrgyzstan in 2013. In 2003 Uzbekistan was higher 
on this mea sure than both of the other countries. Uzbekistan fell between 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in terms of the number of procedures to register a 
business in 2013. In 2003 Uzbekistan was lower than Kazakhstan but similar to 
53. See footnotes four and fi ve in chapter one.
54. Simeon Djankov et al., “The Regulation of Entry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 
1 (2002), 1– 37.
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Kyrgyzstan on this mea sure (see Table 4.8). Thus, state regulation does not seem 
to be a plausible explanation. Moreover, designating state regulation as a cause 
of corruption is questionable as it could just as easily be a symptom. Government 
offi cials already engaged in corruption could create additional state regulations 
to enable illicit exchanges. Weak state capacity is also an unsatisfying explanation. 
With in de pen dence, each country lost state capacity as resources from Moscow 
declined, trade with other former republics diminished, and chaos ensued in the 
unexpected shift from provinces to sovereign states.55
A second group of institutional theories of corruption focuses on the impor-
tance of demo cratic institutions, but these also fail to explain the greater corrup-
tion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Po liti cal parties are one demo cratic institu-
tion that has garnered signifi cant attention, beginning with Martin Shefter’s 
work in the 1970s. Shefter argued that clientelist parties  were more likely to de-
velop when the introduction of demo cratic institutions preceded the profession-
alization of the bureaucracy.56 However, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan 
 were all subject to the same sequencing of bureaucratization and party- building. 
Each inherited the remnants of the Soviet bureaucracy while trying to develop a 
new bureaucracy for a sovereign state and witnessing the emergence of a multi-
party system.
Since Shefter’s work, scholars, including Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkin-
son, Conor  O’Dwyer, and Anna Grzymała-Busse have identifi ed weak party com-
petition as an explanation for party clientelism, patronage, and material gain 
from state assets, respectively.57 Because party competition is weak, as defi ned by 
55. Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: In de pen dence, Foreign Policy, and Regional 
Security (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 4– 5, 9; Richard W. T. 
Pomfret, The Economies of Central Asia (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton University Press, 1995), 5.
56. Martin Shefter, “Party and Patronage: Germany, En gland, and Italy,” Politics and Society 7, 
no. 4 (1977), 403– 51.
57.  O’Dwyer’s examination of patronage focuses on parties’ distribution of state jobs. 
Grzymała-Busse investigates how parties enrich themselves by staffi ng state offi ces and thus control-
ling fi scal resources, by privatizing state entities and establishing new agencies, and by hindering the 
development of government oversight and control institutions. Other works, such as those by 
Heidenheimer, Holmes, and Scott, have mentioned the infl uence of electoral competition. Anna 
Grzymała-Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post- Communist 
Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Arnold J. Heidenheimer, “Parties, 
Campaign Finance and Po liti cal Corruption: Tracing Long- Term Comparative Dynamics,” in Po liti cal 
Corruption: Concepts and Contexts, ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (New Bruns-
wick, NJ: Transaction, 2002), 761– 76; Leslie Holmes, Rotten States? Corruption, Post- Communism, 
and Neoliberalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 188; Conor  O’Dwyer, Runaway State- 
Building: Patronage Politics and Demo cratic Development (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2006); James C. Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Po liti cal Change,” American Po liti cal 
Science Review 63, no. 4 (1969): 1142– 58,  here 1143.
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these scholars,58 in each of the Central Asian countries, these explanations are also 
not illuminating. For example, in each country, citizens and candidates have 
strong incentives to fi nd supporters for their side in national elections, but gener-
ally not in local elections, where offi ces involve little responsibility and offer even 
fewer resources. Both the national and subnational candidates are typically “lo-
cal notables” with a minimal or no platform, so they do not present clear prefer-
ences. In some cases they are simply fake candidates running at the behest of in-
cumbents to make elections appear demo cratic. True opposition candidates 
encounter signifi cant obstacles to winning: incumbents, in some cases backed by 
a “party of power,” wield administrative resources, such as state funds, media 
control, sanctions by inspectors, and threats of job loss. In none of the countries 
has there been a “clear, plausible, and critical governing alternative,”59 to use 
Grzymała-Busse’s terms, and thus party competition cannot explain the varia-
tion in corruption.
58. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson defi ne party systems as competitive “when citizens 
and politicians have strong incentives to try hard to win supporters at the margin for one or the 
other partisan camp.” Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, “Citizen- Politician Linkages: An In-
troduction,” in Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Demo cratic Accountability and Po liti cal Com-
petition, ed. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1– 49,  here 29. 
 O’Dwyer considers there to be party competition when there is no dominant party and there is a 
“manageable number of stable parties with familiar coalition- building preferences.”  O’Dwyer, Run-
away State- Building, 7. For Grzymała-Busse what matters is “opposition parties that offer a clear, 
plausible, and critical governing alternative that threatens the governing co ali tion with replacement.” 
Grzymała-Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan, 1.
59. Grzymała-Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan, 1.





2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013
Time required to complete 
procedures to operate 
a business (days)a
26 12 21 8 29 9
Procedures to register a 
business (number)b
10 6 9 2 8 4
Source: World Bank, “World Databank,”  http:// databank .worldbank .org /ddp /home .do. The latest data are 
provided.
a According to the World Bank, “the [t]ime required to start a business is the number of calendar days needed 
to complete the procedures to legally operate a business. If a procedure can be speeded up at additional cost, 
the fastest procedure, in de pen dent of cost, is chosen.”
b The World Bank Databank site states, “Start- up procedures are those required to start a business, including 
interactions to obtain necessary permits and licenses and to complete all inscriptions, verifi cations, and 
notifi cations to start operations. Data are for businesses with specifi c characteristics of own ership, size, and 
type of production.”
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Another line of reasoning about demo cratic institutions suggests that re-
spect for civil liberties can reduce corruption by enabling in de pen dent media, 
watchdog groups, and opposition forces to check government offi cials.60 How-
ever, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the countries with more corruption to meet 
everyday needs, are also the countries where the governments have shown greater 
respect for civil liberties and po liti cal rights. From in de pen dence in 1991 to 
2013, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have consistently scored better on Freedom 
 House’s rating of civil liberties, which include freedom of expression and asso-
ciation, and po liti cal liberties, which include the right to join a po liti cal party 
(see Table 4.9).
60. Alícia Adserá, Carles Boix, and Mark Payne, “Are You Being Served? Po liti cal Accountabil-
ity and Quality of Government,” Journal of Law Economics and Or ga ni za tion 19, no. 2 (2003), 445– 
90; Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder, “A Free Press Is Bad News for Corruption,” Journal of Public 
Economics 87, no. 7– 8 (2003), 1801– 24; Holmes, Rotten States? 186– 87; Simona Piattoni, “Clien-
telism in Historical and Comparative Perspective,” in Clientelism, Interests, and Demo cratic Repre sen-
ta tion: The Eu ro pe an Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective, ed. Piattoni (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1– 30,  here 17.
TABLE 4.9. Po liti cal rights and civil liberties ratings
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN UZBEKISTAN












1991 5 4 5 4 6 5
1992 5 5 4 2 6 6
1993 6 4 5 3 7 7
1994 6 5 4 3 7 7
1995 6 5 4 4 7 7
1996 6 5 4 4 7 6
1997 6 5 4 4 7 6
1998 6 5 5 5 7 6
1999 6 5 5 5 7 6
2000 6 5 6 5 7 6
2001 6 5 6 5 7 6
2002 6 5 6 5 7 6
2003 6 5 6 5 7 6
2004 6 5 6 5 7 6
2005 6 5 6 5 7 6
2006 6 5 5 4 7 7
2007 6 5 5 4 7 7
2008 6 5 5 4 7 7
2009 6 5 5 4 7 7
2010 6 5 6 5 7 7
2011 6 5 5 5 7 7
2012 6 5 5 5 7 7
2013 6 5 5 5 7 7
Source: “Country Ratings and Status, FIW 1973– 2013” (Freedom  House), available from  http:// www 
. freedomhouse .org /.
Note: Ratings range from 1 to 7, with 7 being the least freedom.
86     CHAPTER 4
Others have suggested that the introduction of demo cratic institutions can 
encourage corruption. One idea is that the establishment of an electoral system 
leads politicians to engage in illicit practices to fund their campaigns.61 Another 
idea is that the po liti cal liberalization pro cess itself is to blame. Much of the logic 
about po liti cal liberalization mirrors the logic regarding economic liberaliza-
tion: confusion over new procedures facilitates corruption because citizens do 
not know their rights; offi cials may use corrupt means to ensure their own sur-
vival; and offi cials may block new reforms if they benefi t from the status quo.62 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan all experienced po liti cal liberalization 
in the late Soviet and early in de pen dence periods. Social and po liti cal organiza-
tions and media unaffi liated with the Communist Party  were allowed, multican-
didate elections  were held, and restrictions on personal freedoms including speech 
and travel  were reduced. So, this explanation does not account for the difference 
in corruption. Scholars have also argued that certain institutions, namely, presi-
dential systems instead of parliamentary ones, are more conducive to corruption,63 
but all three Central Asian states have had presidential systems for all or nearly 
all of their in de pen dence periods.64
Theories about demo cratic institutions as well as a host of other institutional 
theories point to decentralization as a cause of corruption. The idea that decen-
tralization contributes to corruption is not universally accepted,65 but one school 
61. Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, Po liti cal Consequences of Crony Capitalism inside Rus sia (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010).
62. Alexandra Vacroux, “Regulation and Corruption in Transition: The Case of Rus sian Phar-
maceutical Markets,” in Building a Trustworthy State in Post- Socialist Transition, ed. János Kornai 
and Susan  Rose- Ackerman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 135– 50,  here 146.
63. John Gerring and Strom C. Thacker, “Po liti cal Institutions and Corruption: The Role of 
Unitarism and Parliamentarism,” British Journal of Po liti cal Science 34, no. 2 (2004), 233– 54; Jana 
Kunicová and Susan  Rose- Ackerman, “Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints 
on Corruption,” British Journal of Po liti cal Science 35, no. 4 (2005), 573– 606; Daniel Lederman, Nor-
man V. Loayza, and Rodrigo R. Soares, “Accountability and Corruption: Po liti cal Institutions Mat-
ter,” Economics and Politics 17, no. 1 (2005), 1– 35.
64. Kyrgyzstan established a parliamentary system in the winter of 2011.
65. Pranab Bardhan provides a useful review of the literature on this question. Pranab Bardhan, 
“Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” in Po liti cal Corruption: Concepts and Contexts, 
ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002), 321– 38. 
For a sampling of different fi ndings on this topic, see: Ray Fisman and Roberta Gatti, “Decentraliza-
tion and Corruption: Evidence across Countries,” Journal of Public Economics 83 (2002), 325– 45; 
Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Slapping the Grasping Hand: Correlates of Po liti cal Corruption in Emerging 
Markets,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 58, no. 4 (1999), 865– 83; Anwar Shah, “Cor-
ruption and Decentralized Public Governance,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3824 
(2006),  http:// elibrary .worldbank .org /doi /book /10 .1596 /1813 -9450 -3824 (accessed December 19, 
2013); Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, no. 
3 (1993), 599– 617; Daniel Treisman, “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross- National Study,” Journal of 
Public Economics 76, no. 3 (2000), 399– 457; Daniel Treisman, “Fiscal Decentralization, Governance, and 
Economic Per for mance: A Reconsideration,” Economics and Politics 18, no. 2 (2006), 219– 35.
MARKET ACTORS AS AN UNREALIZED ALTERNATIVE     87
of thought does suggest that by increasing the number of offi cials who make deci-
sions and have access to public resources, decentralization creates more oppor-
tunities for corruption. Moreover, according to this school of thought, central 
governments have greater diffi culty monitoring a larger number of offi cials, thus 
hindering corruption prevention and eradication efforts.66 Decentralization is 
often a component of demo cratic reform, so scholars have also attributed cor-
ruption to the decentralizing tendencies of demo cratic transitions and institu-
tions.67 For example, local elections may provide central party leaders with in-
formation and incentives to distribute patronage more effectively to voters in 
order to ensure that local offi cials do not operate in de pen dently of the party.68 
All of these arguments, however, shed little light on the three Central Asian 
countries, which have been similar in terms of decentralization, according to the 
World Bank.69
Cultural Explanations
Because the Central Asian countries share many cultural characteristics, cultural 
theories of corruption offer little help. Of the different types of corruption theo-
ries, cultural explanations are the least pop u lar. They are most common to ac-
count for corruption in less developed countries, and they are most often advo-
cated by sociologists.70 Their adherents attribute corruption to present- day 
culture derived from the precolonial and colonial periods. They view precolonial 
culture as “traditional” culture and emphasize how hierarchical relationships 
and the importance of family ties encourage corruption.71 The pre- Soviet cultures 
of the territories of present- day Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan  were 
66. Goldsmith, “Slapping the Grasping Hand,” 878.
67. Christoph H. Stefes, Understanding Post- Soviet Transitions: Corruption, Collusion and Cli-
entelism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 55.
68. Anoop Sadanandan, “Patronage and Decentralization: The Politics of Poverty in India,” 
Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (2012), 211– 28.
69. World Bank, “Decentralization in the Transition Economies: Challenges and the Road 
Ahead,” 25132 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001).
70. Po liti cal scientists and economists typically identify institutional and economic causes, and 
anthropologists historically have not studied corruption. Giorgio Blundo, “Corruption in Africa and 
the Social Sciences: A Review of the Literature,” in Everyday Corruption and the State: Citizens and 
Public Offi cials in Africa, ed. Giorgio Blundo and Jean- Pierre Olivier de Sardan (New York: Zed, 
2006), 15– 68,  here 25– 26; Johann Graf Lambsdorff, “Causes and Consequences of Corruption: 
What Do We Know from a Cross- Section of Countries?” in  Rose- Ackerman, International Handbook 
on the Economics of Corruption, 3– 51,  here 17.
71. Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, Everyday Corruption and the State, 97– 98; Bryan W. Husted, 
“Wealth, Culture, and Corruption,” Journal of International Business Studies 30, no. 2 (1999), 
 339– 59.
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similar in these respects. Although present- day Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan  were 
inhabited by nomads and present- day Uzbekistan was home to oasis peoples, all 
shared hierarchical social structures, including respect for authority and elders, 
and strong family networks. Vestiges of this traditional culture exist today in 
each country.72
Regarding colonial culture, studies have found less corruption in countries 
that experienced British rule, perhaps because of British legal culture.73 None of 
these Central Asian countries experienced British rule, so this cannot explain 
corruption. More generally, scholars have highlighted how the practice of ignor-
ing rules imposed by the metropole and stealing from a state viewed as illegiti-
mate encourage independence- era corruption.74 In the Soviet context, numer-
ous corrupting infl uences have been identifi ed. These include the hierarchical 
nature of the communist system, atheist policies, leaders’ ability to act with im-
punity, a focus on goals instead of procedures, a blurring of state and society, an 
absence of transparency, the primacy of informal institutions over formal ones, 
and the need to cut through bureaucratic “red tape.”75 Moreover, bribery and 
personal connections to obtain state goods and ser vices  were common in the 
Soviet  Union.76 Yet Uzbekistan, as well as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, experi-
enced these Soviet institutions and practices, raising doubt about their explana-
tory powers in these cases. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the individuals who 
engage in illicit practices, the targets of their requests, and the goods and ser vices 
sought have changed since the Soviet era. This indicates that these practices are 
not a continuation of Soviet- era habits but a new phenomenon that, like market 
reform, emerged after the Soviet collapse.
72. Lucy Earle, “Community Development, ‘Tradition’ and the Civil Society Strengthening 
Agenda in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey 24, no. 3 (2005): 245– 60,  here 249, 252; Gregory Glea-
son, The Central Asian States: Discovering In de pen dence (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 38; 
Alisher Ilkhamov, “The Thorny Path of Civil Society in Uzbekistan,” Central Asian Survey 24, no. 3 
(2005): 297– 317,  here 307; Martha Brill Olcott, “Central Asia: The Reformers Challenge a Tradi-
tional Society,” in The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society, ed. Lubomyr Hajda and Mark 
R. Beissinger (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 253– 80,  here 254, 269.
73. Gerring and Thacker, “Po liti cal Institutions and Corruption”; Treisman, “The Causes of 
Corruption.”
74. Blundo, “Corruption in Africa and the Social Sciences,” 45– 47.
75. Holmes, Rotten States? 183– 86; Rasma Karklins, The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in 
Post- Communist Societies (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), 14– 15, 81; Alena V. Ledeneva, How 
Rus sia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post- Soviet Politics and Business (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2006), 22.
76. Alena V. Ledeneva, Rus sia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Promises of po liti cal support in exchange for state 
goods and ser vices  were less evident in the Soviet  Union because elections  were not competitive and 
promises of po liti cal support are most visible in connection with elections.
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The fi rst piece of clarifying evidence shows that those who sought assistance 
from the Soviet state are not the same individuals who seek government help 
today. In Kazakhstan 83 percent of survey respondents and in Kyrgyzstan 89 
percent who have turned to government offi cials in the in de pen dence period did 
not seek help from the Soviet state.77 These percentages cannot be explained on 
the basis that the respondents  were children during the Soviet era. On the con-
trary, 91 percent and 87 percent of respondents who seek government assistance 
today responded that they  were adults in the Soviet era.
The fact that the targets of citizens’ requests have changed also shows that 
these practices are not a continuation of Soviet era ones. In the Soviet period the 
most pop u lar state entities to turn to for assistance  were places of employment 
and labor  unions. Through offi cial workplaces and the party- controlled labor 
 unions, individuals received state benefi ts, so it is understandable that they also 
turned to them for additional help. In Kazakhstan 19 percent and 18 percent of 
respondents sought help from places of employment and labor  unions, respec-
tively, in the Soviet era. The fi gures  were 16 percent and 12 percent, respectively, 
for Kyrgyzstan. By contrast, in each country only 7 percent turned to Soviet 
party or government offi cials. Today, state enterprises and labor  unions are rare 
and government offi cials instead are the common target of citizens’ requests. In 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 4 percent and 3 percent, respectively, had turned to 
their employer for help in the past year. In each country only 1 percent of survey 
respondents sought assistance from a labor  union.
Finally, individuals today are not seeking the same goods and ser vices from 
the state as they did in the Soviet era. In the Soviet period an individual was 
guaranteed a job and basic necessities such as food, so bribes and connections 
 were useful primarily for obtaining higher quality goods and ser vices, such as a 
better job or better cut of meat.78 In contemporary Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
extensive welfare guarantees do not exist, so bribes, connections, and promises 
of po liti cal support are useful for meeting basic needs, such as a job, credit, and 
money, which can, in turn, allow one to secure food and clothes.
This evidence that corruption for basic state goods and ser vices today is not a 
continuation of Soviet practices is particularly important to this argument be-
cause it challenges the reverse causal argument— corruption promotes market 
77. Respondents  were asked, “Before 1991 whom did you rely on for help with everyday prob-
lems? Choose as many as apply.” Respondents received a card with twenty- one actors and institutions 
listed, including the options to list others and to note “I was a child during the Soviet era.” Interview-
ers read the card aloud. Each country had 1,500 respondents.
78. In the Soviet era, isolated periods of shortages occurred and also certain regions experi-
enced shortages. In these circumstances, bribes and connections  were also useful in obtaining basic 
goods. Ledeneva, Rus sia’s Economy of Favours.
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reform without market- enhancing institutions. Instead by showing that market 
reform preceded this corruption for obtaining basic state goods and ser vices, 
the evidence bolsters the claim of this book that market reform promotes cor-
ruption.
A fi nal set of cultural explanations is linked to present- day ethnic composi-
tion,79 low levels of generalized trust,80 and absence of Protestantism.81 These 
explanations also do not illuminate the difference in Central Asia. Theories 
about ethnicity suggest that corruption, especially clientelist networks, is more 
likely in multiethnic societies because ethnic divides facilitate their development 
and endurance. Patrons and clients can develop within an ethnic group and feel 
greater loyalty to each other than to the national community, including its laws. 
Each of the three countries examined  here has a multiethnic population, as indi-
cated in Table 4.10, so this explanation offers little insight in this instance.82
In none of the countries is generalized trust high. Approximately half of all 
respondents in my survey volunteered that they trusted no one when they  were 
asked to rank a series of market and societal actors from most trusted to least 
trusted.83 Protestantism is weak in all three countries as the populations are pre-
dominantly Muslim.
Economic Explanations
A fi nal set of explanations focuses on economic causes of corruption. Scholars 
have attributed corruption to poverty, economic underdevelopment, in e qual ity, 
79. Elmer E. Cornwell Jr., “Bosses, Machines, and Ethnic Groups,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Po liti cal and Social Science 353 (1964), 27– 39; Samuel P. Huntington, “Modernization 
and Corruption,” in Heidenheimer and Johnston, Po liti cal Corruption, 253– 63,  here 257; Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson, “Citizen- Politician Linkages.” Kanchan Chandra’s work, which examines the inter-
action between ethnicity and clientelism, focuses on a different relationship: how clientelism can 
encourage ethnic voting. Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head 
Counts in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
80. Christian Bjørnskov and Marin Paldam, “Corruption Trends,” in The New Institutional 
Economics of Corruption, ed. Johann Lambsdorff, Markus Taube, and Matthias Schramm (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 59– 75; Stephen D. Morris and Joseph L. Klesner, “Corruption and Trust: Theo-
retical Considerations and Evidence from Mexico,” Comparative Po liti cal Studies 43, no. 10 (2010), 
1258– 85.
81. Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Salman Lenz, “Corruption, Culture, and Markets,” in 
Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, ed. Samuel P. Huntington and Lawrence E. Har-
rison (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 112– 24,  here 120– 22; Treisman, “The Causes of Corruption,” 
427– 28.
82. None of the theories indicates that the greater share of the titular ethnic group in Uzbeki-
stan versus the other countries should have an effect on corruption.
83. The actors  were one’s employer, a respected male elder, government organs, religious insti-
tution or leader, charitable or ga ni za tion, and a company where one does not work.
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abundant natural resources, trade isolationism, and a large supply of interna-
tional funds. None of these explains the difference in Central Asia.
Poor people, according to existing literature, use corruption to survive.84 
They must pay bribes for goods and ser vices that the privileged can obtain for 
free,85 and they tend to trade their votes for immediate concrete benefi ts instead 
of future intangible policy changes.86 Economic underdevelopment promotes 
corruption by increasing poverty and also by increasing in e qual ity.87 One the-
ory is that in e qual ity facilitates corruption by reducing trust across groups and 
increasing trust within groups.88 Another idea is that those who are well- off sell 
84. Tatiana Kostadinova, Po liti cal Corruption in Eastern Eu rope: Politics after Communism 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2012); Piattoni, “Clientelism in Historical and Comparative Perspec-
tive,” 17; Alice Sindzingre, “A Comparative Analysis of African and East Asian Corruption,” in 
Heidenheimer and Johnson, Po liti cal Corruption: Concepts and Contexts, 441– 60,  here 452.
85. Claus Offe, “Po liti cal Corruption: Conceptual and Practical Issues,” in Kornai and Rose- 
Ackerman, Building a Trustworthy State in Post- Socialist Transition, 77– 99,  here 86.
86. Kitschelt, “Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Demo cratic Politics,” 857; Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson, “Citizen- Politician Linkages,” 25; Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Po liti cal 
Change,” 1150– 51.
87. Treisman, “The Causes of Corruption.” For a review of studies that have found correlations 
between economic underdevelopment and corruption, see Benjamin A. Olken and Rohini Pande, 
“Corruption in Developing Countries,” Annual Review of Economics 4 (2012), 479– 509. An economic 
underdevelopment argument about fi rms, instead of individuals, fi nds that fi rms engage in bribery 
instead of lobbying when their level of capital is low, a situation more common in poorer countries. 
Bärd Harstad and Jakob Svensson, “Bribes, Lobbying, and Development,” American Po liti cal Science 
Review 105, no. 1 (2011), 46– 63.
88. Eric M. Uslaner, Corruption, In e qual ity, and the Rule of Law: The Bulging Pocket Makes the 
Easy Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
TABLE 4.10. Ethnic composition
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN UZBEKISTANa
1999 2009 1999 2009 1996 2009
Titular 53 63 65 71 80 NA
Uzbek 3 3 14 14 (see Titular) NA
Rus sian 30 24 13 8 6 NA
Other 14 10 8 7 14 NA
Source: Figures for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan for 2009 are based on national census results: Agency of 
Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “The Results of the National Population Census in 2009,” 2010, 
 http:// www .eng .stat .kz /perepis _nasl; National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Population and 
Housing Census of the Kyrgyz Republic of 2009 Book I: Main social and demographic characteristics of 
population and number of housing units,” 2009,  http:// unstats .un .org /unsd /demographic /sources /census 
/2010 _phc /Kyrgyzstan /A5 -2PopulationAndHousingCensusOfTheKyrgyzRepublicOf2009 .pdf. The latest data are 
presented. The 1999 fi gures for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are based on the 1999 census. For Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan, they are from Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook 2002,” 2002,  https:// www .cia 
.gov /library /publications /download /download -2002. The fi gures for Kyrgyzstan are available from the National 
Statistical Committee publication cited above.
a Uzbekistan did not conduct a census in 2009. The 1996 fi gures are demographers’ estimates based on the 
1989 census results.
92     CHAPTER 4
access to privileges and goods to the lower classes, particularly in democracies 
where outright oppression to maximize one’s wealth is not acceptable. The greater 
the in e qual ity the more diffi cult it is for lower classes to monitor the wealthy and 
hold them accountable and thus to uncover and punish corruption.89 Economic 
underdevelopment has also been linked to corruption through the idea of weak 
state capacity. A poorer state cannot prevent, investigate, and punish corruption 
as effectively as a wealthier state, according to the argument. Furthermore, stud-
ies have found that poorer governments pay their employees less, which increases 
bureaucrats’ incentives to engage in illicit activities.90
The remaining economic explanations focus more on grand corruption, es-
pecially between government and big business, but they are worth considering 
briefl y. From the resource curse literature and corruption studies, we know that 
resource wealth is correlated with corruption. Scholars have argued that abun-
dant natural resources create opportunities for government offi cials to provide 
rents, meaning rights to produce or trade, such as drilling permits, in return for 
payment.91 Countries less open to international trade further exacerbate this 
problem because they strengthen domestic monopolies, enabling government 
offi cials to grant more rents.92 International capital whether in the form of in-
vestments in natural resource extraction or other industries, as well as foreign 
aid, may also increase corruption by providing additional opportunities for gov-
ernment offi cials to enrich themselves.93
These economic explanations do not, however, explain the differences in 
Central Asia. On mea sures of poverty and economic underdevelopment— gross 
domestic product (GDP), the percentage of the population living on less than 
2 USD per day, and the percentage of urban population— Uzbekistan resembles 
Kyrgyzstan, and citizens of both countries are considerably worse off than those 
in Kazakhstan (see Table 4.11). Levels of in e qual ity, as mea sured by the Gini in-
dex, are comparable across the three countries, thus also not an explanation. 
89. Jong- Sung You and Sanjeev Khagram, “A Comparative Study of In e qual ity and Corrup-
tion,” American So cio log i cal Review 70, no. 1 (2005), 136– 57.
90. Kostadinova, Po liti cal Corruption in Eastern Eu rope: Politics after Communism.
91. Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella, “Rents, Competition, and Corruption,” American Eco-
nomic Review 89, no. 4 (1999), 982– 93; Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann, “Does Mother Nature Cor-
rupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth,” IMF Working Paper 99/85 (1999).
92. Ades and Di Tella, “Rents, Competition, and Corruption”; John Gerring and Strom C. 
Thacker, “Do Neoliberal Policies Deter Po liti cal Corruption?” International Or ga ni za tion 59, no. 1 
(2005), 233– 54; Wayne Sandholtz and Mark M. Gray, “International Integration and National Cor-
ruption,” International Or ga ni za tion 57, no. 4 (2003), 761– 800; Wayne Sandholtz and William Koet-
zle, “Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, Democracy, and Trade,” International Studies 
Quarterly 44 (2000), 31– 50.
93. Blundo, “Corruption in Africa and the Social Sciences,” 57; William Reno, Corruption and 
State Politics in Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
TABLE 4.11. Socioeconomic characteristics
MARKET REFORMERS NONMARKET REFORMER
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN UZBEKISTAN
2003a 2012 2003a 2012 2003a 2012
GDP (nominal per capita, USD) 2,068 11,935 381 1,160 396 1,717
Percentage of the population 
living on less than 2 USD 
per day (in 2002)b
22 1 67 22 76 NA
Urban population (percentage 
of total population)
55 54 35 35 37 36
Gini index (in 2002)c 35 29 32 33 35 NA
Energy production (thousand 
metric tons of oil equivalent)d
101,918 160,148 1,290 1,620 56,416 57,268
Imports of goods and ser vices 
(percentage of GDP)e
43 30 45 82 31 31
Foreign direct investment 
(millions, USD)f
2,092 13,227 46 693 83 1,403
Foreign direct investment 
(percentage of GDP)f
7 7 2 11 1 3
Foreign aid and development 
assistance (millions, USD)g
294 213 200 523 195 215
Foreign aid and development 
assistance (percentage 
of GDP)g
1 .11 10 8 2 .47
Source: World Bank, “World Databank,” available from  http:// databank .worldbank .org /ddp /home .do. The latest data 
are presented.
a The data in these columns are for 2003 with the exception of the percentage of the population living on less than 2 
USD per day and the Gini index. See notes (b) and (c) below.
b This statistic is called the “Poverty headcount ratio at $2 per day,” and it is expressed in U.S. dollars at 2005 
international prices. Poverty statistics are not available for Kyrgyzstan in 2003 and for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 2010 
or 2011, so instead I use 2002 and 2009 data. For comparability I use the 2002 data for Uzbekistan, which is only one 
percentage point lower than the 2003 number. The latest year for which this statistic is available for Uzbekistan is 2003. 
The statistic for Uzbekistan was accessed from the database in 2011. Poverty statistics no longer appear in the online 
Databank for Uzbekistan. A comparable statistic, 71.7 percent for 2000, appears in a spreadsheet titled “WDI 
Uzbekistan,” provided by the World Bank and available from the author.
c The Gini index mea sures income in e qual ity, with zero indicating perfect equality and 100 indicating perfect in e qual ity. A 
description of the calculation can be found on the website. Statistics  were not available for Uzbekistan after 2003. 
Statistics for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are from the most recent years available: 2009 and 2011, respectively.
d According to the World Bank, “Energy production refers to forms of primary energy— petroleum (crude oil, natural gas 
liquids, and oil from nonconventional sources), natural gas, solid fuels (coal, lignite, and other derived fuels), and 
combustible renewables and waste— and primary electricity, all converted into oil equivalents.” Scholars who have made 
this argument use fuel, ore, and metal exports instead of energy production, but the former are not available for 
Uzbekistan. These statistics are from 2011, the most recent year available.
e These statistics are from the latest years available: 2012 for Kazakhstan, and 2011 for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
f These statistics appear in the database as “Foreign direct investment, net infl ows” and they are “the net infl ows of 
investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in 
an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long- term 
capital, and short- term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net infl ows (new investment 
infl ows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors.” The statistics for Uzbekistan are from 
2011, the latest year available.
g This statistic is called “Net offi cial development assistance and offi cial aid received” and is mea sured in current U.S. 
dollars. These fi gures include grants and loans that include grants of at least 25 percent from foreign countries and 
multilateral institutions for economic development and welfare. The percentages of GDP  were calculated using the GDP 
fi gures from the website. These statistics are for 2011, the latest year available.
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Energy production fi gures show that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but not Kyr-
gyzstan, are more likely to suffer from the resource curse. Both Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan have an abundance of natural resources. Kazakhstan has large 
amounts of oil and natural gas, but I came across no evidence that resources 
used for petty corruption  were from oil revenues in Kazakhstan or that individ-
uals expected government money because of this revenue source. Moreover, Uz-
bekistan also has reserves, albeit smaller, while Kyrgyzstan has almost no natural 
resources, with the exception of a small amount of gold. A common mea sure of 
international trade openness, imports of goods and ser vices as a percentage of 
GDP, predicts that Kyrgyzstan, but not Kazakhstan, would experience more cor-
ruption than Uzbekistan currently. In 2003 the percentages  were similar across 
the three countries. Mea sures of foreign direct investment and foreign aid and 
development assistance suggest that international capital is also not the answer. 
Uzbekistan’s numbers for foreign direct investment were between those of Ka-
zakhstan and Kyrgyzstan each year. As a percentage of GDP, foreign direct in-
vestment in Uzbekistan was slightly lower than in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 
2011 but comparable to Kyrgyzstan in 2003. Measures of foreign aid and devel-
opment assistance for Uzbekistan were comparable to either Kazakhstan or 
Kyrgyzstan each year.
In sum, alternative institutional, cultural, and economic explanations are not 
helpful in explaining the difference in Central Asia. Instead, the evidence points 
to market reform as promoting corruption when a legacy of signifi cant state 
economic intervention is present and market- enhancing institutions are absent 
or weak. Analyzing the specifi c challenges of market reform, the absence of state 
substitutes, the scarcity of government goods and ser vices, and offi cial proscrip-
tions on state reliance in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan illustrated why individuals 
informally seek state resources in response to market reform. Comparing 
present- day Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with contemporary Uzbekistan dem-
onstrated that individuals are more likely to engage in corruption for basic state 
resources when market reforms have been undertaken.
The Rest of the World
The argument that market reform promotes corruption when a legacy of signifi -
cant state economic intervention is present and market- enhancing institutions 
are absent or weak is not limited to Central Asia but appears generalizable and 
fundamentally important. This is evident from an analysis of a larger set of coun-
tries in the world, which vary on the causal factor and two conditions. This larger 
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set of countries enables me to directly test the importance of state intervention 
legacies and market- enhancing institutions, conditions that are consistent across 
my three Central Asian cases. The statistical results unambiguously demonstrate 
the claim of my argument concerning the importance of market- enhancing in-
stitutions for reducing corruption. Most likely because corruption data sets 
mea sure perceptions of petty and grand corruption, support is weaker for my 
assertions about the infl uence of market reform and signifi cant state interven-
tion legacies on corruption.
This analysis of many countries also allows for an additional test of alterna-
tive explanations. The constellation of factors highlighted in this book is not the 
only cause of corruption. We would expect that expanding the investigation to 
countries outside of Central Asia would reveal that alternative explanations that 
 were not helpful to understanding the three countries are useful in the broader 
context.
From the many alternative explanations, I selected three— state regulation, 
poverty, and natural resource endowment— to test. I chose these because they 
are the most likely to be able to account not only for corruption but also for the 
factors that I contend explain corruption. This approach allows me to examine 
the likelihood that the results of the analysis are spurious, whether one of these 
other factors accounts for market reform, legacies of signifi cant state economic 
intervention, market- enhancing institutions, and corruption.
Conceivably state regulation could account for all of the factors. High state 
regulation historically would be part of a legacy of signifi cant state economic in-
tervention. Government offi cials would implement market reform because they 
would see it as offering additional opportunities to enrich themselves, and diffi cult 
economic circumstances may bring international pressure to undertake reforms 
in return for fi nancial assistance. High state regulation would also promote cor-
ruption by affording bureaucrats many opportunities to engage in corruption.
Poverty can plausibly explain most of the factors. Government offi cials could 
undertake market reform to alleviate poverty, but with so little wealth in the coun-
try, no one may bother to create market- enhancing institutions such as credit 
registries. As others have argued, poor people engage in corruption to survive. 
Conceivably, poverty could account for all of my explanatory factors except for 
signifi cant state economic intervention.
One can imagine that an abundance of natural resources could also explain 
signifi cant state economic intervention, market reform, weak or absent market-
enhancing institutions, and corruption. Natural resources are often state-con-
trolled, so signifi cant state economic intervention could exist historically. Gov-
ernment offi cials would implement market reform, especially privatization, 
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because they see opportunities to enrich themselves or they need investment to 
extract more resources. The dominance of the natural resource industry would 
discourage the development of market- enhancing institutions, such as credit 
registries, that are useful to small businesses. The resources would also facilitate 
at least grand corruption, by allowing government offi cials to provide rents in 
return for payment.
Although these alternative explanations are logical, a statistical analysis shows 
that neither state regulation, poverty, or natural resource endowment can account 
for all of my explanatory factors. In other words, this suggests that my argument 
is not spurious. The results do show that state regulation and poverty are addi-
tional causes of corruption. This confi rms that the factors highlighted in this 
book are suffi cient but not necessary causes of corruption, as I have  argued.
Mea sure ment and Data
One challenge of conducting an analysis of many countries is that no excellent 
mea sures of corruption exist. Many corruption data sets mea sure perceived, in-
stead of experienced, corruption, and they combine data on petty and grand 
corruption. Mea sur ing the other components of my argument posed fewer chal-
lenges.
Even those data sets that claim to mea sure experience typically mea sure per-
ception. Because corruption is a sensitive topic, these data sets ask survey re-
spondents to comment on the experience of people like them, rather than their 
own experience. In other words, they mea sure perceived corruption instead of 
actual corruption.
An additional challenge for my analysis is that corruption data sets typically 
focus more on grand corruption than petty corruption. I use Transparency In-
ternational’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) because it is the closest global 
proxy for petty corruption. The CPI is based on surveys of local and foreign 
business people’s perceptions and experiences and country experts’ assessments. 
It combines reports of different corrupt practices, such as bribery, to derive 
country scores ranging from zero to 10 with 10 indicating the least corruption.94 
The CPI is not an ideal mea sure of corruption, as numerous reviews of the index 
have highlighted.95 For my purposes, it is a signifi cant drawback that the CPI 
94. In 2012 the scale switched to zero to 100. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, “Framework Document 
2004: Background Paper to the 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International, 
2004,  http:// www .transparency .org /content /download /1528 /7959 /fi le /framework _en .pdf (accessed 
December 19, 2013).
95. The studies have highlighted how the perception of corruption is not as valid a mea sure as 
actual corruption. Reviewers have also criticized the CPI for relying on surveys with high propor-
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does not focus exclusively on petty corruption. The survey respondents, who are 
included in the CPI, likely draw on petty corruption experiences they and their 
acquaintances have had, but they are also infl uenced by media reports and inves-
tigations of grand corruption.96 That said, the CPI is the best mea sure available 
for my analysis.97 The CPI scores for the countries in my data set range from 1.9 
to 9.4.
My study of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan offers guidance about how to mea-
sure the other components of the argument. From that analysis it was evident 
that public credit registries, private credit bureaus, and government competition 
tions of respondents who are not from the countries they are evaluating, in par tic u lar Western busi-
nesspeople. The concern is that the CPI presents only the perspective of Western businesspeople. 
From this concern follow criticisms about the CPI’s focus on government corruption in business 
transactions, with an emphasis on bribes. The CPI’s exclusion of private- sector corruption has raised 
additional concerns that developed countries might appear comparatively less corrupt than they ac-
tually are. Incidentally, the exclusion of private- sector corruption is an advantage to my study, which 
focuses on corruption involving government offi cials. Scholars have also challenged the CPI’s meth-
odology, highlighting diffi culties comparing scores across years and across countries, and the vary-
ing defi nitions of corruption from the different surveys and assessments that the index aggregates. A 
fi nal set of criticisms focus not on the index itself, but on how businesses might use it to make invest-
ment decisions and how governments and international organizations have used it to inform aid 
policies. As sample reviews, see Staffan Andersson and Paul M. Heywood, “The Politics of Percep-
tion: Use and Abuse of Transparency International’s Approach to Mea sur ing Corruption,” Po liti cal 
Studies 57 (2009), 746– 67; Stephen Knack, “Mea sur ing Corruption: A Critique of Indicators in East-
ern Eu rope and Central Asia,” Journal of Public Policy 27, no. 3 (2007), 255– 91; Mireille Razafi ndra-
koto and Francois Roubard, “Are International Databases on Corruption Reliable? A Comparison of 
Expert Opinion Surveys and  House hold Surveys in Sub- Saharan Africa,” World Development 38, no. 
8 (2010), 1057– 69; Danielle E. Warren and William S. Laufer, “Are Corruption Indices a Self- 
Fulfi lling Prophecy? A Social Labeling Perspective of Corruption,” Journal of Business Ethics 88, 
Supplement 4 (2009), 841– 49.
96. The problems of the CPI data set for this project are starkest when the scores for the three 
Central Asian countries are considered. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan receive scores of 2.7 and 2.1, 
respectively, and Uzbekistan receives a score of 1.6, indicating that by this mea sure Uzbekistan is 
slightly more corrupt. This suggests that the mea sure masks the use of corruption to meet everyday 
needs in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
97. Other data sets posed more severe problems for my project. For example, Transparency 
International’s Global Corruption Barometer provides data for only half the countries I examine, 
and the World Bank and EBRD’s Business Environment and Enterprise Per for mance Survey (BEEPS) 
sought information only from fi rm managers and own ers, whereas I am interested in the experiences 
of a broader group of people. BEEPS data and reports based on them do not explore individuals’ 
experiences in seeking basic goods and ser vices. For example, the report “Trends in Corruption and 
Regulatory Burden in Eastern Eu rope and Central Asia” describes fi rms’ experiences in securing 
public contracts, importing goods, and using the courts to resolve commercial disputes. As my sur-
vey and fi eld research show, most individuals seeking assistance from government offi cials are unem-
ployed people, individuals hoping to start businesses, or small- scale traders, not fi rm managers and 
own ers, so little to no overlap is likely in the survey respondents. For a review of different indices and 
surveys on corruption, see Treisman, “What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from 
Ten Years of Cross- National Empirical Research,” Annual Review of Po liti cal Science 19 (2007), 211– 
44; World Bank, “Trends in Corruption and Regulatory Burden in Eastern Eu rope and Central Asia” 
(Washington, DC, 2011).
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policies are key market- enhancing institutions. The World Bank and the Inter-
national Finance Corporation supply information about credit registries and 
credit bureaus, recording what percentage of adults each institution covers in 
a country. For each country in the data set I added the two values, between zero 
and 100, which created a scale from zero to 134.3 in practice. I use data from 
2009 because that is the latest year for which data are available for all the vari-
ables. Comparable data on government competition policies are available only 
for postcommunist states from the EBRD, so I cannot include this variable in 
my data set. However, in an earlier study of postcommunist states I found that 
corruption is lower in countries with more effective government competition 
policies.98
The remaining two components of the argument, a legacy of state economic 
intervention and market reform, are related. Market reform reduced state eco-
nomic intervention, so the underlying concept should be the same for these vari-
ables. Market reform, or a reduction in state economic intervention, includes 
many different policies, but the study of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan highlights 
the importance of credit and thus the importance of the banking industry. There-
fore, I use mea sures of bank own ership to capture a legacy of state economic 
intervention and market reform. For the legacy variable I use the percentage of 
bank deposits held in state- owned banks versus privately owned banks in 1975. 
This is the most recent year that data are available before countries of the world 
began to embark on market reform. The index ranges from zero to 10, with 
zero indicating the greatest state involvement. The data come from the World 
Bank.99 The market reform variable is the 2009 value for this mea sure minus the 
1975 value for each country. The possible range is from –10 to 10, with 10 rep-
resenting the greatest reduction in state own ership of banks, zero indicating no 
change, and negative numbers signifying different degrees of increase in state 
own ership.
To test the alternative explanations— state regulation, poverty, and natural 
resource endowment— I include a mea sure for each. The mea sure of state regu-
lation is the number of procedures required to start a business, as reported by 
98. Kelly M. McMann, “Market Reform as a Stimulus to Particularistic Politics,” Comparative 
Po liti cal Studies 42, no. 7 (2009), 971– 94.
99. The data  were compiled by the Fraser Institute from work by the World Bank’s James R. 
Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr., and Ross Levine, “Bank Regulation and Supervision,” World Bank,  http:// 
go .worldbank .org /SNUSW978P0; (accessed December 19, 2013); James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, 
and Ross Levine, Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006); James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, “Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual 
Report,” Fraser Institute, 2009,  http:// www .fraserinstitute .org /publicationdisplay .aspx ?id=13006 & te
rms=economic+freedom+of+the+world+2009 (accessed November 28, 2012).
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the World Bank and International Finance Corporation.100 This seemed to be a 
more valid mea sure of state regulation than the alternative, the time required to 
start a business. In this data set the number of required procedures ranges from 
1 to 17. To mea sure poverty, I use GDP per capita in current U.S. dollars, which 
ranges in this group of countries from 175 USD to 104,354 USD. Natural re-
source endowment is captured by the World Bank’s energy production data, 
mea sured in thousand metric tons of oil equivalent. As described by the World 
Bank, “[e]nergy production refers to forms of primary energy— petroleum 
(crude oil, natural gas liquids, and oil from nonconventional sources), natural 
gas, solid fuels (coal, lignite, and other derived fuels), and combustible renew-
ables and waste— and primary electricity, all converted into oil equivalents.”101 
The values range from 29 to 2,084,935 thousand tons in this data set.
I examined ninety- two countries of the world. Countries that  were excluded 
 were missing data for one of the variables. To ensure that a relatively large num-
ber of countries with a signifi cant state economic intervention legacy  were in-
cluded, I imputed the legacy variable values for post- Soviet states. The 1975 
data include only a value for the Soviet  Union, zero. Because of the uniformity 
of Soviet economic policies, it is reasonable to assign the value of zero for 1975 
to each of the states that emerged from the Soviet  Union. With this adaptation, 
the data set covers all regions of the world and all income levels, as shown in 
Table 4.12. This indicates that excluding countries for which data  were not 
available most likely did not introduce bias. However, the data set does exclude 
the 13 most corrupt countries in the 168 countries mea sured by the CPI, be-
cause they lack data on one or more other variables. The absence of these cases 
can make a relationship that I fi nd in the data set appear stronger or weaker 
than it actually is if the relationship is not constant across all the cases. Extrapo-
lating results to those missing cases would also be problematic. Overall, the data 
set appears representative with the exception of the most corrupt countries of 
the world.
100. For postcommunist countries, the CPI mea sure uses a survey that asks experts a question 
that is similar to this state regulation mea sure: “Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic 
regulations, registration requirements, and other controls that increase opportunities for corrup-
tion?” Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2011: Long Methodological 
Brief,” transparency.ee/cm/fi les/lisad/pikk_metoodika.pdf (accessed December 19, 2013), 3. How-
ever the correlation between the state regulation mea sure and the CPI is not statistically signifi cant 
for postcommunist countries, indicating that this mea sure is not problematic for these cases.
101. World Bank, “World Databank.”
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Analysis
Using this data set, I conducted a series of statistical analyses, which I describe in 
detail in the appendix.  Here let us consider the general conclusions. Because my 
argument focuses on the infl uence of market reform under the two conditions, it 
is important to consider market reform’s effect on corruption under the four 
possible confi gurations of conditions: a legacy of signifi cant state economic in-
tervention with no or weak market- enhancing institutions, no legacy with no or 
weak market- enhancing institutions, a legacy with effective market- enhancing 
institutions, and no legacy with effective market- enhancing institutions.
The fi ndings, summarized in Table 4.13,102 strongly support my claim that 
market- enhancing institutions are important to reducing corruption. When ef-
fective market- enhancing institutions are present, market reform decreases cor-
ruption. This has important policy implications, which will be discussed in the 
fi nal chapter. The analysis does not illustrate my claim that market reform in-
creases corruption when there is a legacy of signifi cant state economic interven-
tion but no effective market- enhancing institutions. Instead, this analysis shows 
that market reform reduces corruption under these conditions. This negative 
fi nding is most likely because the CPI combines grand and petty corruption. 
When a legacy is present, market reform reduces the opportunities for grand 
corruption by trimming offi cials’ extensive responsibilities, and this likely masks 
how market reform can promote petty corruption by limiting where individuals 
can turn for assistance to meet everyday needs.
The inclusion of grand corruption in the CPI likely plays a role in the effect 
of market reform in other ways as well. Its inclusion may help to explain why 
102. For readers who have studied the appendix, note that while we cannot discern the effect of 
market reform on corruption when effective market- enhancing institutions exist (in model 3), we 
can discern it from models 4 and 5.
TABLE 4.12. Number of countries in different regions and with different income 
levels
REGION NUMBER INCOME LEVEL NUMBER
East Asia and the Pacifi c 11 Low income 9
East Eu rope and Central Asia 18 Lower middle income 20
Western Eu rope 19 Upper middle income 24
Latin America and Ca rib be an 11 High income 39
Middle East and North Africa 11
North America 2
South Asia 5
Sub- Saharan Africa 15
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market reform increases corruption when a signifi cant intervention legacy and 
effective market- enhancing institutions do not exist. Specifi cally, under these 
conditions the new illicit opportunities that market reform offers politicians 
outweigh the relatively small number of opportunities it eradicated. Moreover, 
market reform may decrease corruption when market- enhancing institutions 
are present because government offi cials may be restrained in their ability to 
take advantage of new market opportunities to engage in corruption. To the 
extent that market- enhancing institutions that restrain government offi cials’ 
behavior, such as in de pen dent judiciaries, develop alongside credit registries, 
market reform will present fewer occasions for offi cials to engage in grand cor-
ruption.
The inclusion of the alternative explanations in the statistical analysis provides 
strong evidence that the argument is not spurious. These tests are also described 
in detail in the appendix. None of the alternative explanations can account for all 
of my explanatory factors. Poverty, specifi cally lower levels of GDP, and greater 
numbers of state regulations do increase corruption. However, this is consistent 
with my expectation that the factors I identifi ed are suffi cient, but not necessary, 
to promote corruption. Natural resource endowments did not have an effect on 
corruption levels.
The statistical analysis supports my argument about petty corruption as 
well as theories of grand corruption. The results highlight the importance of 
market- enhancing institutions to reduce corruption, as the argument in this 
book claims. In addition, the fi ndings suggest that market reform is likely to de-
crease corruption in countries with a history of signifi cant state economic inter-
vention, as theories of grand corruption assert. Including the alternative expla-
nations in the analysis showed that the argument was not likely spurious and, as 
expected, that my explanatory factors are only suffi cient, not necessary, for cor-
ruption. After all, corruption has multiple causes.
Overall, the evidence in this chapter illustrates the causal argument I make and 
some of the correlations predicted by my argument and theories of grand cor-
TABLE 4.13. Market reform’s effect on corruption under different conditions for 
countries of the world
NO OR WEAK MARKET- ENHANCING 
INSTITUTIONS
EFFECTIVE MARKET- ENHANCING 
INSTITUTIONS
Legacy decreases corruption decreases corruption
No legacy increases corruption decreases corruption
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ruption. From the Central Asian cases it is clear that market actors do not offer 
an alternative to corruption. Market reform in the context of a history of signifi -
cant state economic intervention and absent or weak market- enhancing institu-
tions limits market actors’ abilities to provide the goods and ser vices that indi-
viduals need. Individuals instead turn to government offi cials but fi nd that 
market reform has reduced state resources and thus increased the competition 
for them. Individuals offer bribes, use personal connections, and promise po liti-
cal support in order to try to gain an advantage in this competition. The next 






Obstacles to Providing Substitute Resources
“The mosque? What kind of help could we get from it?” Marzhan, the villager in 
southern Kazakhstan, responded to my question about the local mosque as a 
source of assistance.1 My exchange with her highlights how societal institutions 
that observers have expected to provide assistance in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
to a large extent do not. Mosques, Islamic schools, and proselytizing Islamic 
groups along with local, secular charities have grown in number since the late 
Soviet era when restrictions on charity, religion, and or ga niz ing  were reduced. 
This growth and the experiences of other countries in similar circumstances 
raised expectations among some observers that these organizations would pro-
vide substitute resources as the Soviet welfare state eroded. Yet in reality neither 
Islamic organizations nor secular charities can meet the basic needs of citizens 
because they lack the resources.
Just as a legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention and an absence of 
market- enhancing institutions weaken markets, these two conditions also con-
tribute to a lack of resources among groups in society. Historically, Islamic insti-
tutions and local charities had few resources because of the substantial economic 
intervention of the Soviet party- state. Market reform, coupled with po liti cal lib-
eralization, offered the promise of enriching the religious and secular charitable 
sectors; however, their resource scarcity has continued. Because of the absence of 
effective market- enhancing institutions, few people have disposable income to 
contribute to Islamic institutions and secular charities, and charities have limited 
1. Author’s interview (#161), Kazakhstan, July 22, 2001.
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possibilities for obtaining credit. Interviews I conducted with representatives of 
these groups and with ordinary citizens confi rmed that these organizations pro-
vide limited material assistance. Further supporting this point, the survey data 
show that few citizens turn to them for assistance. Other societal groups that have 
not been the focus of previous studies and speculation also do not provide substi-
tutes for state resources. These include foreign charities, foreign companies, local 
businesses, professional associations, po liti cal parties, aksakals, and secular edu-
cational establishments. The paucity of resources available from societal groups 
encourages citizens to seek assistance from government offi cials, and to use illicit 
means when doing so.
The Growth of Islamic Institutions 
and Secular Charities
Citizens’ minimal reliance on Islamic institutions and secular charities for assis-
tance in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is surprising at fi rst glance, considering that 
their numbers have increased dramatically in the in de pen dence era. The Islamic 
institutions include mosques, educational establishments, and proselytizing 
groups; secular charities have a variety of structures and missions. The growth 
began in the late Soviet era as the government relaxed restrictions on charity, 
religion, and or ga niz ing. The rate of growth increased with the collapse of the 
Soviet  Union and thus the end to the communist party- state’s regulation of these 
spheres of life. Over time the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have 
imposed restrictions on religious institutions and secular charities, but overall, 
the restrictions and the implementation of these restrictions are not nearly as 
severe as they  were in the Soviet era.
Mosques, Educational Establishments, 
and Proselytizing Groups
Mosques, followed in number by Islamic educational establishments and prose-
lytizing groups, have proliferated in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The increase in 
mosques has occurred throughout the territories, but especially in the southern 
part of each country. The southern part of each country is home to a larger per-
centage of ethnic Uzbeks, who generally observe Islam to a greater extent than 
their Kazakh and Kyrgyz counterparts. Members of the titular ethnicity in the 
south of each country also tend to be more observant, perhaps because of the 
Uzbek presence.
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The number of mosques in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has grown to thou-
sands today from double digits in the Soviet era. At the time of the Soviet  Union’s 
collapse the Kyrgyz republic had thirty- nine mosques, whereas today the coun-
try of Kyrgyzstan has more than three thousand.2 In one of Kyrgyzstan’s seven 
oblasts, Osh Oblast in the south, offi cials estimate that there are seven hundred 
mosques. The numbers are inexact because they include both offi cial mosques, 
meaning those that have registered with the state, and unoffi cial ones, meaning 
those that have not. Estimates suggest that there is one unregistered mosque for 
approximately every registered one. If this  were correct it would mean that there 
was one mosque, registered or unregistered, for every 750 Muslims in Kyrgyz-
stan.3 Kazakhstan had approximately twenty- six mosques from 1944 until the 
po liti cal liberalization under Gorbachev.4 Now it has 2,228 registered mosques 
and about seventy that are not registered.5 This represents one mosque for ev-
ery 4,400 Muslims in Kazakhstan.6
New mosques have emerged from numerous sources. In rural areas residents 
have turned village buildings into places of worship. For example, in the village 
where I lived in southern Kazakhstan an el der ly man in the village went to the 
mufti in Almaty in order to found a mosque from a Soviet- era prayer group. An 
existing building was designated as the mosque. Mosques have also been con-
structed in rural areas using government funds. In more densely populated areas, 
communities have pooled resources to build mosques, and foreign donors pro-
vided funds in the early 1990s for the construction of mosques. Saudi Arabia, 
2. Farideh Heyat, “Re- Islamisation in Kyrgyzstan: Gender, New Poverty and the Moral Di-
mension,” Central Asian Survey 23, no. 3– 4 (2004): 275– 87,  here 276; International Crisis Group, 
“Central Asia: Islam and the State” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003), 25n102.
3. International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Islam and the State,” 25n102. This calculation 
uses 2009 data for total population and percentage of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the country, and it is an 
estimate. It assumes that all ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks identify as Muslim, and it does not include 
Muslim minorities other than Uzbeks, although their numbers are small. World Bank, “World Data-
bank,”  http:// databank .worldbank .org /ddp /home .do; National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, “Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia” [National Composition of the Population] (in possession 
of author).
4. Yaacov Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet  Union: From World War II to Perestroika (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 2000), 182.
5. The former number is from Radio Free Eu rope/Radio Liberty, “List of Kazakh Religious 
Groups Curbed,” 2012,  http:// www .rferl .org /content /list -of -religious -groups -in -kazakhstan -curbed 
/24750920 .html (accessed December 19, 2013). The latter number is from U.S. Department of State, 
“International Religious Freedom Report: Kazakhstan” (Washington, DC, 2009).
6. This calculation uses 2009 data for total population and percentages of Kazakhs and Uz-
beks in the country, and it is an estimate. It assumes that all ethnic Kazakhs and Uzbeks identify as 
Muslim, and it does not include Muslim minorities other than Uzbeks, although their numbers are 
small. Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “The Results of the National Population 
Census in 2009,” 2010,  http:// www .eng .stat .kz /perepis _nasl (accessed December 19, 2013).
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Pakistan, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Iran have provided funds.7 Informal lead-
ers of prison inmates have established mosques in the prisons in each country— in 
almost all prisons in Kyrgyzstan. The leaders supervise the prisoners in building 
them and prison directors typically donate construction materials.8 Whereas citi-
zens’ and foreign donors’ involvement refl ects religious expression, state spon-
sorship has also been a sign of government offi cials’ attempts to increase their le-
gitimacy and promote nationalism.
The donations from foreign countries and foreign individuals almost com-
pletely subsided with the increase in government restrictions beginning in the 
mid- 1990s. The start of the civil war in Tajikistan in 1992, the Taliban’s seizure of 
Kabul in 1996, the 1999 bombings in Tashkent, and the September 11, 2001, terror-
ist attacks in the United States prompted these restrictions.9 Government offi cials 
feared strains of Islam that  were unfamiliar in Central Asia, such as Wahhabism 
and Shiism. Only a small amount of foreign funding for mosque construction has 
continued; countries have sometimes linked their economic and technical assis-
tance to ac cep tance of funds for the construction of new mosques. For example, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Iran provided assistance in the oil and fi nancial sectors 
but also insisted on the ac cep tance of donations for the construction of new 
mosques.10 Kazakhstan imposed additional restrictions on worship following a 
string of violent attacks in 2011, which the government attributed to Islamic 
extremist groups. The new regulations ban prayer rooms in public institutions 
and make it more diffi cult for religious communities to register with the state 
and thus to operate legally.11
The number of Islamic educational establishments has also grown in Kazakh-
stan and Kyrgyzstan, although not to the extents that mosques have. In Kyrgyz-
stan the number of Islamic higher educational institutions and madrassas in-
creased from zero in the Soviet era to nine and fi fty, respectively, in recent years. 
The number of madrassas encompasses those registered with the muftiate, but 
this does not capture small, neighborhood madrassas, which would push the 
 7. Igor Lipovsky, “The Awakening of Central Asian Islam,” Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 3 
(1996): 14; Ghoncheh Tazmini, “The Islamic Revival in Central Asia: A Potent Force or a Misconcep-
tion?,” Central Asian Survey 20, no. 1 (2001): 1– 21,  here 16.
 8. International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Islamists in Prison” (Brussels: International Crisis 
Group, 2009).
 9. Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2007), 119, 123.
10. Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: In de pen dence, Foreign Policy, and Regional 
Security (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 32.
11. Nate Schenkkan, “Kazakhstan: Government Pressure on Devout Muslims Generates Re-
sentment,” EurasiaNet, March 20, 2012,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /65156 (accessed December 
19, 2013).
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number higher.12 The pattern is similar in Kazakhstan, with an increase to nine 
madrassas and numerous unregistered ones.13
Many of the new Islamic educational institutions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz-
stan have been started from scratch with the assistance of foreign funders. For-
eign donations have helped found more prominent educational institutions, 
such as the International Islamic Center in Kyrgyzstan, which is in de pen dent of 
the state Islamic structure and is funded by Kuwait, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.14 
In Kazakhstan, Egypt funded the Nur- Mubarak Egyptian University of Islamic 
Culture.15 The most extensive foreign funder of education establishments has 
been the Turkish Islamic movement Gülen. The movement has established 
twenty- seven schools in Kazakhstan and twenty- fi ve schools and two universities 
in Kyrgyzstan since 1992.16 The schools provide an environment supportive of 
religious observers, but not a religious education, according to staff and students 
whom I interviewed. Madrassas have been funded by foreigners and, especially 
in less populated areas, community members have donated to establish them. 
For example, the Kyrgyzstani foundation Adep Bashati was founded by a group 
of Kyrgyz graduates of Al- Azhar University in Cairo and is funded by business-
people, among other locals. The foundation sponsors madrassas, courses about 
Islam, and hajj pilgrimages.17
Islamic proselytizing organizations have also emerged in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. The largest, Hizb ut- Tahrir, is an international group that aims to 
create a caliphate through peaceful means. Missionaries and foreign funders of 
mosques and Islamic schools likely brought the ideas of the group to Central 
12. International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Islam and the State,” 29; “Islam Faces Hurdles in 
Bishkek,” Times of Central Asia, January 29, 2008.
13. “President Nursultan Nazarbayev Received Chairman of the Spiritual Department of Mus-
lims of Kazakhstan Absattar Kazhy Derbisali,” Agency for Religious Affairs of the Republic of Kazakh-
stan, February 22, 2012,  http:// www .din .gov .kz /eng /novosti _i _sobytija /?cid=0 & rid=108 (accessed 
November 28, 2012).
14. Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Po liti cal Islam in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan,” Central Asian 
Survey 20, no. 4 (2001): 451– 65,  here 459, 461– 62.
15. Khalid, Islam after Communism, 185. The university renamed itself the Kazakh- Egyptian Is-
lamic University “Nur” after the ouster of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011.
16. Farangis Najibullah, “Turkish Schools Coming under Increasing Scrutiny in Central Asia,” 
Radio Free Eu rope/Radio Liberty, 2009,  http:// www .rferl .org /content /Turkish _Schools _Coming _
Under _Increasing _Scrutiny _In _Central _Asia /1616111 .html (accessed December 19, 2013); Berna 
Turam, “The Politics of Engagement between Islam and the Secular State: Ambivalences of ‘Civil 
Society,’ ” British Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2 (2004): 259– 81,  here 265.
17. Bruce De Cordier, “Kyrgyzstan: Fledgling Islamic Charity Refl ects Growing Role for Reli-
gion,” EurasiaNet, December 8, 2010,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /62529 (accessed December 
19, 2013).
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Asia in the early 1990s.18 The group’s activities primarily include distributing 
information through leafl ets, books, magazines, videos, the Internet, and semi-
nars.19 The or ga ni za tion has hundreds or thousands of members in Kazakhstan 
and thousands of members in Kyrgyzstan.20 The Kyrgyzstani government placed 
the number in Kyrgyzstan at fi fteen thousand in 2008, but since then numbers 
seem to be on the decline as members have had to migrate to Rus sia and Kazakh-
stan in search of employment.21 With the return of migrants to Kyrgyzstan dur-
ing the global economic recession, it is possible that this trend will be reversed. A 
reasonable estimate for Kazakhstan is two thousand members, all in the south. 
The estimates are inexact because Hizb ut- Tahrir is banned in the countries 
and operates clandestinely. Regionally much of the group is made up of ethnic 
Uzbeks from the Ferghana Valley in Kyrgyzstan and neighboring countries. 
Members of nontitular groups, including Rus sians, Tatars, Chechens, Meskhetian 
Turks, and Kurds, make up one- fi fth of the group in the region. Primarily people 
ages eigh teen to thirty- fi ve join, and recently the group has been most successful 
in recruiting women, former convicts, and those at the younger end of the spec-
trum. In Kyrgyzstan, members of parliament, government bureaucrats, and suc-
cessful businesspeople have joined the or ga ni za tion, according to the head of the 
government agency on religious affairs.22
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad  Union 
(IJU) are smaller organizations. These groups also aim to create a caliphate but 
through violent means. Two residents of the Ferghana Valley city Namangan in 
Uzbekistan, Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani, established the IMU in the 
1990s. The IJU splintered off from the IMU approximately ten years ago as some 
members preferred to concentrate on overthrowing governments in post- Soviet 
Central Asia, whereas the IMU had turned its focus to supporting the Taliban in 
Af ghan i stan and Pakistan. The factions may have re united because the new IMU 
leader, Usmon Odil, advocates refocusing efforts on post- Soviet Central Asia.23 
18. Kathleen Collins, “Ideas, Networks, and Islamist Movements: Evidence from Central Asia 
and the Caucasus,” World Politics 60 (2007): 64– 96,  here 83.
19. International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Islamists in Prison,” 7; Gulnoza Saidazimova, 
“Central Asia: Banned Islamic Group Hizb ut- Tahrir Continues to Gain Members,” EurasiaNet, Au-
gust 13, 2007,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /departments /insight /articles /pp081407 .shtml (accessed 
December 19, 2013).
20. International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Islamists in Prison,” 3.
21. Alisher Khamidov, “Kyrgyzstan: Radical Islam Losing Its Appeal Amid Economic Distress 
and Government Repression,” EurasiaNet, December 8, 2009,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /depart-
ments /civilsociety /articles /eav120909 .shtml (accessed December 19, 2013).
22. Emmanuel Karagiannis, Po liti cal Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb ut- Tahrir 
(London: Routledge, 2010), 65.
23. The previous leader was allegedly killed in a 2009 U.S. military drone attack in Af ghan i stan.
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Primarily an ethnic Uzbek or ga ni za tion, the IMU has set its sights on the gov-
ernment of Kyrgyzstan, as a result of the ethnic violence in the southern part of 
the country in 2010. Greater numbers of Uzbeks than Kyrgyz died and saw their 
property destroyed, and almost all of those tried after the tragedy have been Uz-
beks. Abuses against Uzbeks by local security forces in the south have driven 
some Uzbeks to join the IMU, according to the national government.24 The IMU 
is estimated to have one thousand to fi ve thousand fi ghters from post- Soviet 
Central Asia as well as from the Caucasus and Rus sia. The IJU is thought to have 
considerably fewer. Within post- Soviet Central Asia, most of these groups’ opera-
tions have been in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.25
A fourth group, Tablighi Jamaat, is a missionary and revivalist group composed 
of Pakistanis. The group speaks with people on the street and goes door- to- door, 
teaching people how to observe Islam, for example, by attending mosque. An 
estimated ten thousand Central Asians are followers, with the majority living in 
Kyrgyzstan, especially in the Ferghana Valley.26
Following a series of violent attacks in both countries in 2011, the govern-
ments have claimed that additional Islamic groups exist and that they are re-
sponsible for the violence. The government of Kyrgyzstan named Jaishul Madhi, 
meaning the Army of the Righ teous Ruler, as the perpetrator of bombings and 
attempted bombings of public buildings.27 Its fi fty members are followers of the 
deceased North Caucasian insurgent Said Buryatsky and they have received ex-
plosives training in Tajikistan and Af ghan i stan, the government claims.28 The 
government of Kazakhstan identifi ed the group Jund al- Khilafah or Soldiers of 
the Caliphate as responsible for attacks in its country. According to the govern-
ment, Kazakhstanis fi ghting on the border of Af ghan i stan and Pakistan formed 
the group in 2011 to attack Kazakhstan.29
24. Bruce Pannier, “The Growing Threat of Militants in a Corner of Central Asia,” EurasiaNet, 
April 23, 2011,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /63355 (accessed December 19, 2013).
25. International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Islamists in Prison,” 4; International Crisis 
Group, “Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011), 
 here 1.
26. International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Islamists in Prison,” 4– 5; Igor Rotar, “Pakistani 
Islamic Missionary Group Establishes a Strong Presence in Central Asia,” EurasiaNet, July 22, 2007, 
 http:// www .eurasianet .org /departments /insight /articles /eav072307a .shtml (accessed December 19, 
2013).
27. Pannier, “The Growing Threat of Militants in a Corner of Central Asia.”
28. Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Security Offi cials Blame Islamic Radical Group for Recent 
Violence,” EurasiaNet, January 13, 2011,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /62708 (accessed Decem-
ber 19, 2013).
29. Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Astana Jolted by Terror Incidents,” EurasiaNet, November 16, 
2011,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /64529 (accessed December 19, 2013).
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Secular Charities
In addition to mosques, Islamic educational establishments, and proselytizing 
groups, secular charities have proliferated in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan since 
the collapse of the Soviet  Union. Kazakhstan had 3,050 registered nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) as of January 1997, and Kyrgyzstan had seven 
hundred registered by January 1998.30 This constitutes approximately one NGO 
for every fi ve thousand people in Kazakhstan and one for every 6,800 people in 
Kyrgyzstan. By 2011, more than 9,851 in Kyrgyzstan and 36,815 had registered 
in Kazakhstan, representing approximately one or ga ni za tion for every fi ve 
hundred people in each country.31 Not all of these registered organizations have 
charitable missions; some are professional associations or sports clubs, for ex-
ample. Moreover, not all of them are active or effective: one report indicates that 
only 1,500 to 2,000 actually operate in Kyrgyzstan, and another estimates that of 
those only fi ve hundred “offer quality ser vices to their target groups.”32 That 
said, the numbers do suggest that local charities have emerged and their number 
has increased signifi cantly in both countries.
The most common path to the establishment of a charity has been that ac-
quaintances in a locale perceived a problem and formed a group to resolve it. 
These individuals  were typically acquainted through work, school, military ser-
vice, or an ethnic minority network. For example, in central Kyrgyzstan two 
nongovernmental organizations  were created by groups of teachers— one from a 
pedagogical college and another from a secondary school— to serve disadvan-
taged youth and women. In southern Kyrgyzstan one veteran contacted those 
in his town with whom he had served to establish a charity to help disabled and 
impoverished veterans and families of deceased veterans. The 1990 confl ict in 
Osh, Kyrgyzstan, between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz encouraged local Uzbek nota-
bles there to work together to form an or ga ni za tion to provide material assis-
tance and cultural support to local Uzbeks. In recent years many of these efforts 
have fallen into the new category of “mutual assistance groups,” typically col-
30. Scott Horton and Alla Kazakina, “The Legal Regulation of NGOs: Central Asia at a Cross-
roads,” in Civil Society in Central Asia, ed. M. Holt Ruffi n and Daniel Clarke Waugh (Seattle: Univer-
sity of Washington Press, 1999), 33– 56,  here 36.
31. The report describes the groups included in each count slightly differently, so these num-
bers should be treated as estimates. The number of organizations per person was calculated using 
total population data from the World Bank for 2011. World Bank, “World Databank,”  http:// data-
bank .worldbank .org /ddp /home .do (accessed December 19, 2013); United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID), “2011 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Eu rope 
and Eurasia, 15th Anniversary Edition” (Washington, DC, 2012), 96, 100, 228.
32. USAID, “2011 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Eu rope and Eurasia,” 110. 
Charles Buxton and Kazbek Abraliev, “Leadership in Transition: Developing Civil Society Leaders in 
Kyrgyzstan” (International NGO Training and Research Centre, 2007),  here 14.
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laborations among ten to fi fteen less affl uent women to provide microcredit to 
the poorest in their community and to improve local infrastructure, such as 
roads.33
Two less common origins of charities are Soviet- era institutions or interna-
tional organizations.34 For instance, in central Kyrgyzstan an individual who 
had served as deputy chair for a Soviet- era raion committee for women left the 
position in order to create a charity to support women. As she noted, in her 
government position she had “became familiar with how women live  here . . . 
[but] the committee worked in Soviet ways. . . .  I decided to create my own or-
ga ni za tion. In the committee [we] could not really work.”35 In a case of interna-
tional sponsorship, the nonprofi t microcredit or ga ni za tion Bai Tushum in Kyr-
gyzstan began in 2000 with the assistance of the foreign economic development 
or ga ni za tion ACDI/VOCA and the charity Caritas Swiss. By numerous paths, 
secular charities as well as Islamic organizations have proliferated in the in de-
pen dence era.
Expectations of Islamic 
and Secular Assistance
Accounts of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and the experiences of other regions 
suggest that we could expect Islamic institutions and charitable NGOs to be 
a signifi cant source of assistance for citizens. Eric McGlinchey argues that “Is-
lamic charities have increasingly stepped in to deliver what central governments 
cannot.”36 Islamic social welfare tenets have been described as having “a high 
potential for the societies of Central Asia, particularly Kyrgyzstan, where ac-
cording to World Bank data the poverty rate reached more than 40%. . . .  Islam, 
33. Alisher Khamidov, “Central Asia: Citizens Learning to Take the Initiative,” EurasiaNet, 
May 23, 2012,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /65449 (accessed December 19, 2013).
34. Earlier studies of nongovernmental organizations in Central Asia described the preponder-
ance of groups as government- organized or heavily infl uenced by international NGOs. They reached 
these conclusions because they conducted research primarily in the capital cities and relied largely on 
the accounts of representatives of international groups. By contrast, my fi ndings are based on re-
search not only in capital cities but also in other cities, towns, and villages, and I gathered informa-
tion from domestic NGOs, local citizens, and government offi cials in addition to foreign representa-
tives. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see Kelly M. McMann, “The Civic Realm in 
Kyrgyzstan: Soviet Economic Legacies and Activists’ Expectations,” in The Transformation of Central 
Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to In de pen dence, ed. Pauline Jones Luong (Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 2004), 213– 45,  here 216– 17.
35. Author’s interview (#14), Kyrgyzstan, July 10, 1997.
36. Eric M. McGlinchey, “Islamic Revivalism and State Failure in Kyrgyzstan,” Problems of 
Post- Communism 56, no. 3 (2009), 16– 28.
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then seems to be the most accessible alternative to the demise of the Soviet 
social doctrines,” another scholar concludes.37 This poverty has encouraged a 
strengthening of Islamic belief in Kyrgyzstan,38 as well as in Kazakhstan, so 
people may be more predisposed to turning to mosques and Islamic organiza-
tions for assistance. Moreover, the expansion of material assistance for Islamic 
institutions would mirror the situation in other predominantly Muslim coun-
tries. Millions of Muslims in other regions of the world regularly turn to their 
mosques and other Islamic institutions for assistance including material help 
and vocational training programs. As market reform has reduced government 
social ser vices in the late twentieth and early twenty- fi rst centuries, Islamic 
social ser vices have proliferated in predominately Muslim countries of other 
regions of the world.39
The emergence of nongovernmental organizations has been one of the most 
pop u lar topics among observers of Central Asia, thus leading one to believe that 
these groups may play a signifi cant role in people’s lives. In par tic u lar, local 
groups with foreign funding have received considerable attention. For example, 
Boris- Mathieu Pétric writes, “Nowadays, there is not one village in Kyrgyzstan 
that does not have one or several NGOs,” and they are dependent on foreign aid 
for survival. He comments also on the direct involvement of foreign organiza-
tions in Kyrgyzstan, referring to it as a globalized protectorate: “As access to 
public ser vices is declining, growing numbers are dependent on international 
NGOs for medical ser vices. Higher education has been privatized and for-
eign foundations (Soros, Fatulla Gulan,  etc.) are rushing in to fi ll the gap left by 
the state.”40
37. Ioana Ban, “The Chance for Civil Society in Central Asia or the Role of Islamic Movements 
in Shaping Po liti cal Modernity,” Romanian Journal of Po liti cal Science 6, no. 2 (2006): 117– 28,  here 
121.
38. Heyat, “Re- Islamisation in Kyrgyzstan,” 281.
39. Chaider S. Bamualim et al., eds., Islamic Philanthropy and Social Development in Contempo-
rary Indonesia, 1st ed. (Jakarta: Center for the Study of Religion and Culture, State Islamic University 
Syarif Hidayatullah, 2006); Janine A. Clark, Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle- Class Networks and 
Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Denis 
Joseph Sullivan, Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt: Islamic Development, Private Initiative, and 
State Control (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994); Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in 
Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002); Carrie Rosef-
sky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Po liti cal Change in Egypt (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 2002); Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafi s, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001).
40. Boris- Mathieu Pétric, “Post- Soviet Kyrgyzstan or the Birth of a Globalized Protectorate,” 
Central Asian Survey 24, no. 3 (2005): 319– 32,  here 323, 326. See also Lucy Earle et al., Community 
Development in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan: Lessons Learnt from Recent Experience, Oc-
casional Papers Series No. 40 (Oxford: INTRAC, 2004), 18.
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Evidence of Market Reform’s Effect 
under the Two Conditions
Islamic institutions and secular charities, however, have been limited in their abil-
ity to assist individuals. The legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention has 
meant that most Islamic institutions and secular charities are starting from 
scratch with no experience and no resources. Market reform without market- 
enhancing institutions has limited their ability to secure resources; when market 
actors cannot provide employment, income, and credit, people do not have the 
funds to make generous donations to Islamic institutions and secular charities. 
Furthermore, charities have diffi culty obtaining credit to carry out their missions.
A Legacy of State Control of Charity
The Soviet party- state’s control of the economy extended to religious and secular 
charity. Charity was effectively prohibited throughout most of the Soviet era be-
cause it was thought to impede efforts to establish communism. Charity was 
considered “one of the means the bourgeoisie uses to mask its parasitism and its 
exploitative face by means of hypocritical, demeaning ‘aid to the poor’ in order 
to defl ect them from the class struggle”41 that would result in communism. 
Charity was also banned because it was viewed as unnecessary in the Soviet eco-
nomic system. The thinking was that the party- state provided for the welfare of 
the people, so the people did not require charitable assistance.42 Moreover, un-
der communism there should be no rich and no poor. So, in theory, no one was 
morally obligated to provide charity and no one required it. In the context of 
Muslim charity in Central Asia, the implication was that individuals did not 
have to pay zakat, an annual obligatory welfare contribution of surplus wealth, 
because, in theory, they did not have wealth in excess of their needs. And, Islamic 
institutions did not need to encourage either zakat or sadaq, voluntary contribu-
tions, because, in theory, there  were no poor.43
In the early years, the Bolsheviks persecuted churches, which had been the 
main sources of charity, and closed charitable organizations not affi liated with 
their movement.44 A decree in 1929 codifi ed the anticharity campaign by pro-
41. A 1951 Soviet dictionary quoted in Adele Lindenmeyr, “The Big Impact of Small Deeds: 
Uncovering the Rich History of Rus sian Charity,” Rus sia Profi le, 2007,  http:// russiaprofi le .org /culture 
_living /a3148 .html (accessed December 19, 2013).
42. Ibid.; Anne White, “Charity, Self- Help and Politics in Rus sia, 1985– 91,” Europe- Asia Stud-
ies 45, no. 5 (1993): 787– 810,  here 788.
43. Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet  Union, 141n159, 234.
44. Mervyn Matthews, “Perestroika and the Rebirth of Charity,” in Soviet Social Problems, ed. 
Anthony Jones, Walter D. Connor, and David E. Powell (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 154– 
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hibiting religious organizations from engaging in charitable activities.45 This ex-
tended to mutual assistance funds, shelters, funeral funds, educational establish-
ments, and any assistance to individuals.46
The campaign against philanthropy restricted the survival and development 
of Islamic organizations in the Soviet era. The state closed many mosques and 
subjected remaining and new ones to registration, strict guidelines, and moni-
toring.47 The registered mosques represented only 1 percent of all Islamic orga-
nizations; worshipping illegally in unregistered organizations was more pop u lar. 
In much of the Soviet  Union, Muslims did not have a registered mosque nearby, 
so they could not worship there. Muslims who disagreed with the state’s posi-
tions on Islam also did not attend the registered mosques. Instead, people wor-
shipped in closed mosques, at shrines, in cemeteries, at private homes, in small 
structures constructed on private land plots and kolkhoz (collective farm) land, 
on threshing fl oors, and on the streets. For example, in the village where I lived 
in southern Kazakhstan a mullah met with ten people in a home that the partici-
pants viewed as a mosque. Neither the village nor even the raion had a mosque 
in the Soviet period. These meetings outside offi cial mosques  were illegal unless 
registered with the state. But the state granted approval only in eras when Islam 
was seen as less of a threat and only when a registered mosque was not accessible. 
Illegal worship was particularly common in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which 
had a history of worshipping with mullahs outside of mosques because of the 
people’s nomadic roots and the low population density.48 Yet most illegal orga-
nizations met rarely. Many met just for a few main festivals, per for mance of life- 
cycle rites, and infrequent Fridays. Moreover, they had only small numbers of 
participants. And, the numbers of groups and participants  rose and fell over 
time, with no steady increase into the late Soviet era.49
Financial restrictions limited the activities of both unregistered and regis-
tered Islamic organizations in the Soviet era. In an intentional effort to reduce 
funds to Muslim institutions, the state prohibited them from owning property 
and engaging in commercial ventures. The ban on property extended to waqf, 
religious endowments, which  were seized by the state. The greatest blow to Is-
lamic charity was the Soviet government’s declaration that fi tr, the main source 
71,  here 154.
45. White, “Charity, Self- Help and Politics in Rus sia,” 788.
46. Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet  Union, 27.
47. New mosques  were mainly allowed to open during World War II in order to encourage 
support for the military effort.
48. In some cases local offi cials granted approval for worship outside registered mosques with-
out the knowledge of higher state religious authorities, and thus provided some protection to wor-
shippers. Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet  Union, 185– 86, 294, 300– 301, 315, 317– 18.
49. Ibid., 287– 89, 291, 309– 16.
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of revenue for Islamic organizations, was not obligatory. Typically, every adult 
Muslim is obliged to make a payment to religious institutions or leaders during 
or at the end of uraz, the month- long feast concluding in the Uraz- Bayram cel-
ebration. The government did not outlaw fi tr for fear of worsening relations with 
the Muslim population. However, donations  were to be made only to registered 
mosques, which  were then obligated to forward the money to the spiritual direc-
torates, the offi cial Islamic leadership, to use for salaries, maintenance of facili-
ties, and other costs. During periods of greater religious repression donations 
dropped substantially. Overall, Soviet policies devastated Islamic charity.50
The challenges posed by government restrictions  were even greater for secular 
charities. Few of them survived communism. When the Bolsheviks closed unaffi li-
ated organizations, they allowed only branches of a few international charitable 
organizations to continue to operate. These included the Red Cross, the Society 
for Blind People, and the Society for Deaf People; however, they  were controlled 
by the state throughout the Soviet era.51 Their resources came from the state bud-
get and through citizens’ required purchase of membership stamps.52 In sum, for 
six de cades, or ga nized charity was moribund in the Soviet  Union.
Scarce Resources for Islamic Organizations 
and Secular Charities
In the 1980s, many secular charities and religious institutions emerged because 
legal changes enabled societal groups to form in de pen dently of the Communist 
Party and liberalized the practice of religion. However, they have been stymied in 
their missions to provide material help to average citizens because of the legacy 
of signifi cant state economic intervention. Soviet prohibitions on charity meant 
that the new groups had no institutional history and few resources. Market re-
form in the absence of effective market- enhancing institutions has compounded 
this problem by limiting donations, endowments, and credit, which are key re-
sources for societal groups.
50. Ibid., 27, 271, 486, 561. Despite the restrictions on religion, some charitable giving oc-
curred. Although fi tr and sadaq  were only supposed to be given to a registered mosque, some indi-
viduals gave their donations directly to needy acquaintances or relatives. Furthermore, some evi-
dence shows that registered mosques assisted destitute people who visited. And unoffi cial clergy, who 
received donations at the mazars (shrines) and in private homes when performing rites, kept the 
money and may have used it to help others.
51. Lindenmeyr, “The Big Impact of Small Deeds”; White, “Charity, Self- Help and Politics in 
Rus sia,” 788.
52. Erkinbek Kasybekov, “Government and Nonprofi t Sector Relations in the Kyrgyz Repub-
lic,” in Ruffi n and Waugh, Civil Society in Central Asia, 71– 84.
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Of the Islamic institutions, mosques are most relevant in terms of a mission 
of material assistance. Educational institutions and proselytizing groups are fo-
cused more on disseminating knowledge; some proselytizing groups also have 
the po liti cal objective of establishing a caliphate. Mosques, in contrast, aim to 
provide material assistance in addition to spiritual guidance.
Revenue for mosques from both foreign and domestic sources is now limited. 
As described above, the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have re-
stricted foreign funding of mosques since the mid- 1990s, and, even when it was 
available, this funding was provided for mosque construction, not for operating 
expenses or welfare programs. Domestic sources of revenue include fi tr, zakat, 
sadaq, and waqf. Yet with limited market opportunities, few individuals have 
become wealthy and are able to make generous donations. By one count 27 
percent of Kyrgyzstanis and 21 percent of Kazakhstanis donate money or time to 
a religious or ga ni za tion;53 however, the donations tend to be small. Consider, for 
example, the mosque in the village where I lived in southern Kazakhstan. It relies 
on the contributions of its members, but the villagers are in dire economic cir-
cumstances. Half of the able- bodied people are unemployed. Most people live 
off their garden plots and temporary seasonal employment. The few larger- scale 
private farms have not been able to expand and employ more people because of 
lack of credit and pro cessing monopolies. With most villagers in poverty, the 
mosque has received no donations of land for an endowment and only limited 
donations of money and agricultural products. The imam interprets Sharia to 
require that people give 1 percent of their income each year. One percent of the 
income of impoverished villagers is little, assuming they can even afford that. 
The imam explained that his most reliable donation is sacks of fl our once a year 
from the local miller.54
Like Islamic institutions, charities have indirectly been affected by market re-
form under the two conditions. With limited market opportunities it is diffi cult 
for citizens to earn income. Consequently, charities cannot rely on membership 
dues and donations. Only one of the many civic organizations I interviewed, a 
group to support the Rus sian diaspora in southern Kyrgyzstan, collected mem-
bership dues, but only those with positions inside the or ga ni za tion pay. Leaders 
of most organizations described how the amount that members— many of 
whom  were unemployed or earning little— could possibly pay for membership 
was so small that it was not worth collecting. Mutual assistance groups have re-
lied on monthly dues, typically 10 USD per month, in order to loan money to 
53. This survey was conducted in 2008 by Beth Kolko et al. and the results appear in a book by 
Eric McGlinchey. The numbers are rounded. Eric McGlinchey, Chaos, Violence, Dynasty: Politics and 
Islam in Central Asia (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011), 38.
54. Incidentally, this is the miller who has the pro cessing monopoly.
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each other.55 Donations to local charitable groups have been relatively rare: the 
veterans’ group in southern Kyrgyzstan was able to secure some money to begin 
the or ga ni za tion by appealing to people’s nostalgia for Soviet patriotism and re-
spect for veterans. The fund for disabled children in central Kazakhstan relied on 
periodic assistance from private fi rms and individuals.
Unlike Islamic institutions, charities have also been directly affected by the 
diffi culties of obtaining credit and engaging in successful business ventures. Laws 
on nongovernmental organizations do not prohibit charities from obtaining 
credit, and in other countries of the world credit has been important to the ex-
pansion of the nonprofi t sector. Yet, none of the organizations I examined in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had obtained credit. Limited market opportunities 
also make it diffi cult for charities to fund their activities through business ven-
tures. Of the groups I interviewed, only the veterans’ or ga ni za tion in southern 
Kyrgyzstan engages in business, selling cotton and produce from southern Kyr-
gyzstan in Rus sia and purchasing metal there for resale at home.
With limited possibilities for membership dues, donations, credit, and busi-
ness ventures, charities have been funded primarily through their leaderships’ 
personal resources and secondarily by foreign grants and local governments. 
Leaders of charities typically use their own money to register their groups because 
winning a grant or fi nding a sponsor is diffi cult at this early stage. Yet even more 
mature organizations regularly rely on their leaders’ and most dedicated mem-
bers’ personal resources. For example, one of the charities in central Kyrgyzstan 
collects used clothes, produce, and animal products from its members to distrib-
ute to others.
Only a minority of organizations receives foreign funds, and even those that 
do need to rely on other sources of funding as well. Foreign funds are available 
only for certain missions, such as civil society development or ethnic harmony, 
and for certain expenses, typically not rent or transportation. They are also usu-
ally in the form of grants, one- time windfalls instead of continuous support.56 
Finally, foreign donors are less accessible to local charities based outside of the 
countries’ capitals. These limitations have meant that foreign funds are not a 
primary means of support for local charities. With few options for support, local 
charities often rely on local governments for offi ce space, meeting places, utili-
ties, and transportation.57 Although an end to Soviet- era restrictions enabled 
55. Khamidov, “Central Asia: Citizens Learning to Take the Initiative.”
56. McMann, “The Civic Realm in Kyrgyzstan.”
57. In reaction to the 2003  Rose Revolution in Georgia, the 2004 Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine, and the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, where Western support for NGOs was seen as 
a precipitating factor, Kazakhstan has tried to discourage reliance on foreign organizations. In 2005, 
the government adopted a new Law on Social Contracts enabling local charities to apply for con-
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Islamic organizations and secular charities to proliferate, market reform under 
the two conditions has limited their resources.
Limited Material Assistance from Islamic 
Organizations and Secular Charities
With their scant resources, Islamic and secular organizations do not provide the 
material assistance average citizens need.58 Religious leaders and government 
offi cials confi rmed that mosques generally do not provide employment, credit, 
or income. For example, in the village in southern Kazakhstan, the imam ex-
plained that the mosque neither helps people fi nd work nor assists with credit. 
The only material assistance the mosques provide is to distribute small amounts 
of food or money to the poorest villagers during the observance of uraz, Uraz- 
Bayram, and Kurban- Bayram (a sacrifi cial festival). The village deputy akim 
placed the number of villagers who receive assistance during celebrations at ten 
to fi fteen.
Islamic educational institutions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan may offer 
their students room and board, but they do not provide employment, credit, and 
money.59 In fact, degrees from some of these Islamic higher education estab-
lishments do not even facilitate employment because these institutions are not 
recognized by the state.60 Furthermore, they typically limit their material assis-
tance to their own students. An exception is the Adep Bashti foundation in Kyr-
gyzstan, which provides stipends and materials to approximately two hundred 
students who are studying at institutions other than its madrassas in Bishkek 
and Osh.61
Hizb ut- Tahrir, the IMU/IJU, and Tablighi Jamaat have provided targeted, 
but not widespread, material assistance. Hizb ut- Tahrir offered emergency relief 
to earthquake victims in Naryn, Kyrgyzstan, and has or ga nized community 
tracts to provide social ser vices. The result, however, was the creation of additional government- 
organized NGOs instead of support for existing in de pen dent charities. Armine Ishkanian, “Social 
Policy and Development in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 4 (2006): 
373– 85,  here 379; Vsevolod Ovcharenko, “Government Financing of NGOs in Kazakhstan: Over-
view of a Controversial Experience,” International Journal of Not- for- Profi t Law 8, no. 4 (2006), 21– 29.
58. Other religions also provide only limited material assistance in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
typically through foreign missionaries. They are mostly of different Christian denominations, and 
they typically provide only periodic material assistance in small amounts to small numbers of peo-
ple. An American Baptist or ga ni za tion in Kazakhstan was unusual in that it had a business credit 
program, but only fi ve of seventy interested people received credit.
59. Eric McGlinchey offers examples from Osh, Kyrgyzstan. McGlinchey, “Islamic Revivalism 
and State Failure in Kyrgyzstan,” 26.
60. International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Islam and the State,” 29.
61. De Cordier, “Kyrgyzstan: Fledgling Islamic Charity Refl ects Growing Role for Religion.”
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projects, such as repairing irrigation canals, in a few locations in the country, 
particularly in the south.62 The or ga ni za tion also provides material aid to its 
imprisoned members.63 Hizb ut- Tahrir reportedly pays young adults to distrib-
ute leafl ets. However, members are also expected to contribute 10 percent of 
their income to the or ga ni za tion and purchase every issue of the or ga ni za tion’s 
Uzbek- language newspaper, Ong- Al- Waie (Awareness), so involvement in this 
or ga ni za tion is not a good means to support oneself.64
The IMU promised monthly salaries of 700– 1,000 USD to its fi ghters, who 
have mounted incursions in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and battled U.S. forces 
in Af ghan i stan; however, former fi ghters reported that they  were never paid.65 
There have not been reports of Tablighi Jamaat providing material assistance to 
its supporters.66
Secular charities are also not able to meet individuals’ needs for employment, 
money, and credit. The most typical assistance provided by charities is infre-
quent or periodic provision of goods. Although this can signifi cantly improve 
recipients’ standard of living in the short- term, it does not address the long- term 
diffi culties of lack of income or credit to create a business. Infrequent assistance 
includes the occasional pair of shoes or schoolbooks one of the charities in south-
ern Kyrgyzstan is able to provide to disabled Uzbek children and the medicine 
and groceries that a charity in central Kyrgyzstan distributes to women and poor 
people. Periodic assistance typically coincides with special dates. For example, 
the veterans’ or ga ni za tion in southern Kyrgyzstan provides poor veterans and 
deceased veterans’ families with money and coal on December 28, when the war 
in Af ghan i stan began, and on February 15, when the troops left Af ghan i stan.
Local charities typically do not help with generating income. In none of the 
locations where I worked was there a charity that focused on fi nding or generating 
jobs for people. Credit programs by nongovernmental organizations did exist, 
62. Similarly, the education foundation Adep Bashati provided bread and temporary fi nancial 
assistance to victims of the 2010 violence in Osh. McGlinchey, “Islamic Revivalism and State Failure 
in Kyrgyzstan,” 21– 22. De Cordier, “Kyrgyzstan: Fledgling Islamic Charity Refl ects Growing Role for 
Religion.”
63. International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Islamists in Prison.”
64. Saidazimova, “Central Asia: Banned Islamic Group Hizb ut- Tahrir Continues to Gain 
Members.”
65. Martha Brill Olcott, “Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia” (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2007),  here 33.
66. Neighborhood Islamic charities, or jamiyats, may be a growing presence in Osh, Kyrgyz-
stan. Evidence shows that they provided relief for refugees of the state violence in Andjian, Uzbeki-
stan, in May 2005 and that local businesspeople support them fi nancially. McGlinchey, “Islamic Re-
vivalism and State Failure in Kyrgyzstan,” 26. The role of local businesspeople in meeting people’s 
basic needs directly and through religious or secular charities is further discussed later in a section on 
local businesses.
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although they helped only a small number of people. For example, a charitable 
or ga ni za tion in central Kyrgyzstan was able to provide eight women with credit 
for ventures such as running a farm, operating a cafeteria, or making handcrafts. 
In one and a quarter years a charity aiming to help women and the poor in cen-
tral Kyrgyzstan had provided approximately thirty individuals with credit to 
grow potatoes and wheat and make handcrafts. This assistance is signifi cant for 
the recipients, but it helps relatively few people.
Even with the help of foreign organizations, local charities that provide credit 
have a limited effect. For example, through its Poverty Alleviation Project, the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) granted ten local organiza-
tions the funds to create microcredit programs to support rural residents’ small 
businesses in southern Kyrgyzstan. In three years several hundred people received 
loans of 1,000 to 11,000 som, or about 50 to 600 USD, for one year or less at ap-
proximately 40 percent to sew  house hold goods, grow crops, or raise animals, 
among other ventures. However, this is in a province of 1.5 million people, with 
approximately 99,000 considered poor. Moreover, these loans, like bank credit, 
are only for the short term, which makes it diffi cult for people to escape poverty.
A promising exception is the Kyrgyzstani nonprofi t microcredit company Bai 
Tushum and Partners, which had granted loans to more than 100,000 clients by 
2010 and has offi ces in approximately half of the country’s raions. International 
awards for transparency indicate that, unlike many of its for- profi t counterparts, 
it does not engage in predatory lending. Thanks to its nonprofi t status and sup-
port from international lending institutions like the EBRD, Bai Tushum can lend 
to a wider group of people and offer better terms. Farmers and potential entre-
preneurs are eligible, and people without valuable collateral can obtain a guaran-
tee from another person. The rates are nonetheless high, in part, due to the lack 
of credit histories. Bai Tushum has contributed information to the private credit 
bureaus and thus has helped to expand their coverage. Its further growth will be 
limited as long as its counterparts are hesitant to share information.67
Unlike Bai Tushum, most local charities do not have foreign fi nancial sup-
port. Limited resources have forced most to have narrow target populations, fur-
ther reducing their ability to provide substitutes for state goods and ser vices. 
Irina, the Rus sian woman in the village where I lived in southern Kazakhstan, 
described how she and her family needed help desperately but had not turned to 
a charity for assistance. She is a veterinarian and her husband was a construction 
67. Author’s interview (#134), Kyrgyzstan, June 4, 2009. Bai- Tushum and Partners Microfi nance 
Bank,  http:// www .baitushum .kg /en / (accessed December 19, 2013); Myles G. Smith, “Kyrgyzstan: 
Could Microfi nance Bubble Burst?” EurasiaNet, June 11, 2012,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node 
/65527 (accessed December 19, 2013).
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worker at the sovkhoz, but she has not received her salary for four years and her 
husband lost his job fi ve years ago. They try to support themselves and their two 
teenage sons by living off their plot of land, pig, cow, and a few chickens. Some-
times her husband can fi nd seasonal construction work, such as building a sum-
mer kitchen. Despite these diffi cult circumstances, she has not turned to local 
charities for help because, as she puts it, “I am not a pensioner or a mother with 
many children so no one helps me.”68 Her perception is accurate. Unlike reli-
gious institutions that are open to helping anyone, even nonbelievers in many 
cases, charitable organizations typically have a narrow focus. For example, in a 
region in southern Kyrgyzstan an or ga ni za tion helped veterans while another 
helped invalids or disadvantaged Uzbeks. This excluded much of the population. 
In a central province of Kyrgyzstan, one or ga ni za tion focused on mothers, single 
parents, and children and another group helped women and the poor. The cate-
gory of poor is a broad mandate that a small number of charities have taken on, 
but this target typically refers only to those in the most dire circumstances— 
those who are physically unable to work or homeless.
Charities’ limited geographic scope also reduces their infl uence. Unlike the 
Soviet party- state, which had representatives in each village and urban neigh-
borhood, charities tend to form locally and many are based in urban areas.69 For 
example, the village in southern Kazakhstan had no charitable or ga ni za tion. The 
raion where it is located had no local charities only foreign ones, which have 
their own limitations, as will be described later. Local charities had formed in the 
provincial capital but their work did not extend to the village. Neither secular 
charities nor Islamic organizations have managed to provide widespread mate-
rial assistance in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Minimal Reliance on Islamic Institutions 
and Charitable Organizations
Because Islamic institutions and charitable groups have little material assistance 
to offer, few individuals in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan seek their help in solving 
their everyday problems. This lack of reliance on Islamic institutions and chari-
table groups is evident from both the surveys and in- depth interviews.
68. Author’s interview (#158), Kazakhstan, July 19, 2001.
69. Lucy Earle, “Community Development, ‘Tradition’ and the Civil Society Strengthening 
Agenda in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey 24, no. 3 (2005): 245– 60,  here 249; Earle et al., Com-
munity Development in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 17.
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No more than 2 percent of survey respondents in either country sought as-
sistance from Islamic institutions or charities in the past year (see Table 5.1). At 
most, 2 percent of respondents in a country selected “religious institution or 
leader” or “local, private charitable or ga ni za tion.”
Average citizens and representatives of Islamic institutions and charities I in-
terviewed confi rmed that individuals do not typically turn to these entities for 
material assistance. Not a single person I interviewed had turned to a mosque, 
Islamic educational establishment, or Islamic group, or secular charity for assis-
tance.70 These individuals  were in need of assistance: they included urban resi-
dents who  were unemployed and actively seeking work and villagers who had no 
income and  were trying to survive on subsistence farming and odd jobs. In these 
interviews I asked people to describe the problems they faced in their everyday 
lives and how they tried to solve them. People often explained how they had 
considered different options for solving their problems. No one mentioned a 
mosque, Islamic school, or Islamic group in this context. Instead, I would have 
to prompt interviewees to discuss the possibility that Islamic institutions served 
as potential sources of assistance. The imam in the village in southern Kazakh-
stan corroborated these accounts, explaining that only one person in the village 
of 3,300 sought material assistance from the mosque each year. “People know 
the mosque does not have the means so therefore they do not seek assistance,” he 
explained.71 A few individuals I interviewed mentioned that they considered 
seeking help from charities, but they explained that the organizations could not 
provide them with the resources they needed.
70. Similarly, in her work in the late 1990s in Kyrgyzstan, Kathleen Collins did not fi nd a single 
person who said they would turn to a mosque for a loan or fi nancial assistance. Furthermore, not 
one indicated that a mosque was the most important factor in getting a job or being fi nancially suc-
cessful. Kathleen Collins, “The Po liti cal Role of Clans in Central Asia,” Comparative Politics 35, no. 2 
(2003): 171– 90,  here 178.
71. Author’s interview (#173), Kazakhstan, July 30, 2001.
TABLE 5.1. Societal actors and institutions from whom citizens have sought 
assistance in the past year in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (percentage of 
respondents, rounded)
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN
Religious institution or leader 1 2
Local, private charitable or ga ni za tion 1 2
Note: n = 1,200 for Kazakhstan and 1,199 for Kyrgyzstan. A portion of the 1,500 respondents in each country 
claimed that they had no problems or that describing their problems was too diffi cult and thus some 
respondents  were not asked this question about seeking assistance.
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Not Averse to Islamic Institutions and 
Charitable Organizations
It is because of Islamic institutions’ and secular charities’ inabilities to meet ma-
terial needs— not for other reasons— that people do not turn to them for assis-
tance. The fact that people do use other ser vices of Islamic institutions indicates 
that it is not an aversion to or suspicion of religion that keeps them from seeking 
material assistance. “For seventy years people  were told religion was the opiate of 
the masses,” the imam in Kazakhstan reminds us,72 so it is plausible that people 
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan may be wary of associating with Islam. But, in 
fact, these countries have seen an Islamic revival, with people attending mosque, 
enrolling in religious classes, seeking spiritual guidance from religious leaders, 
reading religious literature, and making pilgrimages. Some people have also de-
cided to pursue religious educations. The imam in southern Kazakhstan con-
trasted the limited material assistance his mosque could provide with the exten-
sive work he was doing in the areas of spiritual guidance, confl ict resolution, and 
youth courses on Islam and the Arabic language, as well as Kazakh culture. Aver-
sion and suspicion explain only the limited contact with proselytizing groups, 
especially Hizb ut- Tahrir and the IMU/IJU. Most Kazakhstanis and Kyrgyzstanis 
prefer secular states73— likely a legacy of Soviet communism— and they are 
aware of their governments’ bans of radical Islamist activity.74 So, seeking mate-
rial assistance from Hizb ut- Tahrir and the IMU/IJU would be not only unfruit-
ful but also po liti cally misguided. With the exception of these organizations, 
72. Ibid.
73. International Crisis Group, “Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities for En-
gagement” (Brussels, 2003); U.S. Department of State, “Central Asians Differ on Islam’s Po liti cal 
Role, but Agree on a Secular State” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Offi ce of Research, 
2000), 5.
74. Government disapproval of certain Islamic groups is evident from Kazakhstan’s 1993 law 
“On the Freedom of Religion and on Religious Associations,” which initially prohibited religious 
po liti cal parties and then was broadened to prohibit the distribution of extremist or proselytizing 
materials without permission. Kazakhstan’s 1995 constitution severely limited the activities of for-
eign religious organizations. In Kyrgyzstan, the registration of religious organizations was intro-
duced in November 1996 as a means of discouraging extremism, although the requirement has not 
been effectively implemented. The government essentially banned foreign religious organizations 
beginning in 1999. A presidential decree and instructions to the National Security Ser vice in 2004 
banned extremist, fundamentalist, and Shiite missionaries. In both countries, government security 
agencies now meet with members of proselytizing organizations to try to discourage their involve-
ment in them, and are increasingly incarcerating them and imprisoning them for longer. Interna-
tional Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Islam and the State,” 25; International Crisis Group, “Central 
Asia: Islamists in Prison,” 5– 6; Karagiannis, Po liti cal Islam in Central Asia, 31, 32, 35; Khalid, Islam 
after Communism, 185.
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Islamic institutions’ lack of resources is the factor that discourages citizens from 
seeking material help from them.
Charities’ limited resources are the only deterrent to seeking assistance from 
them. Some individuals have been suspicious of charitable organizations be-
cause they have believed leaders’ true motives are personal gain and they  were 
unfamiliar, at least in the early in de pen dence period, with practices such as trav-
eling abroad for seminars and applying for grants.75 However, people I inter-
viewed mentioned the lack of assistance charities provide, not their suspicions, 
as the reason they did not turn to charities. Moreover, suspicion is unlikely to be 
an obstacle to seeking charitable assistance when many people have taken jobs 
that they  were suspicious and ashamed of. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, many 
people, including well- educated professionals, began buying and reselling goods 
to survive after the collapse of the Soviet  Union. Yet people  were suspicious 
of working in the bazaar because in the Soviet era they had been taught that 
“spekulatsia”— buying and reselling at a higher price— was amoral. “Teachers 
and doctors  were ashamed to stand in the bazaar [and sell goods],” the head of 
an entrepreneurial association for central Kazakhstan explained.76 Anara, an 
entrepreneur in a central city of Kazakhstan, recounted that when she left her job 
at a technical institute to work in the bazaar, “Many thought, ‘How could a per-
son with higher education work in the market?’ ” She explained to me how in the 
1990s “prices doubled, and then increased fi ve times, and when they increased 
ten times I woke up. We went to the store and prices had three more zeroes. I 
became fearful even though I had work and a salary. . . .  But, I wondered how 
will we live if prices continue to increase.”77 These conditions led her to work in 
the bazaar. Considering that thousands of people in dire straits overcame their 
suspicion and shame to work in the bazaars, it is unlikely that fear and embar-
rassment prevent people from turning to charities for assistance. Instead, few 
people turn to charities or Islamic groups, because the organizations do not ad-
dress the need to generate income.
Other Societal Groups and Individuals
Like Islamic institutions and secular charities, other groups and individuals in 
society cannot meet people’s needs for income, employment, and credit. Foreign 
charities, foreign companies, local companies, labor  unions or other profes-
75. McMann, “The Civic Realm in Kyrgyzstan.”
76. Author’s interview (#196), Kazakhstan, June 8, 2001.
77. Author’s interview (#216), Kazakhstan, June 15, 2001.
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sional associations, political parties, aksakals, and educational establishments do 
not serve as substitutes for the state. Their diffi culties in meeting individuals’ 
needs are refl ected in the low numbers of people who have sought their help. No 
more than 4 percent of respondents turned to one of the groups.
Foreign Charities
Foreign organizations engaged in charitable work tend to work through local 
NGOs, so it is not surprising that less than 1 percent of citizens in Kazakhstan 
and only 1 percent in Kyrgyzstan would have turned directly to the foreign 
groups for assistance, as indicated in Table 5.2. Moreover, foreign organizations 
engaged in charitable work have many of the same limitations as local charities. 
Much foreign charitable assistance is narrowly targeted, infrequent or one- time, 
focused on goals other than generating income, and limited in geographic scope.78
One category of help is the distribution of goods to specifi c groups, such as 
refugees, disaster victims, and the poorest members of a community. In many 
cases this is one- time assistance. For example, the leader of a provincial branch 
of the Red Cross/Red Crescent in southern Kazakhstan explained that the or ga-
ni za tion tried to help each needy individual only once a year. She said that some 
people come repeatedly to the offi ce and request help: “I ask, ‘Why do you eter-
nally come  here? You came not long ago and ate at the cafeteria at a cost of 
$1.50. . . .  Do you think you are alone? Let others receive help too.’ ”79
Other categories of foreign assistance— educational programs and commu-
nity projects— might enable people to generate income in the future, but they do 
not provide an immediate solution. Educational programs, by the U.S. Peace 
Corps and the Eu ro pe an  Union’s Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
In de pen dent States, for example, concentrate on teaching people foreign lan-
guages, agricultural techniques, and business skills. The community projects have 
local residents, typically in a rural area, improve infrastructure, such as sewer or 
water systems, with guidance and funds from the foreign or ga ni za tion.80 A foun-
dation in a foreign language or improved irrigation is helpful for generating in-
come but only if jobs or credit are available.
Microcredit programs offer the most promising foreign assistance; however, 
they illustrate an additional constraint of foreign groups— limited geographic 
scope. Foreign organizations typically have a representative in place to monitor 
78. Other foreign groups focus less on meeting material needs, concentrating instead on devel-
oping civil society and reducing ethnic tensions, for example.
79. Author’s interview, Kazakhstan (#146), July 5, 2001.
80. Community projects aim to overcome an additional limitation of foreign assistance— poor 
knowledge of local needs.
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credit recipients’ use of funds. Only with such a monitoring system is it “appar-
ent if the money was not used for the business— if [the entrepreneurs] bought a 
sheep for a wedding” instead, a regional manager of one foreign or ga ni za tion in 
southern Kyrgyzstan explained.81 However, almost no groups have the human 
resources to operate such programs countrywide, particularly in larger countries 
like Kazakhstan. In Kyrgyzstan it is plausible to blanket the country. In the early 
part of the de cade residents near urban areas and in provinces viewed by foreign 
representatives as easier to work in  were the only people likely to have access to 
microcredit. More recently, foreign organizations have been able to open more 
offi ces by relying on locals to staff them. For example, the American or ga ni za-
tion FINCA has its headquarters in Bishkek but also has twenty- two branches 
and approximately 120,000 clients. Similarly, Kompanion, backed by the U.S. 
or ga ni za tion Mercy Corps, has offi ces in all regions of the country and has ap-
proximately 120,000 borrowers.82
With the exception of institutions like these, foreign organizations mainly 
help meet everyday needs by providing funds for credit programs run by local 
charities. Unlike Islamic institutions and local, secular charities, the limitations 
faced by foreign organizations are generally not because of lack of fi nancial re-
sources. Instead, mandates from their governments and boards limit their target 
populations and objectives. Preferences for immediate, concrete solutions en-
courage one- time or periodic assistance and the distribution of tangible goods 
81. Author’s interview, Kyrgyzstan (101), May 15, 1998.
82. FINCA, “Kyrgyzstan,”  http:// www .fi nca .org /site /c .6fIGIXMFJnJ0H /b .6088573 /k .348A /Kyr 
gyzstan .htm (accessed December 19, 2013); Kompanion,  http:// www .kompanion .kg /index .php 
?lang=en (accessed December 19, 2013).
TABLE 5.2. Other societal actors and institutions from whom citizens have 
sought assistance in the past year in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN
Foreign charity <1 1
Foreign company where you don’t work <1 0
Local company where you don’t worka 3 <1
Labor  uniona 1 1
Respected male elder 1 4
Educational establishment <1 2
Note: n = 1,200 for Kazakhstan and 1,199 for Kyrgyzstan. A portion of the 1,500 respondents in each country 
claimed that they had no problems or that describing their problems was too diffi cult and thus some 
respondents  were not asked this question about seeking assistance.
a Some local companies and labor  unions remain state institutions in these countries as a result of the commu-
nist period; however, market reforms have ensured that most are now nonstate entities. Counting them as 
market actors increases the diffi culty of arguing that the reliance on the state is greater than reliance on 
nonstate actors.
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instead of ongoing assistance, the results of which are more diffi cult to mea sure. 
The diffi culty of recruiting and retaining staff from the home country to work in 
remote locations causes programs to be concentrated in urban areas and places 
where it is considered easiest and most comfortable to work.
Foreign Companies
Scholars have identifi ed foreign companies, even more than foreign NGOs, as 
holding the greatest promise for addressing everyday needs. For example, Pau-
line Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal note that “[a]n examination of several con-
tracts with foreign companies active in the energy sector reveals a consistent pat-
tern of foreign companies’ adopting all the social and economic burdens in the 
regions, cities, towns, and villages surrounding the fi elds to which they have 
bought rights to explore and produce oil and gas,” including maintaining full 
employment and paying back wages.83 Not only on paper but also in practice, 
foreign companies can provide individuals with the income, employment, and 
other assistance that they need.84 However, like charities, their assistance has 
limited target populations and limited geographic scope. They help employees of 
their operations and the city where they are based, but their operations do not 
blanket Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. For these reasons, less than 1 percent of 
survey respondents in Kazakhstan and no respondents in Kyrgyzstan indicated 
that they had turned to a foreign company for assistance (see Table 5.2).
Let us explore these benefi ts and limitations by considering a foreign natural 
resource extraction fi rm working in Kazakhstan. From interviews I conducted 
with directors, employees, and residents of towns where it operates, I found that 
in many respects the foreign fi rm had taken over the welfare responsibilities of 
the enterprise and one large town. One director, one of many foreigners in up-
per management, began the story, saying, “What we perceived when we came 
was that the [Kazakhstani enterprise] maintains the entire town.”85 The enter-
prise had constructed homes and was providing free utilities and education, 
among other benefi ts. However, with the economic crisis of the early in de pen-
dence period, this system began to collapse. The Kazakhstani enterprise was re-
lying on barter for inputs and for payment and was producing only 3 percent of 
83. Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong, “Environmental NGOs in Kazakhstan: Demo-
cratic Goals and Nondemo cratic Outcomes,” in The Power and Limits of NGOs, ed. Sarah E. Mendel-
son and John K. Glenn (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 152– 67,  here 170.
84. See examples in Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, Oil Is Not a Curse: Own ership 
Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
288– 90.
85. Author’s interview (#218), Kazakhstan, June 16, 2001.
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what it once had. “Without cash how could they pay the workers? Workers  were 
paid in products and clothes,” a current director explained.86 Or, at times the 
employees  were not paid at all. When the foreign fi rm purchased the enterprise 
in the 1990s, the workers had not been paid for fi ve months and the decreased 
production at the enterprise meant that the town could no longer provide heat 
to people’s homes at times. As a result, workers  were fi nding excuses to stay at 
work to keep warm.
The foreign fi rm purchased not only the enterprise but its related facilities, 
including a children’s cultural center, three children’s summer camps, a textile 
plant that produced uniforms, and a cafeteria. It also eventually bought all the 
utility plants in the town as the local government was not effectively providing 
ser vices, in part because of lack of investment in the facilities in recent de cades. 
The fi rm also purchased a hospital and pays salaries at another one. Besides buy-
ing facilities, the fi rm has funded the city sports complex, schools, and children’s 
camps. It also contributed 1 million USD for an oblast agricultural credit fund. 
The fund provides half of each loan and a bank provides the other half. In one 
year the fund provided credit to one hundred entrepreneurs.
The fi rm’s direction and funding of these welfare ser vices in this town has 
addressed the income and employment problems of its workers, but not of all 
residents.87 Workers received their fi ve months of back pay and now receive 
150– 200 USD per month on time. This money goes far because workers receive 
free medical care, one free meal at the cafeteria each day that they work, resort 
vacations at only 15 percent of cost, and subsidized university courses in their 
fi eld. These benefi ts have an enormous effect on the town as approximately one 
in seven of the town’s residents is employed at the fi rm. Moreover, an individual 
in an urban area typically lives in a  house hold with four others— a spouse, two 
children, and a grandparent. However, as a worker at one of the fi rm’s remote 
locations noted, while the fi rm’s workers live well, other residents are trying to 
survive off their garden plots. Furthermore, although nonemployees in these for-
eign company towns have access to functioning and often improved infrastruc-
ture, such as utilities and public transportation, they may not be able to afford 
the prices charged by the foreign fi rms operating them according to market 
principles.
Foreign fi rms have in fact addressed the problems of income and employ-
ment for their own workers, but they cannot employ everyone in a location and 
they do not operate throughout a country. Instead, they tend to be based where 
86. Ibid.
87. It is important to note that 23 percent of the enterprise’s employees at the time of purchase 
lost their jobs, approximately 14 percent under early retirement plans and the rest through on- time 
retirement, migration, or layoffs.
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extractive resources are available. For Kyrgyzstan, in par tic u lar, this is of little 
help because the country has few of these resources.
Local Businesses
Like foreign businesses, local businesses are limited in providing charity because 
of geographic scope, but also because of scant resources. Businesses, particularly 
large businesses, are more likely to be based in cities and thus more likely to help 
urban residents. But, whether they are based in urban or rural areas, most busi-
nesses do not have an excess of resources to use to help people. As a result, only 
3 percent of respondents in Kazakhstan and less than 1 percent in Kyrgyzstan 
had sought help from a local company where they do not work. The local busi-
nesses that do manage to provide charity are those that  were started at the end of 
the Soviet era by Communist Party leaders, specifi cally leaders of the Komsomol, 
a communist youth or ga ni za tion for people ages fourteen to twenty- eight. These 
businesses  were built on the advantages of Communist- era connections and, in 
some cases, commandeering of state resources at the end of the Soviet era. Busi-
nesses developed by average citizens in later years face the limited opportunities 
resulting from market reform under the two conditions. The relatively few busi-
nesses that can afford to engage in charitable work fall into two categories: those 
that direct most of their assistance to their own employees and those that direct 
most of their assistance to local residents who are not employees.
Falling into the former category is a business in a city in central Kazakhstan. 
Ivan, the found er and a former Komsomol leader, established the company from 
a Komsomol housing program he began in 1987. At the time, his city had a 
shortage of apartments; young people had to wait ten years for the enterprise 
where they worked to provide them with a unit. The enterprises had a surfeit of 
cash but not the means or the mandate to build apartments. Ivan convinced the 
enterprise directors to let him use the cash to purchase construction materials. 
He and the employees waiting for apartments then built approximately 1,500 
homes for their use. With market reform, Ivan transformed the business venture 
into his own private companies, one of which was the fi rst private company in 
Kazakhstan. The companies continue to construct buildings as well as operate 
stores, produce bottled water, and expand into new areas.
Just as Ivan established the housing program with an eye to both meeting 
people’s needs and making a profi t, he provides welfare ser vices to his employ-
ees today. His rationale for buying  houses for employees today is that an em-
ployee “should not think about where to live, but about work.”88 He established 
88. Author’s interview (#217), Kazakhstan, June 15, 2001.
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a cafeteria that provides free lunches to employees because he found that work-
ers  were getting sick from bringing in and eating poor quality food, and manage-
ment was taking too long to go out to eat lunch. More generally, he explained 
why he provides extensive goods and ser vices to his employees: “I want people to 
believe in the fi rm. That was a concern.”89 His philosophy has worked, as no em-
ployee has left voluntarily unless he or she has decided to emigrate. Ivan explained 
that his approach is also infl uenced by growing up in the Soviet era, when work-
places provided many benefi ts for employees.
In addition to providing  houses and lunches for employees, Ivan established a 
day- care facility and school that are free for employee’s children, and he pays for 
employees’ care at the local hospital. Ivan also provides cars for employees; those 
who have worked well for a year or two are eligible. Finally, he makes small sums 
of money available for other purposes, such as an eye operation in Moscow for 
an employee’s daughter.
Like other successful businesspeople, Ivan has focused on helping his own 
employees. People in the community are aware of this; as a result, nonemployees 
do not approach him for help. Ivan does, however, provide some support for the 
community. He subsidizes the school and hospital for nonemployees and dis-
tributes food to 366 pensioners in the raion on New Year’s Day, Victory Day, and 
Pensioners’ Day. Assistance three times a year is more frequent than typical. 
Businesses in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that make charitable donations at all 
typically do it only once a year, according to residents of each city and town 
where I lived.
Other businesspeople focus their charity primarily on the community. Con-
sider, for example, a businessman in southern Kyrgyzstan. Bolotbek was active 
in the Komsomol in the Soviet era and he began his business ventures early. 
While a university student and a Komsomol leader, he opened small enterprises 
offering shoe shines and haircuts. In 1993, when he graduated from the univer-
sity, Bolotbek used his accumulated capital and his Komsomol connections to 
purchase a restaurant through the privatization initiative. With a relatively small 
number of employees, most of his charity goes to members of the community 
who seek assistance with everyday problems. From zero to fi fteen people ap-
proach him each month for help with different types of problems. To address 
legal problems, such as an unfair fi ring, he contacts government offi cials. For the 
problem of insuffi cient income, Bolotbek provides for individuals with his own 
money.
The two businesses above are exceptions; they are highly successful because 
they  were started in the late Soviet era by well- connected people. As a result, they 
89. Ibid.
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are able to provide assistance to their employees and the community. Most busi-
nesspeople, however, lack excess income because of the legacy of signifi cant state 
economic intervention and the weakness of market- enhancing institutions. Busi-
nesspeople explained to me that they could not help people by providing credit, 
other monetary handouts, or jobs because they did not have extra resources. For 
example, as one of four successful private farmers in a village in southern Kazakh-
stan, Muratkhan, explained, he does not help anybody outside his family because 
“You can only help when you have the means.”90 His tractor is too old to lend 
and he does not have surplus cash. His comments also highlight the point that 
extra resources go to  house hold and extended family members, not to charita-
ble giving.
Overall, charitable assistance from local businesses does not provide a substi-
tute for state goods and ser vices. Few businesses are successful enough to make 
charitable donations, and they tend not to be located in rural areas. The assis-
tance is mainly targeted at each company’s own employees. Help that does reach 
community members tends to be annual donations of goods.
Professional Associations
For potential entrepreneurs and businesspeople seeking to expand their ven-
tures, professional associations would be a logical source of credit, yet in practice 
these associations do not serve in that capacity. Associations for farmers and for 
nonagricultural small businesspeople, such as traders, do “shorten the long path 
to becoming an entrepreneur,” as the head of a businesswomen’s association in 
Kazakhstan put it.91 However, the groups focus on supplying information about 
inputs, potential buyers, and government laws and regulations, instead of pro-
viding credit. Associations typically offer seminars as well as one- on- one consul-
tations. Some associations have begun to help attract buyers, for example, by 
serving as a central contact point for potential purchasers. Some have also begun 
to lobby the government.
While these associations provide information about credit— usually about 
the challenges of obtaining it or referral to a government credit program— it is 
rare for them to have credit programs themselves. The businesswomen’s associa-
tion is an exception; it has a small fund to supplement credit that female entre-
preneurs have been able to obtain elsewhere. A farmers’ association in central 
Kyrgyzstan was also able to provide credit during a two- year period thanks to a 
grant from the UNDP. It assisted thirty- fi ve farmers; however, the terms allowed 
90. Author’s interview (#174), Kazakhstan, August 1, 2001.
91. Author’s interview (#150), Kazakhstan, July 6, 2001.
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only for purchasing seed or animals and for repayment six months later, so this 
credit did not enable expansion in terms of employment or pro cessing. Like the 
other options for credit, this one has disadvantages: it helps only small numbers 
of people, has limited geographic coverage, and offers small amounts over short 
loan periods.
Another type of employment or ga ni za tion, the labor  union, has been even 
less successful in assisting people. Labor  unions  were important welfare organi-
zations in the Soviet era, but without the Communist Party’s support and with 
the shift of workers from industry to bazaars, the old  unions disintegrated and 
few new ones have formed. From the Soviet era to the present day, reliance on 
labor  unions dropped from 18 percent to 1 percent in Kazakhstan and from 
12 percent to 1 percent in Kyrgyzstan. Like charities, those new ones that have 
developed lack resources, in part, because of market reform under the two 
conditions.
Po liti cal Parties
Po liti cal parties also have not generally been a source of income, employment, and 
credit for people. Parties in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are not the party machines 
familiar in previous centuries in the United States. Parties are relatively small and 
short- lived because of government repression, unfavorable electoral rules, and di-
visions among elites. Like charities, they are also resource- poor, in part, because of 
market reform under the two conditions. The only exception to these general-
izations are “parties of power,” those parties established by sitting presidents to 
ensure that they remain in power. These parties do not lack resources because their 
leaders can draw on resources from their government positions.
Given this general landscape of parties, no survey respondent in either coun-
try reported turning to a po liti cal party for assistance.92 In their capacity as gov-
ernment offi cials, some oblast and national deputies who are members of parties 
of power do provide material assistance, as described in chapter three. However, 
the resources are from the government, not the party or ga ni za tion, and individ-
uals associate the assistance with the government offi cials, not with the party. Of 
the other parties in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, a couple of the larger, longer- 
lived parties reported receiving requests for assistance. One oblast division of a 
party in Kyrgyzstan reported that it received from zero to three requests per 
month. Bolotbek, the former Komsomol leader who began with shoe shine and 
92. “Po liti cal party” was not an option on the survey, but respondents  were encouraged to list 
anyone or any group they had turned to, even those that did not appear on the card provided.
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haircut businesses, also headed an oblast division of a party. However, he used 
his profi ts from his successful businesses, not party funds, to assist people. Fur-
thermore, those who requested assistance  were targeting him, a well- known 
businessman, more than the party.
In general, parties that are not parties of power do not provide material assis-
tance except for one- time handouts during elections. However, these resources 
come not from the po liti cal parties, but from state or personal resources. For 
example, the head doctor of a veterinary clinic distributed government veteri-
nary medicine. A candidate in central Kyrgyzstan who worked on an oblast state 
property committee tasked with implementing privatization offered to tell vot-
ers “where they could profi tably place their [privatization] coupons.”93 At other 
times, parties help people with legal or bureaucratic problems, such as an illegal 
fi ring or unreceived veterans’ benefi ts, and they do this by contacting government 
offi cials. Po liti cal parties are not a source of employment, income, or credit.
Aksakals
Particularly in the early in de pen dence period local and foreign observers specu-
lated that aksakals may be infl uential in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Aksakals, 
literally white beards, are respected male elders in the community. Typically, ak-
sakals are men who held positions of responsibility in the Soviet era, for exam-
ple, as heads of industrial enterprises, sovkhozes, or local party divisions. The 
governments have granted them some formal authority, such as in the develop-
ment of aksakal courts, which have been designated to resolve minor disputes in 
Kyrgyzstan. However, individuals do not turn to them for help with employ-
ment, income, or credit. Only 4 percent of survey respondents in Kyrgyzstan and 1 
percent in Kazakhstan had sought help from them. In none of the rural or urban 
locations where I lived in either country did I fi nd any evidence that aksakals 
help people obtain credit or employment. They are not sources of assistance be-
cause they no longer have access to the resources of their former posts, assuming 
those enterprises or offi ces even exist, and their infl uence has waned because 
they are more familiar with Soviet ways than contemporary ones. After all, they 
are accustomed to socialist, not marketizing, economies. As the editor of a news-
paper in southern Kyrgyzstan observed in an interview with me, “There are 
young people now who can explain [survival in the market economy] to people. 
There are people who are prepared [to step in]. Most are businessmen.”94
93. Author’s interview (#22), Kyrgyzstan, July 2, 1997.
94. Author’s interview (#56), Kyrgyzstan, April 29, 1998.
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Educational Institutions
A more plausible source of assistance for young people who seek help in fi nding 
a job would be their educational institutions, but although the state no longer 
assigns jobs to graduating students, educational institutions have not stepped in 
to fi ll this void. Instead, graduating students tend to rely on connections to se-
cure employment.
To illuminate the pro cess I interviewed university staff and students graduat-
ing from a mining department in a university in central Kazakhstan. I focused 
on mining majors because they are some of the students most in need of assis-
tance fi nding jobs. While the mining industry has enormous potential, it is a fi eld 
that has gone through a period of layoffs during the in de pen dence phase. In this 
era, mining graduates have not always been in demand to the same extent as their 
counterparts in foreign language, economics, and computer science departments. 
Unfortunately, the help that their educational institution provides is limited.
The university staff and students have adapted to the end of the Soviet em-
ployment guarantee. The department chair commented, “When [job assignments 
 were] centralized our heads did not hurt, but life dictates changes.”95 To help 
students fi nd jobs, the department established an agreement with a foreign fi rm 
operating in Kazakhstan. The fi rm’s management agreed to review students’ fi les 
and test them; it typically employs ten to fi fteen of the sixty who graduate each 
year. The department has also secured contracts for placement at a few other 
fi rms where department faculty members have made contacts through their re-
search. The university sends letters to potential employers each year and holds a 
job fair.
The university makes a concerted effort; however, most students have to fi nd 
jobs through connections, and these jobs are often not in their fi eld. One student 
found work at a fi rm that produces iron bars for fences, where his neighbor is a 
director. The student explained, “I want to work in my fi eld but the main con-
sideration is that the salary is high and stable.”96 One fortunate student had three 
job offers, all secured through connections: an acquaintance proposed that he 
work as a mining technician in a nearby mine; an aunt secured a position for him 
as a mining safety engineer, which would allow him to travel around Kazakh-
stan; and a friend who is a Rus sian army general offered to help this student, an 
ethnic Rus sian, obtain a career in the Rus sian military.
As the director of a university offi ce involved with placement explained, “The 
government’s role is to make sure that enterprises operate. Nothing  else is 
95. Author’s interview (#175), Kazakhstan, May 28, 2001.
96. Author’s interview (#176), Kazakhstan, May 28, 2001.
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needed. . . .  Students should study well and fi nd work on their own. This is nor-
mal and students are accepting of this.”97 The students, in fact,  were divided on 
this issue. The two students described above  were accepting. The fi rst com-
mented: “No one is guilty [for the poor economic situation]. Before, coal pro-
duction was state- run. Now employers may decide how to run the business. . . . 
It is just the market . . .  the economy.”98 Similarly, the second said: “There should 
not be an [employment] guarantee because enterprises are private now and take 
those whom they need. . . .  Companies now pay more for a well- educated 
person.”99 On the other hand, another student who had neither a job nor connec-
tions in her fi eld suggested, “The government should propose jobs for people but 
allow them to refuse . . .  because many people now do not work in their fi elds.”100 
While student opinion about the effects of market reform on job hunting was 
divided, all of the students  were in the same position of relying more on connec-
tions than on their university to secure a job.
Societal institutions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not provide the employ-
ment, money, and credit that individuals need. They have not replaced the So-
viet welfare state. The institutions some observers thought to be most likely to 
play this role, Islamic organizations and local charities, do not have the resources 
to help. Market reform in the context of a history of signifi cant state economic 
intervention and absent or weak market- enhancing institutions has meant that 
few individuals are able to make generous donations and few opportunities exist 
for secular charities to obtain credit. For these and other reasons, foreign chari-
ties, foreign companies, local businesses, professional associations, po liti cal par-
ties, aksakals, and secular educational establishments also do not offer substi-
tutes for state goods and ser vices. The next chapter examines one institution that 
has, in fact, been able to provide some individuals with the employment, in-
come, and credit they need— families.
 97. Author’s interview (#180), Kazakhstan, May 29, 2001.
 98. Author’s interview (#177), Kazakhstan, May 28, 2001.
 99. Author’s interview (#179), Kazakhstan, May 28, 2001.




The Uneven Effect of Market Reforms
“In diffi cult times I turn to Kanat,” Marzhan said, referring to how she relied on 
her uncle, the successful private farmer, to resolve her problems and avoid en-
gaging in corruption.1 Like Marzhan, individuals in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz-
stan turn primarily to family members for assistance, more so than to other per-
sonal contacts, such as friends and neighbors. Yet, only some people have 
relatively well- off members in their extended families who can provide the em-
ployment, income, or credit that they need. While market reform, as well as the 
economic chaos of the Soviet collapse, impoverished many people, some man-
aged to adapt and prosper in the new economy. In this chapter evidence from a 
successful rural  house hold and a successful urban  house hold illustrates the type 
of support relatively well- off individuals can provide to their immediate and ex-
tended families and how members of these families rely on relatives as an alter-
native to engaging in corruption. Because of the small, dispersed nature of their 
families, reliance on relatives is less common among ethnic minorities than 
among members of titular ethnic groups.
The fi nancial success of those individuals who are able to assist their relatives 
can be attributed to a constellation of factors. These individuals  were relatively 
young and in leadership positions in the late Soviet era, and they became entre-
preneurs either then or in the early in de pen dence period. They prospered as a 
result of market reform; whereas many people did not. This uneven effect of 
market reform provides an answer to the second puzzle of this book: Why do 
1. Author’s interview (#161), Kazakhstan, July 22, 2001.
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some people rarely or never engage in corruption even in countries where it is 
pervasive? Market reform has made their extended families comparatively well- 
off so that these individuals can obtain the goods and ser vices they need from 
relatives.
Significant Reliance on Family
Individuals in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan turn primarily to family for assis-
tance. In Kazakhstan 35 percent of survey respondents and in Kyrgyzstan 42 per-
cent of survey respondents have sought assistance from a family member in the 
past year. These numbers are considerably higher than the fi gures for those who 
turned to any state, market, or societal actors, as indicated in Table 6.1. Of dif-
ferent family members, relatives inside the country but not in one’s  house hold 
are the most common targets of requests. In Kazakhstan 28 percent of survey 
respondents and in Kyrgyzstan 30 percent sought assistance from relatives in 
their country. This was followed by requests to  house hold members, made by 13 
percent and 19 percent, respectively. Many Kazakhs and Kyrgyz do not have kin 
outside their countries, so seeking help from such relatives was rare— 3 percent 
and 2 percent, respectively. However, between the time of the survey and the 
global economic recession the number of Kyrgyz abroad grew when perhaps as 
many as 1 million people left Kyrgyzstan to work in Kazakhstan and Rus sia.2 
Turning to relatives outside the countries is more common for ethnic Slavs in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but the percentages are still small. It is important 
to note that these relatives, as well as the friends, acquaintances, neighbors, and 
coworkers, and relatives described below, are not government offi cials, so their 
assistance does not constitute corrupt exchanges.
Evidence of Market Reform’s 
Differential Influence
Although many people in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan turn to family members 
for assistance, only a small percentage of relatives are able to provide the em-
ployment, income, and credit these individuals need. The numbers of impover-
2. The offi cial numbers are between 350,000 and 500,000 but thought to be much higher. 
Mostly young men, and some young women, become labor migrants. Vanessa Ruget and Burul Us-
manalieva, “Citizenship, Migration, and Loyalty Towards the State: A Case Study of the Kyrgyzstani 
Migrants Working in Rus sia and Kazakhstan,” Central Asian Survey 27, no. 2 (2008): 129– 41,  here 
130.
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ished, as recorded in Table 6.2, are staggering, considering that poverty was rare 
in the Soviet  Union due to extensive state welfare ser vices. The chaos of the So-
viet collapse and market reform impoverished many, and although poverty has 
declined in recent years, it is still high in Kyrgyzstan. Substantial income in e-
qual ity exists in both countries, indicating that while some families have become 
impoverished, others have thrived in the new market economies. The income 
in e qual ity statistic in Table 6.2 is the Gini coeffi cient, which has a scale ranging 
from zero, indicating perfect equality, to 100, indicating perfect in e qual ity. Most 
recently Kazakhstan had a score of 29 and Kyrgyzstan a score of 36. For com-
parison, Sweden, a country known for low income in e qual ity, has a score of 25, 
and the United States, where recent media coverage indicates growing income 
in e qual ity, has a score of 41.3 In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the fi nancially suc-
cessful have been able to help members of their extended families. Let us con-
sider an example from a village in Kazakhstan and a city in Kyrgyzstan.
A Successful Rural  House hold
The fi rst case of someone who is thriving in the post- Soviet era is Kanat, Mar-
zhan’s uncle. He is one of four private farmers in the village and its environs who 
3. Data are from World Bank, “World Databank,”  http:// databank .worldbank .org /ddp /home 
.do (accessed December 19, 2013). The data are from 2009 for the Central Asian countries and from 
2000 for the others. These are the latest data available.
TABLE 6.1. Family from whom citizens have sought assistance in the past year 
with comparisons to other actors in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN
Any family member a 35 42
   Relative in country b 28 30
   Member of  house hold 13 19
   Relative outside country 3 2
Any state actor c 19 24
Any market or societal actor d 16 14
Note: n = 1,200 for Kazakhstan and 1,199 for Kyrgyzstan. A portion of the 1,500 respondents in each country 
claimed that they had no problems or that describing their problems was too diffi cult and thus some 
respondents  were not asked this question about seeking assistance.
a Included in this category  were members of  house holds, relatives living in one’s own country, and relatives 
living in another country.
b The questionnaire specifi ed a relative who is not a member of the  house hold.
c This category includes government offi cials and the replies of a small number of respondents who specifi ed 
law enforcement, social security, and government employment offi ces as separate from “government offi cials.”
d This category includes banks, current and former employers, local and foreign companies where respondents 
do not work, religious institutions and leaders, foreign and local charitable organizations, labor  unions, 
aksakals, and educational institutions.
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have succeeded, not only in subsisting but also in building an agriculture busi-
ness. His work has changed dramatically since the Soviet era. As he put it, “Be-
fore, one worked to put in time; now, one works for oneself. Before, one worked 
9 to 5 and had off Sundays. Now, one works to survive.”4
In the Soviet era he was the head engineer and the second in command for 
production at the sovkhoz. His wife was working as an accountant at the sovk-
hoz. They had three children to support. After in de pen dence, as the economic 
crisis worsened, the sovkhoz began paying workers’ salaries in grain instead of 
money. Kanat realized that his and his family’s economic survival was at risk so 
he proposed to his brother, brother- in- law, and nephews— all working at the 
sovkhoz— that they begin a business together. The plan was to work together 
until each had suffi cient capital to begin his own business. The initial business 
was to keep the grain the sovkhoz paid them and then sell the seeds back to the 
sovkhoz, which lacked them. In return for the seeds, the sovkhoz provided them 
with land and equipment and the family and sovkhoz split the profi ts from the 
harvest. Other sovkhoz workers sold their grain immediately for cash or other 
goods instead of providing seed to the sovkhoz.
4. Author’s interview (#153), Kazakhstan, multiple dates in July and August 2001.
TABLE 6.2. Poverty and in e qual ity statistics from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
POVERTY STATISTICSa 
(PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION 
LIVING ON LESS THAN 2 USD PER DAY)
INCOME IN E QUAL ITYb 
(0 = PERFECT EQUALITY, 
100 = PERFECT IN E QUAL ITY)
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN
1993 18 30 33 54
1996 19 NA 35 NA
1998 NA 61 NA 36
1999 NA NA NA NA
2001 30 NA 41 NA
2002 22 67 35 32
2003 17 NA 34 NA
2004 14 39 32 35
2005 NA 46 NA 40
2006 3 32 31 39
2007 1 29 31 33
2008 1 21 29 37
2009 1 22 29 36
a Data are available online from World Bank, “World Databank,”  http:// databank .worldbank .org /ddp /home .do. 
This poverty statistic is called the “Poverty headcount ratio at $2 per day.” The latest data are presented. A 
missing year and NA indicate that data are not available for that year.
b The in e qual ity statistics are the Gini index. The Gini index mea sures income in e qual ity, with zero indicating 
perfect equality and 100 indicating perfect in e qual ity. A description of the calculation can be found at the 
website above. NA indicates that data are not available for that year.
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In the midst of this business venture, Kanat’s wife left the sovkhoz because she 
was not being paid and there was no heat. She was concerned about ruining her 
health and not being able to care for their animals and home.5 As she recounts, 
“There was no heat and often the electricity was turned off in the winter. We 
 were freezing and people  were getting bronchitis. . . .  We put in a stove and we 
sat there in the smoke.”6 Kanat left the sovkhoz to pursue the family business 
full- time in 2001. At that point he had not received his salary— or even been 
paid in grain— for three years. Without a salary, he and his extended family had 
lived off profi ts from the business venture, his mother’s pension, and food from 
their land and animals. He did not leave his job earlier because “there was the 
expectation that investors would come.”7
Kanat and his relatives put together approximately 8,000 USD of capital to 
establish a private farm. The capital came from the seed venture and their long- 
term savings. They invested the capital immediately so they did not lose it to in-
fl ation and devaluation. They purchased combines and tractors and rented ap-
proximately 1,000 hectares from the sovkhoz to add to the 42 hectares the family 
had received through privatization. The business includes a 1,000 hectare grain 
fi eld, 400 hectares of which are planted in wheat to sell, 100 of which are planted 
in barley for animal feed, and the remaining 500 that must rest every other year. 
The grain fi eld brings in 5,000– 10,000 USD per year depending on the snowfall 
and thus the moisture in the ground; the fi eld is not irrigated.8 This money is 
used to invest in the business: equipment to clean the grain and ware houses to 
store the grain have been purchased. It will be necessary to have pesticides 
sprayed from a plane because dust smut is slowly working its way across the 
5. Their children  were fourteen, eigh teen, and nineteen at the time, so they did not require 
much care. However, she was responsible for preparing the food and maintaining the farm house, 
which today requires her to work from 7:00 each morning until 10:30 at night, except for a nap after 
lunch, which everyone takes. Those minimal con ve niences that had existed to help her in the Soviet 
era are now worn out or shuttered. For example, her Soviet- era butter churn had broken and now 
twice a day, after milking the family’s cows, she makes butter as well as sour cream and kurut, a hard- 
candy- sized cylinder of milk and salt, by hand. Preparing food takes most of her day because she 
begins almost every dish from the basic ingredients, such as freshly slaughtered chicken or lamb. 
Only bread is purchased. She also cares for thirteen chickens, many chicks, three mature cows, two 
calves, a turkey, two cats, and three dogs; burns the paper from the latrine; cleans chicken excrement 
from the breezeway, where the family eats and socializes; and maintains the many courtyards.
6. Author’s interview (#154), Kazakhstan, multiple dates in July and August 2001
7. Author’s interview (#153), Kazakhstan, multiple dates in July and August 2001.
8. In addition to harvesting grain, the farmer has cleaned grain for acquaintances in return for 
money or the promise of part of their future harvest. However, often the contract is broken, typically 
because the harvest is poor. In one case he is suing to get property from the person who owes him. 
The lawyer will get 10 percent of the claim whether he wins or loses. “Before people looked negatively 
at [lawsuits], but now it is just the times. . . .  People are accustomed to it.” Author’s interview (#153), 
Kazakhstan, multiple dates in July and August 2001.
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fi elds and reducing yield in those areas. Approximately 1,000 USD per year is 
spent to maintain a new livestock venture, designed to protect against bad grain 
harvests; however, this venture is not yet profi table.
SUPPORT FOR REL ATIV ES
In addition to the livestock venture, the earnings from the grain fi eld must sup-
port a large number of people. The grain fi eld provides income for Kanat, who 
manages the business, and the other four members of his  house hold. The business 
also pays a salary to his brother who oversees the grain fi eld, and it supports his 
brother- in- law who looks after the livestock, enabling them to provide for their 
own families. Kanat also employs fi ve people to work in the fi elds, most of them 
relatives, including a nephew who works as a tractor operator. From March to 
November he employs another fi ve people, including his nephew’s wife. Relatives 
receive a salary and some of the profi t, and nonrelatives are paid based on the 
number of hectares they work. In addition to his brother- in- law, two other people 
work with the livestock on an hourly basis.
The support of relatives only begins with regular employment of them. 
Kanat’s wife emphasized his generosity, saying “It is best that I am not involved 
in the business because I would scold him for helping relatives.”9 This assis-
tance has included paying off a past, steep debt incurred by his brother during a 
ten- year period when he left the family. With the wife’s blessing their  house hold 
has also given a cow to her sister- in- law who lives in another village and will pro-
vide room and board to her nephew who will attend a nearby technical school. 
She gives old clothes to her niece and her niece’s family who live in a neighboring 
village. I also witnessed the farmer frequently giving relatives rides to and from 
the raion center twenty minutes away by car.
AVOIDING CORRUPTION
When assistance from a relative is in the form of income, credit, or employment, 
an individual can avoid engaging in corrupt practices with government offi cials. 
Let us consider in more detail the case of Marzhan, the farmer’s niece, whose 
comment about not liking to give bribes began the book. In many ways, she is a 
typical rural resident: she and her husband Temir, ages forty and forty- two at the 
time of the interview, no longer work at the sovkhoz. Without their sovkhoz sala-
ries, they are left with a small benefi t of 470 tenge per month she receives for 
having many children. Temir has also been able to secure a state benefi t of 750 
tenge per month per child because he is unemployed; however, he has not re-
ceived the payments for three months. So, in a month when they receive their 
9. Author’s interview (#154), Kazakhstan, multiple dates in July and August 2001.
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benefi t payments they have 3,000 tenge in income or approximately 23 USD.10 
This amount can buy them potatoes and low- quality fl our and cover expenses 
for their one cow for the month. This does not cover many other expenses. A 
healthier, more varied diet would require additional funds. Their few chickens, 
from which they eat eggs and eventually meat, each cost 417 tenge per month to 
care for. A sheep, which they have not been able to afford, costs 7,000 tenge and 
the meat can last a month if stretched. Carrots for a month cost 120 tenge. Other 
 house hold and personal goods must also be purchased periodically. The most ba-
sic adult shoes cost 1,500 tenge, boots 2,500 tenge, and a coat 1,000– 2,500 tenge. 
A bar of soap costs 35– 100 tenge.
Like all villagers, Marzhan and her family must pay for ser vices that  were free 
or highly subsidized in the Soviet era. Electricity and gas cost more.11 Medical 
ser vices are no longer free and food and linens typically must be brought from 
home to those who are hospitalized. Treatment for hepatitis B, a common ail-
ment in the village, costs about 3 USD per day, according to my calculations.12 
The niece explained how she and her family avoid going to the hospital and doctor, 
and villagers go without teeth. “Now we are afraid of getting sick,” she added.13 
Fear of the expense of falling ill was a common sentiment in the village.
Primary and secondary education is offi cially free, but parents, including 
Marzhan and her husband, must pay for textbooks as well as supply coal for 
heating buildings and paint for renovations. The sovkhoz no longer pays for 
graduates to study at universities and technical schools in Almaty. Those gradu-
ates with the highest scores on entrance examinations will be awarded a govern-
ment grant, but most must pay for all the expenses of a higher education.
Entertainment, while not essential for survival, can be important to commu-
nity relations and the fi ght against substance abuse, yet this also comes at a price 
now. The village club, subsidized by the sovkhoz, once offered shows, concerts, 
10. They have slightly more money at their disposal in the spring when they sell extra milk from 
their cow.
11. The village does not have gas because some residents did not pay. The private gas company 
reacted by cutting ser vice to the village as it is not profi table to provide only some residents with gas. 
Phone ser vice is an additional expense, 250 tenge per month, or approximately 2 USD, plus the cost 
of calls outside the area. Marzhan and her husband opt to have phone ser vice because their son will 
soon study in the provincial capital, an hour and a half away by car. Unlike other utilities, phone ser-
vice was limited in the Soviet era because of a shortage and thus long waits for ser vice. Water was free 
in the Soviet era and it is basically free now. Water from  house hold pumps, used for animals and 
people, is free. Water from the village canal, which is used to water gardens, comes at nominal cost. 
Residents order canal water in advance for a certain time and the canal is opened. The fee goes to the 
salary of the man who operates the canal.
12. Kanat’s son received a diagnosis of hepatitis B the day after I arrived. I was privy to discus-
sions about purchasing medications and I witnessed the food preparation.
13. Author’s interview (#161), Kazakhstan, July 22, 2001.
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and fi lms but has now been turned into a private disco that charges for admis-
sion. The sovkhoz also no longer provides vacations.
One expense residents do not have to worry about is rent or mortgages. 
Through the privatization program people could buy their own homes for low 
prices and most  were able to do so. However, the sovkhoz no longer pays for 
home repairs as it did in the Soviet era.
Like typical villagers, Marzhan, her husband, and their four children have 
coped with the lack of employment and suffi cient income by living off their 
land. Besides a cow and some chickens, they have a calf and a  horse, although the 
latter is too old to provide milk or transportation.14 They also have a garden. 
However, this approach is not adequate for covering all of their expenses, so, like 
other villagers, Marzhan looked for help outside their  house hold. As described in 
the preceding chapter, the mosque does not have resources to help her, no char-
ities exist in the village, charities in the raion capital neither provide the assis-
tance she needs nor include her in the target population, and the village akim 
turned her away. Then she decided to apply to the raion credit program, which 
could enable her to begin an entrepreneurial venture. However, she learned that 
others in the raion had been offering a bribe in order to obtain credit.
Unlike many villagers, Marzhan, however, did not have to engage in corrup-
tion because she had a fi nancially successful relative to whom she could turn for 
help. Her uncle Kanat hired her husband Temir to do seasonal work, the money 
from which will enable her son to obtain a higher education. When Marzhan’s 
 house hold expenses exceed her income, Kanat helps out by giving her some 
money. “My husband does not love that,”15 she explains, but it has enabled 
them to survive. Kanat has also indirectly helped them with employment and 
income by offering advice. He advised her to try to secure an early pension for 
her husband because he did dangerous work during the Soviet era. He also rec-
ommended that she and her husband sue for their salaries from the sovkhoz, as 
approximately fi fteen former employees have done.
A Successful Urban  House hold
The second example of thriving in the post- Soviet era is a family living in a city 
in Kyrgyzstan. The father, Omurbek, had made a career in the Soviet party- 
government, serving as a town leader and later a republic- level offi cial. As the 
economy began to change under Mikhail Gorbachev, Omurbek became involved 
in business, acting as a middleman between farmers and bazaar merchants. His 
14. Kazakhs drink  horse milk as well as cow milk.
15. Author’s interview (#161), Kazakhstan, July 22, 2001.
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wife, Ainura, initially continued to work as a manager in a state- run ser vice in-
dustry. She lost her job when the fi rm where she was working was purchased by 
a foreign investor who downsized. Ainura searched for work for two months, 
but because she lived in a city, she was eventually able to fi nd a job again, even 
in the same industry. Most recently she invested the capital they had accrued to 
leave her post as a manager and become the own er and operator of a business in 
the same industry. The family accumulated capital from their pensions and sala-
ries as well as another venture; they renovated two apartments, which they rent, 
often to foreigners, for a relatively high price.
SUPPORT FOR REL ATIV ES
Over the years, Omurbek and Ainura’s fi nancial success has enabled them to 
support their own four children, now grown, as well as their extended family. 
Recently they have provided money to a daughter whose husband was not phys-
ically able to work. Another way they have indirectly boosted the income of ex-
tended family is by providing free or subsidized housing in the city. Many rural 
and small- town residents in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have sought work in the 
cities, but fi nding housing can be diffi cult. As the villager Marzhan explained, 
“To move to the city you need money for a home and connections to get a job.”16 
Omurbek and Ainura provided a room to a niece who came from a small town 
for employment; orders dried up at the factory where she was working because 
state purchasing guarantees had ended. The couple will allow a grandson to live 
in one of their apartments when he studies at the university in the city. His own 
town does not offer higher education.
AVOIDING CORRUPTION
The effect of the family’s resources on decisions about corruption is particularly 
evident from the behavior of one of their daughters, Cholpon. In her twenties 
Cholpon was hunting for a job. She had purposely narrowed her search to posi-
tions that did not require paying a bribe or using a connection. She avoided 
government divisions where applicants bought their jobs. She even rejected the 
idea of asking for a position from one of her brothers, who managed a type of 
government offi ce notorious for selling positions in the former Soviet  Union 
and, before his tenure, in Kyrgyzstan. Cholpon also did not apply to interna-
tional organizations where locals had control of hiring and had decided to hire 
based on bribes and connections instead of qualifi cations. Those who worked in 
or with this sector could easily identify these organizations, and she sought their 
advice. In one case, an international or ga ni za tion was establishing a new pro-
16. Author’s interview (#161), Kazakhstan, July 22, 2001.
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gram and the head, a local man, hired only his relatives to fi ll the second- tier 
positions. A woman in her forties with signifi cant experience working in the 
Kyrgyzstani government with international organizations recounted a similar rev-
elation. After losing her government job following the ouster of President Askar 
Akavev in 2005, she considered applying for positions with international organi-
zations. In one case where the job description essentially matched her résumé, a 
friend who worked with the or ga ni za tion revealed to her that the search was 
bogus and the director, a local, had already designated relatives to hire.
How could Cholpon manage to avoid corruption in her job search? She had a 
back- up position that she had obtained legitimately but with the help of her 
family’s resources. In the early in de pen dence period her parents had used their 
growing capital to send her to one of the best schools in the city and provide her 
with extra instruction in En glish. This preparation made it possible for Cholpon 
to gain admission to a well- respected Eu ro pe an university. Her family’s re-
sources made it possible for her to cover the expenses of attending. With this 
education, Cholpon then secured a position with a multinational based in the 
Eu ro pe an country. A family tragedy brought her home to consider the possibil-
ity of living and working in Kyrgyzstan; however, she could be selective in her 
search because the multinational was encouraging her to return. Furthermore, 
her language skills, Eu ro pe an education, and impressive experience— resulting 
from her family’s resources (as well as her own hard work)— made it likely that 
Cholpon would be a top contender for a job where qualifi cations matter.
Values and Corruption
A closer examination of the situations of Marzhan and Cholpon reveals that they 
avoid corruption because they have the resources to do so; they are not morally 
superior to the average person in their country. Describing the distribution of 
sovkhoz equipment as the farm was failing, Marzhan commented, “We do not 
have such money,” to explain why she would not offer a bribe.17 She would con-
sider giving a bribe if she had the money, but her uncle does not provide money 
for bribes, only seasonal work for her husband and emergency funds for their 
 house hold. Although willing to engage in corruption, Marzhan can usually avoid 
it because of her uncle’s fi nancial success and generosity. Cholpon is also like the 
average person in that she will engage in corruption when no other options exist. 
In one situation corruption was the family’s only option, but they did not realize 
it at the time and later regretted not having offered a bribe. Cholpon did not 
17. Ibid.
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make the fi nal cut for a study- abroad program because the locals managing the 
pro cess for the foreign or ga ni za tion switched the list of fi nalists based on who 
paid bribes and had connections. Her mother, Ainura, explained that she would 
have paid a bribe but she did not realize one was required because it was a West-
ern program. In her current job search, however, Cholpon can act on her prefer-
ence not to engage in corruption because she has other options thanks to her 
family’s resources.
Ethnic Minorities
To what extent do members of ethnic minority groups, particularly the relatively 
large number of Slavs in each country, rely on family assistance and, more broadly, 
how do they fi t into this argument about corruption? Slavs depend less on family 
and informal government assistance because they have small, dispersed families 
and few connections with government offi cials. With fewer kin, they are less likely 
to have a well- off family member who can provide them with resources. How-
ever, they also lack an ethnic connection to government offi cials, so they are less 
likely to approach them for assistance in the fi rst place and thus less likely to 
engage in corruption. Instead, Slavs rely on their own individual efforts to meet 
their basic needs.
Slavs constitute a signifi cant portion of the populations in each country. Slavs 
make up 27 percent of Kazakhstan’s population and 9 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s. 
The category includes Rus sians, Germans, and Ukrainians. Rus sians are most 
numerous, composing 24 percent and 8 percent of the populations of Kazakh-
stan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively.18
Family assistance is less common among Slavs because they have smaller 
 house holds and fewer relatives nearby. As Irina, a Rus sian woman in the southern 
village of Kazakhstan, explained, “Kazakhs have many relatives and help each 
other. Many businesses are family businesses so they hire their relatives and help 
each other. Kazakhs have an advantage because of these relative connections.”19 
18. The category includes only Rus sians, Ukrainians, and Germans, not other Slavs, due to the 
information available. Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “The Results of the Na-
tional Population Census in 2009,” 2010,  http:// www .eng .stat .kz /perepis _nasl (accessed December 
19, 2013); National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Population and Housing Census 
of the Kyrgyz Republic of 2009 Book I: Main Social and Demographic Characteristics of Population 
and Number of Housing Units,” 2009,  http:// unstats .un .org /unsd /demographic /sources /census 
/2010 _phc /Kyrgyzstan /A5 -2PopulationAndHousingCensusOfTheKyrgyzRepublicOf2009 .pdf (accessed 
December 19, 2013).
19. Author’s interview (#158), Kazakhstan, July 19, 2001.
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By contrast, Slavic couples typically have fewer children than Kazakh or Kyrgyz 
couples, so Slavs have fewer offspring living at home or nearby. Moreover, be-
cause of Soviet job assignment policies that sent Slavs to work throughout the 
Soviet  Union, especially in technical and managerial positions, only parts of Slavic 
families live in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, and the rest live in other post- Soviet 
republics. For example, a typical middle- aged Slav will have a spouse, one parent,20 
and two children in the country, but all her other relatives will be in other coun-
tries. The data in Table 6.3 refl ect this situation, with smaller percentages of Slavs 
seeking assistance from  house hold members and relatives within the countries.
The difference in reliance on family, between the titular group and Slavs, is 
greater in Kyrgyzstan because of the lower level of urbanization there. In Kyrgyz-
stan only 9 percent of Slavs, but 22 percent of Kyrgyz, turn to  house hold mem-
bers for help, and only 17 percent of Slavs, but 32 percent of Kyrgyz, turn to rela-
tives inside their country. In Kazakhstan, we see almost no difference between 
Slavs (12 percent) and Kazakhs (14 percent) in terms of  house hold members. The 
difference between Slavs (25 percent) and Kazakhs (31 percent) regarding rela-
tives in the country is smaller than the difference in Kyrgyzstan. The dissimilarity 
between countries can be explained by the additional 20 percent of the popula-
tion of Kyrgyzstan that lives in rural areas compared to the population of Kazakh-
stan. Rural titular families tend to be considerably larger than urban titular fam-
ilies. The higher proportion of large titular families in Kyrgyzstan accounts for the 
greater difference between Slavs and Kyrgyz and the smaller difference between 
Slavs and Kazakhs in terms of relying on  house hold members. Overall, more 
Kyrgyz have a larger number of relatives from whom to seek assistance.
Migration accounts for another difference between the two countries— the 
smaller percentage of Slavs in Kyrgyzstan, compared to those in Kazakhstan, 
who seek assistance from relatives within the country.21 In both Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan large numbers of Rus sians have migrated; however, more have left 
Kyrgyzstan. Ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan in 1990 and 2010, and greater eco-
nomic diffi culties, as compared to Kazakhstan, have meant that a larger percent-
age of Rus sians have emigrated from Kyrgyzstan. Approximately 40 percent of 
the Rus sians who once lived in Kyrgyzstan but only 20 percent of the Rus sians 
who earlier lived in Kazakhstan have left. As a result Rus sians in Kyrgyzstan are 
20. It is common for the middle- aged individual’s mother, but not father, to be living because 
male life expectancy is signifi cantly lower than female life expectancy in the former Soviet  Union.
21. It cannot be attributed to greater rates of mixed parentage. For example, there are not more 
people of Rus sian and Kyrgyz heritage in Kyrgyzstan who are part of large extended Kyrgyz families. 
Of the survey respondents, only one Slav in Kyrgyzstan, and two in Kazakhstan,  were of mixed eth-
nicity, also being members of the titular ethnicity.
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less likely than Rus sians in Kazakhstan to have a relative to turn to for assistance. 
In many cases not the entire family, but instead members of the younger genera-
tion, left in search of economic opportunities elsewhere. Older Rus sians felt that 
it was too late to begin a new life elsewhere.
As an illustration of migration in these countries, consider the situation in the 
village in southern Kazakhstan. In the Soviet era, seventeen ethnic groups  were 
represented in the village of 3,850 residents. Today, of the 3,300 residents, only 
two German families remain, and Irina’s family is the only Rus sian family I en-
countered. Irina described why Rus sians migrated from the village: “No one 
came and said, ‘You are Rus sian and you should leave.’ But people feared war 
and violence like there was in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. . . .  People  were afraid 
that their children would be shot. . . .  Sometimes when people are drunk they 
will say, ‘You are living on my land.’ . . .  If there  were work, people would not 
leave.”22 Irina and her family had decided not to migrate for the time being, in 
part, because they  were under consideration for jobs in Almaty in the fi eld of 
veterinary science. Like many other members of ethnic minority groups, Irina 
moved to the village on a job assignment. She grew up in Rus sia and obtained a 
degree in veterinary science there, and then was assigned to work in the village. 
Unusually, her Rus sian husband was born in the village; his father had settled 
there on his way home from fi ghting at the front against the Japa nese. For the 
time being, Irina and her husband have opted to try to live on their land. As 
she explained, “When we went on vacation in Rus sia, we began to feel like it was 
time to go home. And, when we came back  here, this felt like home.”23 So besides 
the job prospects, the family also has emotional reasons to stay. Yet, they have no 
relatives in the country.
22. Author’s interview (#158), Kazakhstan, July 19, 2001.
23. Ibid.
TABLE 6.3. Members of ethnic groups who have sought assistance from 
 house hold members and relatives in the country in the past year in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan (percentage of respondents, rounded)
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN
KAZAKHS SLAVS KYRGYZ SLAVS
Member of  house hold 14 12 22 9
Relative in country a 31 25 32 17
Note: In Kazakhstan, 550 Kazakhs and 544 Slavs are included. The numbers for Kyrgyzstan are 742 Kyrgyz and 
256 Slavs. Slavs included Rus sians, Belarusians, Germans, Poles, and Ukrainians. Most of the Slavs  were 
Rus sian.
a The questionnaire specifi ed a relative who is not a member of the  house hold.
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Although Slavs in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not have much extended 
family in the countries, few of them seek help from relatives in other countries. 
In fact, they do not rely on relatives outside their countries much more than eth-
nic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz do. In Kazakhstan 4 percent of Slavs and in Kyrgyzstan 
5 percent sought assistance from relatives in the year prior to the survey com-
pared to 1 percent of the titular ethnic groups in each country.24 Slavs in Ka-
zakhstan and Kyrgyzstan explained that, like them, their relatives outside of the 
countries  were also struggling eco nom ical ly and that receiving material goods 
from them through the mail was diffi cult.
The reduced availability of assistance from relatives within Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan does not propel Slavs into corrupt exchanges. Policies in the Soviet 
and especially in de pen dence period promoted titular nationalities in govern-
ment. As a result, ethnic minorities hold fewer government positions, so using 
connections based on ethnic identity is more diffi cult for Slavs. Also because 
Slavs have fewer relatives, a family member in a government position is a rarity. 
Nontitular groups are less likely to turn to government offi cials. Only 12 percent 
of non- Kazakh survey respondents sought assistance last year in Kazakhstan 
compared to 20 percent of Kazakh respondents. In Kyrgyzstan, the fi gures are 13 
percent and 30 percent, respectively.
Lacking larger numbers of relatives and ethnic ties to government offi cials, 
Slavs rely more on themselves. Larger percentages of Slavic respondents, 38 per-
cent in Kazakhstan and 49 percent in Kyrgyzstan, selected “myself” as a place to 
turn for assistance. Compared to members of the titular ethnic groups, 11 per-




The importance of family, even to ethnic minorities, is further underscored 
when we compare reliance on family with reliance on friends, acquaintances, 
neighbors, and coworkers. Individuals do seek assistance from friends, acquain-
tances, neighbors, and coworkers;25 however, turning to nonrelatives for assis-
tance is considerably less common than turning to relatives. This is evident from 
24. The percentages of respondents  were rounded. In Kazakhstan, 550 Kazakhs and 544 Slavs 
are included. The numbers for Kyrgyzstan are 742 Kyrgyz and 256 Slavs. Slavs included Rus sians, 
Belarusians, Germans, Poles, and Ukrainians. Most of the Slavs  were Rus sian.
25. No signifi cant differences are evident between members of titular and nontitular ethnicities 
in terms of seeking assistance from friends, acquaintances, neighbors, and coworkers.
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the data in Table 6.4. In Kazakhstan 35 percent sought assistance from any fam-
ily member, whereas only 12 percent sought help from a neighbor, friend, ac-
quaintance, or coworker. The respective fi gures are 42 percent and 9 percent for 
Kyrgyzstan. Assistance from friends and acquaintances is most sought after and 
from coworkers least sought after, with help from neighbors falling in- between.
Some friends, acquaintances, neighbors, and coworkers can address the prob-
lem of lack of money. They typically provide employment or assistance with en-
trepreneurial ventures, sometimes including credit. Recall how the mining stu-
dents at the university in central Kazakhstan had used friends, acquaintances, 
and neighbors, as well as relatives, to fi nd work. Employment assistance is not 
limited to those fresh from university or technical school. A former mine admin-
istrator in the same province started a cable tele vi sion company and hired many 
of his former workers from the mine. Finding employment through this ap-
proach, however, is not successful for those who do not have friends, acquain-
tances, and neighbors who can provide this type of help. Not having friends, ac-
quaintances, and neighbors who could provide work was a common refrain I 
heard from the unemployed.26 Furthermore, the unemployed do not have co-
workers to whom they can turn for assistance.
When friends, acquaintances, and neighbors cannot provide a job, they may 
be able to help people start a business instead. Sulushash, the successful auto 
parts entrepreneur in central Kazakhstan, described how she and her husband 
began their business with the help of others. An acquaintance in the bazaar 
agreed to sell the husband some auto parts, which he could then resell at a slightly 
higher price. This work did not require any start- up capital, and it allowed him 
to learn which products would sell. Sulushash later joined him in working for 
the acquaintance. However, she noted that “You cannot earn real money work-
ing for someone  else. With your own business you can earn more.”27 So with the 
help of their former boss and other acquaintances, they began their own auto 
parts distribution business. The former boss took the couple on buying trips to 
Rus sia and gave them advice. “We are like his graduates,” Sulushash explained.28 
Other acquaintances lent them money at 5– 7 percent per day. This was a steep 
26. Another problem was that even friends, acquaintances, and neighbors who had the capacity 
to offer a job  were unlikely to work in the sphere in which the unemployed person has been trained. 
For example, an unemployed music teacher in central Kazakhstan explained how her acquaintances 
and friends, as well as family, work in accounting and trade so they cannot help her. As she explained, 
“I do not have any relatives or acquaintances in other spheres of work. . . .  All the good jobs are 
through acquaintances. Many are family businesses.” The result is that many people work outside 
their area of expertise. From the employer’s perspective, hiring friends, acquaintances, neighbors, 
and family can result in poor workers. Author’s interview (#210), Kazakhstan, June 13, 2001.
27. Author’s interview (#195), Kazakhstan, June 7, 2001.
28. Ibid.
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rate but the only way for them to obtain capital. Other entrepreneurs also de-
scribed how they had obtained credit from acquaintances. The percentage is very 
high, but there is no collateral requirement— which is the main obstacle for ur-
ban entrepreneurs seeking loans from banks. A Rus sian acquaintance also 
helped Sulushash and her husband by letting them pay only 50 percent of the 
costs of goods and paying the rest on their next buying trip.
Sulushash described how this assistance to entrepreneurs is not unusual. 
“People help each other at the market, so money does not sit but grows. . . .  If 
your car breaks down, you use a friend’s and go together [to purchase goods]. 
When three or four people work together, everyone’s position improves. . . .  It is 
hard for one to improve alone.”29 This cooperation occurs among members of 
different ethnic groups, including Kazakhs, Rus sians, and Ukrainians, she ex-
plained. Sulushash and her husband have now begun to help other entrepre-
neurs. “We all began with nothing. It is hard to refuse people who have nothing, 
who have small children. A person may be good but cannot even earn a piece of 
bread. . . .  I am not afraid of competition. . . .  I do not need a private jet or a 
luxurious home.”30 They helped a neighbor who had three children and whose 
husband had lost his job and begun to drink. The couple set her up to distribute 
auto parts. In addition, Sulushash and her husband help those who have worked 
with them for about three years go out on their own.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
TABLE 6.4. Family and personal contacts from whom citizens have sought 
assistance in the past year in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN
FAMILY
Any family 35 42
Relative in country a 28 30
Member of  house hold 13 19
Relative outside country 3 2
PERSONAL CONTACT (NONFAMILY)





Note: n = 1,200 for Kazakhstan and 1,199 for Kyrgyzstan. A portion of the 1,500 respondents in each country 
claimed that they had no problems or that describing their problems was too diffi cult and thus some 
respondents  were not asked this question about seeking assistance.
a The questionnaire specifi ed a relative who is not a member of the  house hold.
b The questionnaire specifi ed friend who is not also a neighbor.
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Employment and business help more commonly comes from friends and ac-
quaintances than from neighbors, particularly in rural areas where neighbors 
face the same fi nancial challenges. As Irina, the Rus sian woman in the village in 
southern Kazakhstan, explained, “Life is more diffi cult in the village because it is 
hard to fi nd work. In the city you can go to a person’s home and ask to wash the 
fl oor. If you go to a neighbor  here and ask to wash the fl oor, she would laugh.”31 
Instead, neighbors provide a wide range of other assistance. Living on the farm 
in southern Kazakhstan, I saw neighbors sharing food, such as a delicacy made 
from pig fat, and providing free ser vices, such as giving a  ride to the raion capi-
tal, inoculating chickens, or cutting hair. Money and groceries are also common 
forms of assistance from neighbors. Irina explained, “There is a Rus sian proverb: 
‘You don’t buy a home, you buy a neighbor.’ ”32 At times she has lent 50 USD to 
a neighbor until he was able to harvest his grain or sell his goods at the bazaar. 
On other hand, she said, “There have been times when I could not lend someone 
20 tenge . . .  and we are not poor.”33 This assistance occurs in cities too. The 
urban couple, Omurbek and Ainura, frequently gave food to the children of an 
alcoholic neighbor in their apartment building and also provided money for the 
neighbor’s burial later. This assistance among neighbors occurs among all na-
tionalities. “Whether you lend to a person depends not on nationality, but on the 
decency of the person, on whether he will return it. There are no bad nationali-
ties, but there are bad people,” according to Irina.34 Friends, acquaintances, 
neighbors, and coworkers do lend a helping hand to each other, even though 
family is the most common place to turn for assistance.
The Roots of Success
For family, friends, neighbors, or any individual to provide employment, credit, 
or money— especially signifi cant sums of credit or money— they must have 
some means. This begs the question of how these individuals became fi nancially 
successful in the fi rst place. What is special about this small number of people 
who are thriving fi nancially? Did they, by any chance, use corrupt means to be-
come relatively wealthy? Use of illicit means would be ironic as it would mean 
that engaging in corruption enabled others to avoid it at a later date. What I 
found, however, is that corruption does not account for these individuals’ eco-
31. Author’s interview (#158), Kazakhstan, July 19, 2001.
32. Ibid.
33. Twenty tenge is approximately 15 U.S. cents. Author’s interview (#158), Kazakhstan, July 
19, 2001.
34. Ibid.
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nomic ascendance. Instead, being relatively young, holding a leadership position 
in the late Soviet era, and entering business either then or in the early in de pen-
dence period  were key factors.35
At the end of the Soviet era many of the people who are fi nancially successful 
today  were in their twenties to forties. The younger ones  were in university, and 
the older ones  were working in a variety of different fi elds. Age is an important 
characteristic in the sense that the people of these generations  were beyond 
childhood and well before retirement age, so they could not rely on parents or 
pensions for support. They needed to fi gure out how to succeed in the new eco-
nomic system.
Yet why did only a small number of those from these generations succeed fi -
nancially? They  were in positions of leadership in the late Soviet era, and these 
positions gave them resources, contacts, and experience that would be useful in 
the new economy.36 The younger people  were leaders of the Komsomol. For 
example, Sulushash, the auto parts distributor, was in her late twenties and head 
of her school’s Komsomol or ga ni za tion when the Soviet  Union collapsed. Other 
examples include the entrepreneurs Ivan, who began in construction, and Bolot-
bek, who began in shoe shining and haircutting. Those individuals at the older 
end of the age range held leadership positions at their workplaces. Muratkhan, 
the farmer described earlier in this chapter, worked as the head engineer and the 
35. Interestingly, in addition to these factors, being female makes one more likely to be an en-
trepreneur, although it does not necessarily mean one will succeed in business. As a local employee 
of an EBRD small business program explained, “Many women are in business, whereas men have 
not adapted. . . .  For men there is a kind of inertia. . . .  In the East a woman is brought up to care for 
her children, so she will take any work to earn a single kopeck because she needs to feed her chil-
dren.” Sulushash, the auto parts distributor, described how concern for the children motivated her to 
build on her husband’s experience working for someone in the bazaar to develop their own business. 
Talking about their three children, she explained “I needed to prepare the children, their education, 
their development, their psychological state.” She has used their earnings to send their children to a 
better school, buy them a computer, and send them on trips to the United States and France. She 
contrasted her personality with her husband’s: “I set a goal and fulfi ll it. I am not afraid.” She de-
scribed her husband as indecisive and risk averse. The idea of seeking credit upset him, she explained, 
because he was afraid they would lose their home. Author’s interview (#193), Kazakhstan, June 5, 
2001. Author’s interview (#195), Kazakhstan, June 7, 2001.
36. Future generations will not have the benefi t of these Soviet- era experiences to facilitate 
their entrepreneurial ventures and, in turn, support large numbers of relatives. One economic phe-
nomenon that is new in the post- Soviet era is labor migration; however, this does not hold the same 
long- term promise of enriching  house holds. Remittances do not endure in many cases. Migrants, 
typically young men, often establish new families in the countries where they work and abandon 
their wives and children in their homeland. Another common scenario is for migrants to return 
home after a relatively short period due to diffi culties fi nding jobs or because of racial and ethnic 
harassment or legal problems abroad. Time will tell whether enough young men continue to send 
money home and overcome these obstacles so that remittances will be an alternative to corruption 
for a signifi cant number of people. International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Migrants and the Eco-
nomic Crisis” (Bishkek: International Crisis Group, 2010).
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second in command for production— positions he characterized as comparable 
to being a company vice president— at the sovkhoz. The three other successful 
farmers in the village also had vice- president- like positions in the sovkhoz. 
Omurbek, the father in the successful urban  house hold, was a town leader and 
then a republic- level offi cial. Successful entrepreneurs also emerged from indus-
try. Nikolai, the successful store own er in a small town in central Kazakhstan was 
once a mine director.
The most clear- cut example of the use of resources from one’s position is 
Ivan, the entrepreneur who built his construction business out of the Komsomol 
housing program when he was a Komsomol leader. For older entrepreneurs, the 
higher salaries of leadership posts, when coupled with good savings practices, 
also meant that these individuals had some of their own capital to begin a busi-
ness, particularly if they began them before infl ation hit in the in de pen dence 
period. Contacts  were also important. Typically, the most helpful connections 
 were not with government offi cials but with small traders who could offer mar-
ket advice. Bolotbek, the former university Komsomol leader who began in shoe 
shining and haircutting, however, described how contact with local offi cials was 
benefi cial to establishing his business: he knew all the local offi cials, including 
information about illegal and amoral things they had done, so he could make 
demands of them. In such leadership positions, these future businesspeople also 
gained some helpful experience, even though the economy had changed dramati-
cally. For example, the former mine director explained his willingness to take a 
loan even on poor terms to begin his business, saying, “In the mines we  were also 
borrowing. Credit is always advantageous.”37
Another characteristic common to successful entrepreneurs is that many of 
them began their ventures early. Some started their businesses in the late Soviet 
or early in de pen dence era, whereas others began their businesses in later years 
but before they lost their formal employment. Sulushash, the auto parts distribu-
tor, Anara, the woman working in the bazaar, Ivan, the construction entrepre-
neur, and Muratkhan, the successful farmer, began their ventures in the late 
1980s or early 1990s. Some others, including, for example, the store own er Niko-
lai, began their businesses in the late 1990s, but early in the sense that their for-
mal employment had not yet dried up. This is signifi cant because even though 
the economic crisis of the 1990s had not decimated their fi elds they  were willing 
to take a risk with an entrepreneurial idea.
Entering business early meant that these individuals  were the fi rst to take ad-
vantage of opportunities. Ivan, the entrepreneur in central Kazakhstan who built 
apartment buildings, profi ted from the economic reforms in the late 1980s, as 
37. Author’s interview (#191), Kazakhstan, June 5, 2001.
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well as his Komsomol position. He was the fi rst to take advantage of the excess 
cash of enterprises and the need for housing. In the same region of Kazakhstan, 
Anara, described earlier as working at a technical institute, now has a successful 
business selling food in the bazaar because she seized an opportunity in the early 
1990s. At the technical institute where she worked, employees had to pay a per-
centage of their salaries in order to receive their wages in cash instead of coupons 
to use at a store. She accepted coupons so as to not lose a percentage and then 
found that she could obtain goods that  were in short supply at a store for miners. 
She then sold the goods at the end of the street near the institute and doubled her 
money. Anara expanded her business to sell in nearby sovkhozes and the city ba-
zaar. Kanat’s initial venture selling seeds back to the sovkhoz similarly took ad-
vantage of the state farm’s fi nancial crisis in order to earn income for his family.
Starting businesses relatively early and being the fi rst to take advantage of 
new opportunities also indicate specifi c personality traits. These fi nancially suc-
cessful individuals seem to be more willing to take risks. Many people have suf-
fered eco nom ical ly and some can identify opportunities, but only a smaller num-
ber have taken advantage of these opportunities, in part because of their leadership 
experience and resources but also because they  were not risk averse. An offi cial 
from a provincial small and medium- size business development offi ce in Kazakh-
stan explained this well: “Many fell into business. Many lost work with the end of 
the  union. . . .  [However], the fi rst wave of entrepreneurs left work on their own 
because they wanted to work in de pen dently. . . .  They  were the bravest individu-
als.” This was in 1989 to 1993, and many created businesses related to their for-
mal employment, as the construction entrepreneur, coupon schemer, and Kanat 
did. The offi cial continued, “The second wave occurred after the disintegration 
of the  union [in the mid- 1990s] when people lost work and industry stopped. . . . 
People  were forced into the bazaar.”38 Many of them struggled.
These successful entrepreneurs recounted how they  were unusual in the risks 
that they took. They also contrasted themselves to others who are not risk- takers, 
who continued in their formal jobs, and are now in more diffi cult situations. 
Anara, the former employee of the technical institute, explained, “It is harder for 
those who stayed because now they cannot fi nd different work.”39 Unlike most 
of his colleagues, Nikolai, the former mine director now store own er, chose to 
leave his job in 1998. Some had already been laid off but many continued to 
work at the mine, not receiving their salaries on time or receiving their salaries 
38. The latest trend is the third wave. “The third wave of people have studied business and en-
trepreneurship. They are not forced into business. . . .  These young people are studying with a par-
tic u lar goal in mind. . . .  They know where they are going.” Author’s interview (#205), Kazakhstan, 
June 11, 2001.
39. Author’s interview (#216), Kazakhstan, June 15, 2001.
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in- kind. Nikolai, the former director, described how he is different: “In the 
mines most people  were not initiators. There  were few leaders. . . .  The Soviet 
system discouraged leadership. . . .  Workers  were like screws. . . .  Put them in 
their place and they work. . . .  At the mine things  were always changing, and I 
was always solving problems. . . .  Therefore, I was more self- reliant and a person 
who takes initiative. . . .  I also knew I should feed my family.”40 Nikolai added 
how he read an article about a business school in Japan where students  were sent 
to different public places, like a store or the metro, and had to sing out loud. At 
fi rst he thought, “What is the point of this? What if I cannot sing? Now that I am 
in business I understand. I should be able to sing a song and I should not have a 
complex. I can sing that song anywhere. . . .  Few people can sing this song.”41 As 
a result of his willingness to take initiative and stand out, Nikolai is now in a bet-
ter position than his former colleagues. “I am breathing different air. . . .  I am 
much better off than my neighbor who continues to work in the mines. . . .  I am 
one of the richest people in town,” he explained.42 One mine director who did 
not leave on his own has been demoted to cleaning work at the mine. Mining 
workers who  were later laid off try to survive mostly by living off their small 
plots of land.
The personalities and experiences of these successful entrepreneurs can 
also be contrasted with those of unemployed people I interviewed. For exam-
ple a teacher in her forties in central Kazakhstan lost her job at a music school 
and has been looking for work. She described how the end of the Soviet em-
ployment system and start of the new economy  were not a good fi t for her. “For 
me a job assignment would be better. But, some people have more initiative 
than me.”43
Of the traits shared by the fi nancially successful individuals, Soviet- era lead-
ership positions offered the most potential for corruption. Studies have de-
scribed how po liti cal and economic leaders in the Soviet era used their positions 
to enrich themselves.44 Judging whether an economic behavior in this environ-
ment was corrupt, either by legal or cultural defi nitions, is diffi cult. In the late 
Soviet era when economic reforms  were outpacing the legal changes, it often was 
40. Author’s interview (#191), Kazakhstan, June 5, 2001.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Author’s interview (#210), Kazakhstan, June 13, 2001.
44. Andrew Scott Barnes, Owning Rus sia: The Struggle over Factories, Farms, and Power (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Marshall I. Goldman, The Piratization of Rus sia: Rus sian Reform 
Goes Awry (New York: Routledge, 2003); Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “From Soviet 
Nomenklatura to Rus sian Elite,” Europe- Asia Studies 48, no. 5 (1996), 711– 33. This is evoked by the 
term “nomenklatura privatization.” The nomenklatura  were the group of individuals in the Soviet 
 Union who fi lled top positions.
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not clear what economic behavior was illegal. From the perspective of Soviet 
citizens much of the new economic behavior, even that specifi cally allowed by 
law, violated ethics built upon de cades of Soviet prohibitions against buying and 
selling for a profi t. As individuals in post- Soviet countries have become more 
accustomed to new economic behaviors and more familiar with new laws, their 
assessments of what is corrupt have changed.
Whether by legal or cultural defi nitions of corruption, fi nancially successful 
individuals in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan did not accrue benefi ts from their po-
sitions illicitly in most cases. Spending one’s salary or drawing on one’s work 
experience to start a business is not corruption. By contrast, using state resources 
for private gain is evidence of corruption. The entrepreneur who began in hous-
ing might fall into this category; however, the legal framework at the time when 
this entrepreneur transformed the Komsomol housing program into his own 
private company was too murky to make a legal judgment about corruption. 
Culturally, the interpretation is clear- cut with locals not viewing the conversion 
as corrupt.45 An unambiguous example of corruption is the former university 
Komsomol leader’s use of blackmail threats to help build his business. The for-
mer example is more common than the latter, and overall, youth, Soviet- era 
leadership positions, and early ventures, not corruption, best explain the fi nan-
cial success of these individuals.
Relatively well- off individuals in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have offered oth-
ers, mainly family members, an alternative to engaging in corruption. By assist-
ing with employment, income, and credit, they enable their family members to 
meet their needs without approaching government offi cials with offers of bribes 
and other favors. Those who do not have fi nancially successful relatives must 
resort to corruption. Markets, religious organizations, and secular charities also 
cannot provide them with the goods and ser vices they need because market re-
form under the conditions of a legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention 
and weak market- enhancing institutions has limited these institutions’ re-
sources. Market- enhancing institutions are particularly important to making 
alternative sources of essential goods and ser vices available and stemming cor-
ruption: the analysis of ninety- two countries demonstrated that corruption is 
lower where market- enhancing institutions are effective. This global analysis 
also highlights that the problem of market reform promoting corruption is not 
specifi c to Central Asia; it exists wherever there is a history of substantial state 
45. Of course, their evaluations are now colored by his generosity toward his employees and his 
charitable acts.
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economic intervention and weak or absent market- enhancing institutions. Many 
countries of the world have these attributes, thus making a solution to petty cor-
ruption all the more critical. Establishing strong market- enhancing institutions 
as well as reducing restrictions on societal groups may be effective anticorruption 






Providing ordinary citizens with alternatives to corruption can be an effective 
anticorruption strategy. To the extent that markets, groups in society, and family 
members can meet individuals’ basic needs, individuals are less likely to engage 
in corruption with government offi cials. Creating market- enhancing institutions 
and reducing restrictions on groups in society can increase the availability of 
essential goods and ser vices from these other sources.
These recommendations for reducing corruption depart in vital ways from 
existing anticorruption strategies. The new recommendations rest on a funda-
mental observation: corruption is a two- party exchange that can be a coping 
strategy for citizens, not just a scheme for offi cials to boost their income. For 
these reasons, it is important to determine how to infl uence citizens’, rather than 
just government offi cials’, calculations about engaging in corruption. Other ap-
proaches propose reducing resources available to offi cials, decreasing their dis-
cretion, and increasing their accountability. However, these strategies do not ad-
dress the root problem of corruption to meet everyday needs: citizens must be 
able to acquire essential resources through means other than illicit exchanges 
with government offi cials. Reducing the resources available to offi cials does not 
guarantee that substitute resources are available elsewhere. In fact, it only guar-
antees that competition, and thus incentives to engage in illicit exchanges for 
those remaining government resources, will be greater. Substitute resources 
need to be available from the market, groups in society, or extended family in 
order to stem corruption. Regarding the expansion of substitute resources, the 
outlook for Central Asia, the geographic focus of this book, remains rather bleak.
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Acknowledge the Incentive 
of Ordinary Citizens
Because ordinary citizens, not just government offi cials, have an incentive to 
engage in corruption, an anticorruption strategy has to address each side’s mo-
tivations. Focusing on both sets of incentives would enable a two- front attack 
on corruption. Unfortunately, existing recommendations concentrate exclu-
sively on infl uencing the incentive of government offi cials.1 The recommenda-
tions are directly or indirectly derived from scholar Robert Klitgaard’s formula 
in Box 7.1.
Box 7.1 Robert Klitgaard’s Formula
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion − Accountability
Source: Robert E. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 75.
Specifi cally, these approaches devise means to reduce offi cials’ monopoly on re-
sources, decrease their discretion, or increase their accountability.
Advocates of combating corruption by reducing government offi cials’ mo-
nopoly on resources propose downsizing the state. Ideas include decreasing 
public spending, abolishing licenses, and reducing or eliminating government 
programs.2 Advocates suggest that with fewer resources government offi cials will 
have fewer opportunities to engage in corruption. This approach is likely to be 
helpful in circumscribing grand corruption. In fact, the statistical fi nding in this 
book that market reform diminishes corruption to some extent supports this idea. 
However, these recommendations to downsize the state wrongly imply that citi-
zens do not need government ser vices. Governments have to provide certain regu-
latory and large- scale functions. Moreover, those who advocate downsizing the 
state overlook the fact that government offi cials still effectively have a monopoly 
if markets and groups in society cannot generate and distribute substitute re-
sources. Downsizing the state will not reduce corruption to meet essential needs 
if people have no other sources for the goods and ser vices they require. On the 
1. Susan  Rose- Ackerman advocates for this to be the focus, in Corruption and Government: 
Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5.
2. Anders Åslund, How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, Rus sia, and Central Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 252;  Rose- Ackerman, 
Corruption and Government, 39.
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contrary, downsizing will only increase competition and thus corruption for re-
maining state resources.
Recommendations to increase constraints on government offi cials aim to re-
duce their discretion and thus limit their opportunities to engage in corruption. 
These constraints include laws to combat corruption, effective law enforcement, 
an in de pen dent judiciary, a separation of powers, and anticorruption commis-
sions or offi cials who report only to a legislature or an executive.3 Yet this ap-
proach does not acknowledge that not only government offi cials but also ordinary 
citizens have an incentive to engage in corruption. This strategy does nothing to 
address the problem of limited substitute resources to meet everyday needs. 
Constraints are likely to discourage some government offi cials from accepting 
bribes and other favors that citizens offer, yet they are not likely to signifi cantly 
reduce corruption.
Reducing offi cials’ discretion is not even essential if they have no incentive to 
engage in corruption. For this reason, some scholars and policymakers have ad-
vocated increasing government offi cials’ salaries as a way to reduce corruption.4 
The thinking is that economic need encourages government offi cials to demand 
and accept bribes and other favors, and if their needs are met, then they will not 
engage in corruption. This approach does not tackle ordinary citizens’ economic 
needs and thus overlooks the fact that not only offi cials but also citizens can 
3. Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 200, 205, 208; Rasma Karklins, The System Made Me Do It: Cor-
ruption in Post- Communist Societies (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 108; Goran Klemenčič and 
Janez Stusek, “Specialised Anti- Corruption Institutions: Review of Models” (Or ga ni za tion for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, 2007);  Rose- Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 144– 62; 
World Bank, “Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate” (Washington, DC: 
World Bank 2000), 41– 44.
Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission is an example of an anticorruption agency that 
has worked effectively. It has successfully prosecuted more than one hundred top government offi -
cials, and it has recovered signifi cant state assets. Emil P. Bolongaita, “An Exception to the Rule? Why 
Indonesia’s Anti- Corruption Commission Succeeds Where Others Don’t—A Comparison with the 
Philippines’ Ombudsman,” U4 Anti- Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2010, 
 http:// www .cmi .no /publications /fi le /3765 -an -exception -to -the -rule .pdf (accessed December 19, 
2013).
4. Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption, 214; Karklins, The System Made Me Do It, 121; 
 Rose- Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 72, 80.
Signifi cantly increased salaries have been shown to reduce corruption among traffi c police in 
Georgia, although other reforms, including replacing most offi cers, providing new equipment, and 
adapting training,  were implemented at the same time. Lili di Puppo, “Police Reform in Georgia: 
Cracks in an Anti- Corruption Success Story,” U4 Anti- Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen 
Institute, 2010,  http:// www .u4 .no /document /publication .cfm ?3748=police -reform -in -georgia (ac-
cessed December 19, 2013); Lauren Horoschak, “Fighting Corruption in Saakashvili- Era Georgia: 
Successes, Challenges and Public Perceptions,” U4 Anti- Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen 
Institute, 2007,  http:// 158 .37 .161 .167 /training /incountry -open /Georgia -materials /saakashvili -georgia 
-horoschak -2007 .pdf (accessed December 19, 2013).
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initiate illicit exchanges. Higher salaries could meet offi cials’ economic needs, 
but greed may nonetheless encourage them to accept a bribe or other favor a 
citizen offers.
Unlike recommendations to reduce government monopolies and discretion, 
strategies that aim to increase offi cials’ accountability do consider the role of 
citizens. However, they consider citizens only as watchdogs, not as individuals 
who may also have an incentive to engage in corruption. According to these rec-
ommendations, increased transparency helps citizens to uncover corruption. 
Mea sures to increase transparency include a free press, civic organizations, com-
petitive elections, confl ict of interest and fi nancial disclosures, in de pen dent au-
diting, freedom of information acts, information about fees for government ser-
vices, and monitoring of party fi nancing.5 Advocates of this approach add that 
educating citizens about their rights and establishing laws to protect whistle- 
blowers make people more likely to publicize corruption that they have discov-
ered.6 The underlying idea is that by enabling citizens to uncover corruption and 
punish their leaders for it, the offi cials will be less likely to engage in it. The evi-
dence presented in this book, that citizens prefer not to engage in corruption 
and instead to search for other ways of meeting their needs, bodes both well 
and poorly for this anticorruption strategy. On the one hand, the evidence 
suggests that citizens are opposed to corruption and thus may be willing to 
serve as watchdogs. On the other hand, anticorruption campaigns that merely 
inform citizens that they have a right not to engage in corruption may have lit-
tle effect as citizens already consider corruption repugnant. Most important, ef-
forts to increase government accountability do not deal with the problem that 
citizens themselves have an incentive to engage in corruption, namely, to meet 
everyday needs. Increasing citizens’ role as watchdogs can help in reducing 
grand corruption but it will be less useful in decreasing corruption to meet 
everyday needs.
5. Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption, 201– 2, 204– 6, 208, 212; Karklins, The System Made Me 
Do It, 109, 111– 12;  Rose- Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 162– 74; World Bank, “Anticor-
ruption in Transition,” 40– 41, 44– 47.
Poor people in India have been able to use a freedom of information law, instead of corruption, 
to pressure government offi cials to distribute ration cards more effi ciently, although bribery remains 
the quickest approach. Leonid Peisakhin and Paul Pinto, “Is Transparency an Effective Anti- 
Corruption Strategy? Evidence from a Field Experiment in India,” Regulation and Governance 4 
(2010), 261– 80.
6. Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption, 208;  Rose- Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 162. 
Michael Johnston’s idea of deep demo cratization offers a framework for understanding how the po-
liti cal involvement of ordinary people can help combat corruption. Michael Johnston, Corruption, 
Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Demo cratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014).
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A weakness of all of the existing recommendations is that offi cials often prefer 
not to change a system in which they personally benefi t. Who is willing to imple-
ment the recommendations? Some advocates have suggested that international 
organizations and foreign countries can help. International anticorruption efforts 
in de pen dent of the target country seem most promising. Laws ending tax write- 
offs for bribes and prohibiting bribery outright can discourage foreign businesses 
from engaging in corruption. International efforts to reduce money- laundering 
can also be helpful.7 Direct international pressure on countries to reduce corrup-
tion, through foreign aid conditionality,8 is likely to meet with fewer successes 
because countries can refuse aid or hide corruption. For the same reason, it makes 
sense to focus attention on citizens, who would rather not engage in corruption 
and would instead prefer to meet their basic needs through other means.
Reduce the Incentive 
of Ordinary Citizens
For an anticorruption strategy to be effective it must not only acknowledge that 
ordinary citizens have an incentive to engage in corruption but also identify that 
incentive. This book found that meeting everyday needs is an incentive for citi-
zens to engage in corruption and that an absence of resources from the market, 
groups in society, and family members strengthens that incentive. To reduce or-
dinary citizens’ incentive to engage in corruption, it then follows that the mar-
ket, groups in society, and extended family must be able to generate and distrib-
ute goods and ser vices that individuals need. Creating effective market- enhancing 
institutions and reducing government restrictions on po liti cal groups are two 
ways to help achieve this.9
Market- enhancing institutions— “[r]ules, enforcement mechanisms, and or-
ganizations . . . [that] transmit information, enforce property rights and contracts, 
and manage competition”— can create substitute resources.10 For example, credit 
registries facilitate lending by private banks and other fi nancial institutions and 
thus meet the need for credit. This credit enables development and enlargement 
7. Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption, 203;  Rose- Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 185– 93.
8. Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption, 212– 13;  Rose- Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 183.
9. Citizens’ needs could also be met by introducing or reintroducing extensive state welfare 
programs. However, this approach expands opportunities for grand corruption. It is also not com-
patible with the market philosophy of international fi nancial institutions, which can be important 
resources for anticorruption programs.
10. This defi nition comes from World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institu-
tions for Markets (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4.
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of private businesses and groups in societies, such as charities. Antimonopoly 
policies, another example of a market- enhancing institution, reduce the prices 
of inputs, freeing private businesses’ capital for expansion. With expansion, pri-
vate businesses hire more people, and thus meet their needs for employment and 
money. A successful entrepreneur or an employed individual is more capable of 
meeting the needs of his or her own  house hold, providing for extended family, and 
making donations to groups in society. When the market, groups in society, and 
extended family can meet everyday needs, individuals do not need to offer bribes 
and other favors to government offi cials to try to obtain limited state resources.
Creating market- enhancing institutions is a plausible approach to combating 
corruption. International fi nancial institutions began advocating the develop-
ment of market- enhancing institutions in the early twenty- fi rst century, as part 
of what has come to be termed the post- Washington Consensus.11 This recom-
mendation, and the broader idea of the necessity of state economic involvement, 
has endured and even strengthened through the global economic crisis begin-
ning in 2008. According to a World Bank report, “[O]n the question of the re-
spective roles of the market and state, the crisis reinforces the past de cade’s 
movement toward a balanced, less ideological approach. This approach gives 
primacy to the private sector as driver of growth, employment, and productivity, 
but recognizes that government may need to create the road network, meta phor-
ical ly and literally, on which private fi rms can drive.”12 Although the primary 
goal is to increase economic growth, employment, and productivity, the devel-
opment of market- enhancing institutions should also help generate substitute 
resources and thus reduce corruption.13 Because campaigns to develop market- 
enhancing institutions have economic aims, they are likely more palatable to 
leaders who may take offense at outright foreign efforts to reduce corruption in 
their countries.
11. Washington Consensus originally referred to ten economic reform policies proposed by 
John Williamson of the Institute for International Economics in 1989. He believed politicians, bu-
reaucrats, scholars, and technocrats with international fi nancial institutions based in Washington, 
DC agreed that these  were good policies for Latin America. The term has evolved to mean initial 
market reform. It has also been used pejoratively by critics of market reform and U.S. foreign policy. 
John Williamson, “A Short History of the Washington Consensus,” in The Washington Consensus 
Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance, ed. Narcâis Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 14– 30.
12. F. Halsey Rogers, “The Global Financial Crisis and Development Thinking,” (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2010), 13.
13. One market- enhancing institution, an in de pen dent judiciary, has been identifi ed as useful 
by those who call for constraints on offi cials. Karklins, The System Made Me Do It, 112; 
 Rose- Ackerman, Corruption and Government, 151– 59; World Bank, “Anticorruption in Transition,” 
41. Michael Johnston proposes establishing other market- enhancing institutions as a way to reduce 
po liti cal and economic elites’ insecurity and, thus he argues, reduce corruption. Johnston, Syn-
dromes of Corruption, 208.
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For groups in society to reap the full benefi ts of market- enhancing institu-
tions, an additional anticorruption strategy may be necessary in some countries. 
Governments will have to reduce restrictions on religious organizations and secu-
lar charities as well as other groups in society. Although not the main obstacle in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, laws and government harassment prevent individu-
als in other countries of the world from forming groups and providing essential 
goods and ser vices. To the extent that the groups are simply charities and not also 
po liti cal groups, international development organizations can more effectively 
convince government leaders to allow them to operate. Advocating for freedom 
of or ga ni za tion in the name of poverty relief is less controversial than advocating 
for freedom of or ga ni za tion to combat corruption.
Citizens’ preference to avoid corruption to meet everyday needs bodes well 
for these two anticorruption strategies. If the market, groups in society, and ex-
tended family can meet their needs, individuals will avoid illicit exchanges with 
government offi cials. However, this begs the question: Will individuals use simi-
lar techniques to secure goods and ser vices from nongovernmental institutions, 
particularly markets and societal groups? Will reducing corrupt exchanges be-
tween citizens and government offi cials simply shift illicit practices to the private 
sector? Conceivably individuals could offer bribes and use personal connections, 
for example, to try to obtain credit from private banks or charitable organiza-
tions. Promises of po liti cal support, by contrast, would only be useful if market 
actors and representatives of societal groups sought po liti cal offi ce. However, the 
risks and implications of corruption in the nongovernmental sphere are not as 
great. Citizens would have less incentive to use illicit strategies in their interac-
tions with market actors and societal groups because of the existence of multiple 
sources for obtaining essential goods and ser vices. This is in contrast to the pres-
ent where limited alternatives to the state encourage citizens to use illicit tech-
niques to gain an advantage in the competition for government goods and ser-
vices. To the extent that corruption does occur in citizens’ interactions with 
market actors and societal groups, the negative po liti cal consequences are mini-
mized. Private fi nancial institutions, religious organizations, and charities are 
not government bodies, so illicit exchanges with them are less likely to reduce 
government legitimacy and effectiveness, as po liti cal corruption typically does.
Because corruption to meet everyday needs is not the only form of corrup-
tion, strategies to create alternative sources of essential goods and ser vices can-
not eradicate all corruption. Some individuals, whether ordinary citizens or gov-
ernment offi cials, engage in corruption not to survive, but to gain an advantage. 
Moreover, corruption can be grand, involving exchanges of large amounts of 
money and goods between businesses and po liti cal elites. Corruption can also 
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exist outside of the spheres of politics and basic needs, for example, in universi-
ties. Because of the varieties of corruption, other strategies are also needed.
In fact, even to combat corruption to meet everyday needs, a multipronged 
approach can be useful. Both citizens and offi cials can initiate corruption, so it is 
important that anticorruption programs address both parties. Prior anticorrup-
tion recommendations do not directly address the problem of corruption to meet 
everyday needs, and they focus on government offi cials’ motivations, as described 
above. Some recommendations  were developed with only grand corruption in 
mind, and some of these can actually promote petty corruption. Other recom-
mendations are applicable to both types of corruption, and, by focusing on gov-
ernment offi cials’ incentive, may serve as a useful complement to those presented 
in this book.
When multiple anticorruption strategies are used to reduce corruption to 
meet everyday needs, in what order should they be introduced? The strengthen-
ing of markets and groups in society should precede reforms of the government. 
This approach would address the root causes of this form of corruption. Changes 
to the government, such as further downsizing, can actually increase corruption 
for meeting everyday needs when substitute resources are not available. More-
over, increased salaries would be wasted, at least on government offi cials who 
seek income beyond their needs; they would continue to be receptive to citizens’ 
offers of bribes and other favors. And citizens will not hold government offi cials 
accountable if, in order to survive, they need these offi cials to participate in illicit 
exchanges. Only once substitute resources are available to citizens should reform 
turn to decreasing the resources available to offi cials, reducing their discretion, 
and increasing their accountability.
Continued Corruption in Central Asia
The likelihood is slim that corruption to meet everyday needs in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan will diminish in the near future. Efforts to develop market- enhancing 
institutions have been minimal: the governments have neither established public 
credit registries nor offered incentives for the development of private credit bu-
reaus. Moreover, government competition policies have not improved. The growth 
of predatory lending has made credit available to a larger number of people but 
this will not be a long- term alternative to state assistance. Furthermore, neither 
government has made a genuine effort to tackle everyday corruption. Anticor-
ruption efforts by the government of Kyrgyzstan have focused on grand corrup-
tion, and many anticorruption pronouncements have merely been plays to retain 
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or acquire po liti cal power. The government of Kazakhstan has done even less to 
fi ght corruption.
Credit, which is important to meeting basic needs, has been more readily 
available in both countries thanks to predatory lending. Poor coverage by credit 
registries and credit bureaus and weak regulation of the microcredit industry has 
enabled this expansion. Unscrupulous microcredit companies lend to individu-
als who otherwise have not been able to obtain credit. They lend at exorbitant 
rates and often in a nontransparent manner. This credit is only a short- term al-
ternative to state assistance, however. Microcredit industry watchers predict 
widespread loan defaults and microcredit company bankruptcy. Under this sce-
nario borrowers not only lose their alternative to the state assistance but also face 
greater impoverishment.
Fortunately, a rosier scenario is imaginable because the governments of Ka-
zakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have recognized the dangers of predatory lending. The 
Kazakhstani parliament is considering legislation to regulate the industry, and the 
Kyrgyzstani National Bank has closed some unscrupulous microfi nance compa-
nies. These efforts may help the countries to avoid a bursting microfi nance bubble. 
However, if government regulation increases, credit- lending will likely contract, 
also robbing many citizens of their alternative to state assistance.
The governments could compensate for the likely decrease in credit- lending 
by developing credit registries or offering incentives to lenders to do so. Credit 
information about potential borrowers would enable fi nancial institutions to 
lend to more people responsibly. As people have borrowed through private and 
government microcredit programs, they have begun to develop credit histories. 
With this information, private banks can evaluate which individuals pose a suffi -
ciently low risk to be worth lending to. Even with improved coverage, all individu-
als will not be eligible to obtain credit, as some potential borrowers may nonethe-
less be too risky. However, improved credit registry or credit bureau coverage 
would expand the number of eligible borrowers.
Unfortunately, little evidence indicates that the government will promote 
credit registries or credit bureaus. So far the governments have not developed 
public credit registries, even though offi cials have been aware that their absence 
has stymied economic growth, particularly in rural areas. The best hope is for 
private credit bureaus: private credit bureaus have begun to grow, covering ap-
proximately 46 percent and 32 percent of the adult populations of Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, respectively, in 2013.14 The nonprofi t microcredit institutions 
14. International Finance Corporation and Bank, “Doing Business: Mea sur ing Business Regula-
tions,”  http:// www .doingbusiness .org /custom -query (accessed December 19, 2013).
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have contributed to this growth; however, other players in the microcredit and 
banking industry, including the governments, have been reluctant to share in-
formation. A dramatic expansion of private credit bureaus coupled with sound 
government restrictions on predatory lending is the most likely way citizens will 
be able to obtain the credit they need to meet their everyday needs and thus to 
avoid engaging in corruption with government offi cials.
Whereas the slow development of market- enhancing institutions is discour-
aging, the trend of decreasing poverty bodes well for a reduction in corruption. 
People who are fi nancially secure can help their extended families. From 2002 to 
2009, the latest year for which statistics are available for both countries, the pro-
portion of people living on less than 2 USD per day dropped from 22 percent 
to 1 percent in Kazakhstan and from 67 percent to 22 percent in Kyrgyzstan.15
The global economic recession may, however, reverse this trend, particularly 
in Kyrgyzstan. Farmers in Kyrgyzstan have had greater diffi culty obtaining credit 
during the recession, even with the growth in predatory lending. Furthermore, 
prices for their products, particularly meat, fell, because people in Kazakhstan, a 
major market, began to eat less. Migrant workers lost their jobs in Rus sia and 
Kazakhstan and returned home to Kyrgyzstan. Even when Rus sia began to re-
cover and job opportunities returned, migrant workers faced a new obstacle to 
fi nding employment in the country. Those who seek citizenship in order to work 
in Rus sia encounter additional paperwork and a year- long pro cess, instead of 
three months. And applicants cannot leave Rus sia during that period.16 Most 
recently Rus sia adopted a law requiring migrants to pass a Russian- language 
exam to work in ser vice industries. With the decline of the education system after 
the collapse of the Soviet  Union, rural Kazakhs and Kyrgyz receive inadequate or 
no Russian- language instruction in their home countries making this new work 
requirement daunting.17 Even if they cannot mitigate the effects of the new Rus-
sian policies, the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan may be able to 
stem some of the gloomy effects of the global recession. Kazakhstan’s government 
created an 18 billion USD stimulus package, mostly from its oil fund, and Kyr-
gyzstan’s agreed to a 100 million USD stimulus package from the International 
Monetary Fund.18
15. This statistic is called the “Poverty headcount ratio at $2 per day,” and it is expressed in U.S. 
dollars at 2005 international prices. World Bank, “World Databank,”  http:// databank .worldbank 
. org /ddp /home .do (accessed December 19, 2013).
16. Chris Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan: Rus sia Multiplying Citizenship Hurdles,” EurasiaNet, De-
cember 1, 2011,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /64622 (accessed December 19, 2013).
17. “Kyrgyzstan: Labor Migrants Grapple with Russian- Language Requirement,” EurasiaNet, 
February 1, 2013,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /66491 (accessed December 19, 2013).
18. Igor Gorbachev, “Kyrgyzstan Steels Itself for Slowdown,” Institute for War and Peace Re-
porting, January 11, 2009,  http:// iwpr .net /report -news /kyrgyzstan -steels -itself -slowdown (accessed 
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The decrease in poverty, growth of private credit bureaus, and the expansion 
of credit have so far not been signifi cant enough to reduce corruption, at least as 
mea sured by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Since 
private credit bureaus emerged in the mid- 2000s, Kazakhstan’s corruption rating 
has hovered between 2.1 and 2.9, on a scale of zero to 10, or 21 to 29, as Transpar-
ency International began to present its scores in 2012 on a scale of zero to 100. 
Kyrgyzstan’s has oscillated in the range of 1.8 to 2.4 (or 18 to 24).19 It is important 
to keep in mind that Transparency International’s ratings capture both grand and 
petty corruption.
Kyrgyzstan periodically undertakes national anticorruption efforts, but they 
have not yet reduced petty corruption. The target of the campaigns has been 
grand corruption, and the purpose often has been to undermine opponents of 
the regime as much as to actually reduce corruption. Frustration over po liti cal 
elites’ corruption, as well as creeping authoritarianism, fueled the pop u lar pro-
tests that ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2010, as well as President 
Askar Akayev in 2005. In response, interim president Roza Otunbayeva initiated 
an anticorruption campaign. Criminal cases  were opened against top offi cials in 
the Bakiyev administration for stealing state assets including hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in Rus sian aid.20 Anticorruption efforts in economic sectors 
with foreign investment, such as mining, show some signs of success. Foreign 
businesspeople have reported that bribes are less essential to negotiating and 
implementing transactions.21 Two small glimmers of hope are evident for re-
ducing both petty and grand corruption. First, a few public advisory councils, 
voluntary watchdog groups legislated by the government to monitor ministries 
and state agencies, have increased transparency and improved ser vices, although 
most have had no effect.22 Second, the government plans to fi ll positions in the 
state agency responsible for granting mining licenses with specialists instead of 
patronage appointees.23 Connections to government offi cials would no longer 
guarantee positions in this agency.
December 19, 2013); Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Astana Acts to Bolster Banks and Contain Rising 
Unemployment,” EurasiaNet, January 21, 2009,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /departments /insightb 
/ articles /eav012209 .shtml (accessed December 19, 2013).
19. Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index,”  http:// www .transparency .org 
(accessed December 19, 2013).
20. Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: Corruption Crackdown Intensifi es in Bishkek,” EurasiaNet, 
November 2, 2010,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /62287 (accessed December 19, 2013).
21. Chris Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan: Bishkek Missing out on Gold Bonanza,” EurasiaNet, Sep-
tember 12, 2011,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /64161 (accessed December 19, 2013).
22. Chris Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan: Demo cratization Initiative Losing Steam?” EurasiaNet, Au-
gust 13, 2013,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /67381 (accessed December 19, 2013).
23. Chris Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan: Mining Sector in Nationalists’ Crosshairs,” EurasiaNet, Oc-
tober 9, 2012,  http:// www .eurasianet .org /node /66026 (accessed December 19, 2013).
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The likelihood that these anticorruption mea sures or any others will enjoy 
great success is small, however. The corruption allegation as a po liti cal tool has 
returned in full force after a brief hiatus under Otunbayeva. Upon selection as 
interim president, Otunbayeva agreed not to compete for the regular position so 
anticorruption allegations  were less useful to her. Since her administration, po-
liti cal elites have been slinging charges of corruption at one another once again. 
Their aim is to retain power or secure po liti cal positions in order to protect their 
business interests. Most recently, a fl urry of corruption accusations brought 
down Prime Minister Omurbek Babanov in 2012. In Kyrgyzstan, the extent to 
which any anticorruption mea sure is genuine is questionable.
By contrast, in Kazakhstan anticorruption mea sures and allegations have 
been less common. Struggle among po liti cal elites has been minimized in part 
because President Nursultan Nazarbayev has managed to maintain relative eth-
nic harmony among Kazakhs and the signifi cant Rus sian minority and has dis-
tributed some of the gains from the country’s profi table oil industry. When car-
rots do not work, the administration has used sticks. For example, in 2012 the 
government seized the property of the only healthy opposition force, the Alga! 
po liti cal party, and sentenced its leader to jail. The alleged crimes  were that the 
opposition sought to overthrow the government and incite protests among oil 
workers. Perhaps another po liti cal entrepreneur will try to harness growing dis-
content among oil workers as a means to secure power. In this scenario, compe-
tition among po liti cal elites could grow and anticorruption efforts as a po liti cal 
tool could become prominent. However, it is likely that before that came to pass 
the individuals would face prison time.
In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as in other parts of the world, multiple factors 
can fuel corruption. However, in order to understand and combat corruption it 
is important to recognize that neither offi cials’ demands, the absence of sanc-
tions, convention, nor economic need automatically propels citizens into illicit 
exchanges with government offi cials. Rather, ordinary citizens engage in cor-
ruption when market actors, groups in society, and family members cannot pro-
vide the resources they need. When market reform occurs in countries with a 
legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention and absent or weak market- 
enhancing institutions, goods and ser vices from nonstate sources are limited. By 




This appendix presents details about the statistical analysis that informed the 
conclusions described in the Rest of the World section of chapter four. Specifi -
cally, it explains how I tested for the infl uence of market reform, market- 
enhancing institutions, and a legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention 
on corruption; market reform’s effect on corruption conditional on the other 
two factors; and the effects of alternative explanations.
The fi rst statistical analysis I conducted demonstrates strong support for the 
importance of the two conditions, a legacy of signifi cant state economic inter-
vention and market- enhancing institutions. Regression analysis suggests that 
countries with weaker legacies of state economic intervention and more effective 
market- enhancing institutions have less corruption. For the calculation, I re-
gressed the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) variable on the legacy, market- 
enhancing institutions, and market reform variables. This model, in Table A.1, 
shows that legacy and market- enhancing institutions are signifi cant at the .01 
level, meaning that there is less than 1 percent chance of obtaining the result when 
no relationship exists. The magnitude of the effects is relatively small. A one- unit 
increase in the legacy and market- enhancing variables represent a 5 percent in-
crease and approximately a .3 percent increase, respectively, in the range of actual 
CPI scores. The small size likely refl ects the facts that the CPI score is only a rough 
proxy for petty corruption and that many factors infl uence corruption.
TABLE A.1. Corruption Perceptions Index 
regressed on legacy, market- enhancing 
 institutions, and market reform variables for 
countries of the world
MODEL 1 CPI SE
Legacy .410** .069
Market- enhancing institutions .020** .005




** = p < .01.
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This regression also indicates that countries with more market reform have 
less corruption. The market reform variable is also signifi cant at the .01 level. My 
argument, however, indicates that market reform’s effect depends on the degree 
of state economic intervention historically and the extent of market- enhancing 
institutions currently. So, I conducted further tests that enable me to examine 
market reform’s effect conditional on these two factors.
I conducted a series of four regressions. I fi rst split the data set into two to 
explore how the degree of state economic intervention historically affects market 
reform’s infl uence on corruption when market- enhancing institutions are ab-
sent or weak and when they are effective. One data set had only countries with 
no or weak market- enhancing institutions, meaning that less than 20 percent of 
the adult population was included in public credit registries or private credit 
bureaus. The other data set included countries where the proportion was 20 per-
cent or higher. Then in each data set I regressed CPI on the legacy and market 
reform variables and a variable I created to mea sure the interaction between the 
two. Likewise, to explore how the extent of market- enhancing institutions infl u-
ences market reform’s effect on corruption when state economic intervention 
was historically strong and when it was weak, I split the data set in two. One data 
set contained only countries with signifi cant state economic intervention, mean-
ing they scored a zero on the index. The other data set included countries where 
the number was higher than zero. Then in each of these data sets I regressed CPI 
on the market- enhancing institutions and market reform variables and a vari-
able I created to mea sure the interaction between the two.
The results of these four regressions are presented in Tables A.2 and A.3. These 
fi ndings are also the basis for Table 4.13 in chapter four. The fi rst table includes 
the analysis from the data sets that are split depending on the strength of market- 
enhancing institutions, and the second table includes the analysis from the data 
sets that are split depending on the presence or absence of a state intervention 
legacy. At the bottom of each table are predicted effects. Specifi cally, Table A.2 
shows the effect of market reform conditional on whether market- enhancing in-
stitutions are effective or weak or absent, and Table A.3 shows the effect of market 
reform conditional on whether a legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention 
is present or absent.
With the limited data, model 2 tests my argument that market reform in-
creases corruption when market- enhancing institutions are weak or absent and 
a state economic intervention legacy is present. The results, however, are not as 
expected, most likely because the CPI mea sures both grand and petty corrup-
tion. The model shows that when market- enhancing institutions are weak, the 
result is an interaction effect between a legacy of state intervention and market 
reform, such that market reform reduces corruption when a state economic in-
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tervention legacy is present and increases it when a state economic intervention 
legacy is absent. Market reform most likely decreases corruption, as mea sured 
by the CPI, even when a legacy is present, because it reduces government offi -
cials’ opportunities to engage in grand corruption, as the overbearing state the-
ory would predict. As signifi cant state economic intervention is reduced even 
without effective market- enhancing institutions, the net effect is to reduce the 
TABLE A.2. Corruption Perceptions Index regressed on legacy and market 
reform variables for countries of the world
MARKET- ENHANCING INSTITUTIONS
MODEL 2 SE MODEL 3 SE
NONE/WEAK EFFECTIVE
Legacy .597** .083 .337** .138
Market reform .123* .071 .114 .143
Legacy × market reform −.038† .024 .016 .025
Constant 1.774 .444 3.581 1.123
Observations 40 52
R-squared .632 .214
** = p < .01; * = p < .05; † = p < .10.
The effect of market reform on corruption
When legacy = 0 (high intervention) .123 (decrease) NA
When legacy = 10 (low intervention) −.257 (increase) NA
(“Increase” and “decrease” are expressed in terms of level of corruption not the CPI scale, where 
an increase in CPI means a decrease in corruption.)
The effect of market reform on corruption
When m-e institutions = 0 (absent or weak) .095 (decrease) −.308 (increase)
When m-e institutions = 134.4 (effective) .095 (decrease)  .230 (decrease)
(“Increase” and “decrease” are expressed in terms of level of corruption not the CPI scale, where 
an increase in CPI means a decrease in corruption.)
TABLE A.3. Corruption Perceptions Index regressed on market- enhancing (M-E) 
institutions and market reform variables for countries of the world
LEGACY
MODEL 4 SE MODEL 5 SE
PRESENT ABSENT
Market- enhancing institutions .034** .014 .014† .009
Market reform .095† .060 −.308* .146
M-E institutions × market reform .000 .002 .004* .002
Constant 2.089 .382 5.194 .629
Observations 33 59
R-squared .560 .250
** = p < .01; * = p < .05; † = p < .10.
174     APPENDIX
CPI value because it includes grand corruption. The negative effect on petty cor-
ruption that my argument predicts is perhaps masked by the positive effect on 
grand corruption.
The additional fi nding from model 2 that market reform increases corrup-
tion when both a legacy and market- enhancing institutions are absent or weak is 
consistent with my argument and with grand corruption theories. My argument 
emphasizes the importance of market- enhancing institutions, and grand cor-
ruption theories highlight that market reform offers government offi cials new 
opportunities to engage in illicit exchanges, regardless of the history of state in-
tervention.
More technically, model 2 shows that the legacy, market reform, and interac-
tion effect variables are signifi cant at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
When seven additional countries, which lack data on the natural resources vari-
able, are included in this analysis these variables are signifi cant at the .01 level. 
The results  here indicate that with a maximum level of state economic interven-
tion (legacy = 0) market reform has a positive effect, and a one- unit increase in 
market reform increases the CPI score by .123 (meaning slightly less corruption). 
With no legacy of state economic intervention (legacy = 10), market reform has 
a negative effect, and a one- unit increase in market reform reduces the CPI score 
by .257 (meaning somewhat more corruption). Remember, a higher number for 
CPI represents less corruption. In model 3, market reform is not statistically 
signifi cant, meaning it has no infl uence on corruption when market- enhancing 
institutions are effective. So, I did not calculate predicted effects.
Now let us consider the analysis where the data set is split depending on 
whether a legacy of signifi cant state economic intervention is present or absent. 
These results appear in Table A.3. They are consistent with the fi ndings described 
above. Specifi cally, in model 4, where the legacy is present, the interactive term is 
not signifi cant, so market- enhancing institutions do not infl uence market re-
form’s effect on corruption when a legacy is present. Instead, market reform 
consistently decreases corruption when a legacy is present.1 Model 5 again shows 
the importance of market- enhancing institutions to reducing corruption. With 
no market- enhancing institutions, a one- unit increase in market reform in-
creases corruption, reducing the CPI score by .308. However, with the maximum 
number of market- enhancing institutions in the data set (a score of 134.4), each 
one- unit increase in market reform increases the CPI score by .230, indicating a 
reduction in corruption. When the additional seven countries are included, all 
three variables reach the .01 level of statistical signifi cance.
1. With the inclusion of the additional seven countries, the market reform variable is signifi -
cant at the .05 level.
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Including the alternative explanations in the statistical analysis indicates that 
the argument is not spurious. For the calculation, I regressed CPI on the legacy, 
market- enhancing institutions, market reform, state regulation, poverty, and 
natural resource endowment variables. Model 6 in Table A.4 shows that the 
market- enhancing variable remains signifi cant at the .01 level. So, none of the 
three alternative explanations, even though they  were the leading contenders, 
can account for all of my explanatory factors and corruption. This result offers 
strong evidence that my argument is not spurious. Moreover, the result shows 
that a weakness or absence of market- enhancing institutions does, in fact, con-
tribute to a higher level of corruption. With a signifi cance level of .10, the chance 
of obtaining the result when no relationship actually exists is less than 10 percent. 
The magnitude of the effects remains small, likely because the CPI score is only a 
rough proxy for petty corruption. A one- unit increase in the market- enhancing 
institutions variable represents a .2 percent increase in the range of actual CPI 
scores, so its effect did grow smaller.
The coeffi cient for the legacy variable drops substantially from .410 to .079, 
and the market reform variable loses signifi cance, as a comparison of models 6 
and 1 in Table A.4 indicates. A possible explanation for these changes is the in-
troduction of the state regulation variable, which is signifi cant at the .01 level. 
Logically, the legacy and state regulation variables could be related as they both 
mea sure state economic intervention. High state economic intervention, mea-
sured as deposits in state banks relative to private banks in 1975, could contrib-
ute to high state regulation, mea sured as the number of procedures to register a 
business in 2009. Including the intervening variable of state regulation in the 
analysis reduces the effect of the antecedent legacy variable. As models 2 through 
TABLE A.4. Corruption Perceptions Index regressed on legacy, 
 market- enhancing institutions, market reform, state regulation, poverty, 
and natural resource endowment variables for countries of the world
MODEL 6 CPI SE MODEL 1 CPI SE
Legacy .079† .052 .410** .069
Market- enhancing institutions .015** .003 .020** .005
Market reform .015 .044 .158** .064
State regulation −.160** .036 — —
Poverty .00006754** .000 — —
Natural resource endowment −.00000001705 .000 — —
Constant 3.850 .505 1.764 .490
Observations 92 92
R-squared .816 .520
** = p < .01; * = p < .05; † = p < .10.
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4 demonstrated, the market reform and legacy variables interact, so market re-
form lost its signifi cance once the legacy variable was included. Unfortunately, 
the data set has too few cases to test for additional interactions, such as between 
the state regulation and legacy variables.
More broadly, this model indicates that my explanatory factors are only suf-
fi cient, not necessary, for corruption. Besides state regulation, poverty is another 
factor that contributes to corruption. The results indicate that the more proce-
dures required to start a business and the lower GDP per capita the higher the 
level of corruption. Remember that the higher the CPI score, the lower the level 
of corruption. Like state regulation, poverty is signifi cant at the .01 level. The 
magnitude of the effects is small for state regulation and minuscule for poverty. A 
one- unit increase in the state regulation variable represents a 2 percent decrease 
in the range of actual CPI scores. A one- unit increase in the poverty variable, 
meaning an increase in GDP, represents a .0009 increase in the range of actual 
CPI scores. The natural resource endowment variable is not statistically signifi -
cant, meaning that there is no evidence that this variable has an effect on the cor-
ruption variable.
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